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PREFACE
The delegates to the 1971-1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention will need historical, legal and comparative
Recognizing
information about the Montana Constitution.
this need, the 1971 Legislative Assembly created the
Constitutional Convention Commission and directed it to
assemble and prepare essential information for the Convention.
To fulfill this responsibility, the Constitutional Convention
Commission is preparing this series of reports.
This report, a collection of readings on the nature and purpose of state constitutions, was prepared under the supervision of the Commission's Research Committee consisting of
Dr. Ellis Waldron, Chairman; Bruce R. Toole; Jack E. Brenner;
and Charles L. Harrington.

The selection of readings is designed to provide a broad background for the delegates of contemporary thought on the nature
and purpose of state constitutions.
Although all items selected
are published in other sources, the Commission felt that the
collection of these essays into a single volume would be especially useful to the delegates. The Commission's appreciation
is extended to the various authors and publishers who so graciously granted permission to use the selections contained
herein.

This report is respectfully submitted to the people of Montana
and their delegates to the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention.

ALEXANDER BLEWETT
CHAIRMAN
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Constitution states or ought to state not rules
for the passing hour but principles for an expanding future.

A

Justice Cardozo

Constitution to contain an accurate detail of
all the subdivisions of which its great powers
will admits and of all the means by which they
may be carried into execution^ would partake of
a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely
he embraced by the human mind.
It would probably
never be understood by the public.
Its nature,
therefore, requires that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects be deduced from the nature of the
objects themselves
In considering this
question, then we must never forget that it is
a Constitution we are expounding
A

Chief Justice Marshall
McCulloch V. Maryland
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GENERAL DATA ON STATE CONSTITUTIONS

.

CHAPTER

I

TWO CENTURIES OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING
By Albert L. Sturm

The first state constitutions date from the period of the
American Revolution, and most of them were framed immediately before or soon after the Declaration of Independence.
A few states made alterations in their colonial charters
and used them as constitutions.
These early documents reflected a basic belief, that, at best, government is evil
In philosophy they expressed
and should be restrained.
eighteenth-century revolutionary ideals. These and later
documents embodied basic principles of political democracy.
Their leading characteristics were popular sovereignty,
limited government which is implemented through the familiar tripartite separation of powers, a system of checks
and balances, a bill of rights and legislative dominance.
In addition they generally set forth the organization,
powers and procedures of the three governmental departments in varying detail, defined state boundaries, described the relationship of the state to the national government, specified suffrage qualifications and the manner of
conducting elections, and provided the method of amendment
Except for a few local jurisdictions in
and revision.
Europe, the new American states had the only republican form
of government in existence during the last decades of the
eighteenth century.

The original state constitutions were short, rarely containing more than 5,000 words, and demonstrated the principle
that the basic law should be restricted to fundamental matters.
Developments of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, however, produced many changes reflecting new political, economic and social conditions, and problems of
the growing nation.
Much verbiage in state constitutions

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
Albert L. Sturm.
"Two Centuries of Constitution-Making."
Part of Chapter I in Thirty Years of State ConstitutionMaking: 1938 1968 pp. 4-15. New York:
National Municipal
League 1970 (Revised and updated to 19 71)
,

,
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reflects the diversity and complexity of functional growth,
exemplified in such areas as finance, education, highways,
welfare, agriculture and labor.

Significant factors that contributed to the growth in length,
detail and restrictive contents of state constitutions include:
population growth and urbanization; expansion of popular participation in public affairs through the extension
of the suffrage, increase in the number of elective officers,
and adoption in some states of the initiative and referendum;
industrialization; technological development, particularly in
transportation and communication; and resultant growth in the
magnitude and complexity of state functions and responsibilities.
Also of primary importance was the change in the people's conception of the proper role of government in modern
society.
Initially, it was minimal; today the extensive protective, regulatory and service activities of the states
clearly indicate the growing popular demand for positive government.
State constitutional growth has occurred through writing new
constitutions, amending and revising existing documents,
usage and interpretation.
Liberal construction of delegated
powers has been the principal method of national constitutional development; in contrast, the states have relied mainly on formal amendment, revision and rewriting, which have
produced lengthy documents featured by massive detail. In
large measure the dynamic factors contributing to big government account for the length and detail of state constitutions.
New functions and programs require provision tor
expanded governmental machinery; state decision-makers have
often insisted that implementing apparatus have a constitutional basis. Much detail is attributable to the popular
distrust of legislatures resulting from abuses and excesses
of these bodies during the nineteenth century.
Other reasons
for the growth of state constitutions include:
public dissatisfaction with strict judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions, the pressure of special interests for
constitutional status, and faulty drafting. American experience indicates that lengthy constitutions tend to breed
more amendatory detail.
Of special significance in state constitutional development
are the restrictive provisions that obstruct the adaptation
of state government to changing needs and conditions.
Under
the terms of the federal constitution, the states possess
residual or reserve powers; except as expressly limited by
the constitution and by assignment of power to the national
government, the writers of state charters are relatively free
-2-
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to prescribe the structure and authority of state organs.
The trend in the past has been to impose numerous and excessive restrictions on governmental agents, particularly
Thus, most state constitutions are
the lawmaking body.
of
governmental limitations rather than
essentially systems
for
achieving social objectives.
instruments
positive

A related characteristic of most state constitutions is
In
inclusion of much nonfundamental or transitory material.
theory constitutional provisions are presumed to include
only organic features of permanent character and sufficient
significance to warrant placement in the basic law. Actually,
with most state documents, any effort to distinguish constitutional from statutory law on the basis of fundamental
character is doomed to failure.
Both stability and flexibility are generally regarded as
Constitutionfundamental attributes of a sound constitution.
al stability provides the necessary basis for the ongoing
work of public policymaking and execution. When developed
to an excessive degree, however, stability hardens into rigidity which prevents government from responding to popular
demands.
Flexibility, although obviously a laudable and
necessary feature, can also be carried too far. Amendment
and revision procedures that raise constitutional changes
little above the level of ordinary legislation tend to produce documents with much statutory-type content.
The detailed
and restrictive language of most state documents leaves far
less freedom for constitutional growth by interpretation than
Formal methods
the provisions of the federal constitution.
of constitutional change, therefore, have been much more
important in the states than on the national scene.

Table 1 provides general information on American state constitutions up to January 1, 1971. The first three columns
contain basically historical data, indicating the number and
dates of adoption of all state constitutions and identifying
those documents that were promulgated and became effective
without submission to the electorate. The last two columns
list the effective dates of all present constitutions and
their estimated length as amended.

-3-

TWO CENTURIES OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING
TABLE 1

GENERAL DATA ON STATE CONSTITUTIONS

As of January 1 , 1972"

Sta te

I

Number
of
Cons ti tu tiona

Alabama

6

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas

1
1
5

Ca 1 i torn ia
coioraclo
Connecticut
Delaware

2
1
46
4

F'loricla

6

Georgia

8

Hc1wa ii
Idaho
1IIino1s
Indian.:i
Iowa

10

A

I

1
4

2
2

Conat1-tut1-ons
Effective
without Submission
to Voters

Datec of
Adoe,tion
1819, 1861, 1865,
1875, 1901
1956
1911
1836, 1861 , 1864,
1874
1849, 1879
1876
1638, 1662 , 1818,
1776, 1792 , 1831,
1839,
1885,
1777,
1865,
1950

1868,

1868,

1965
1897

1861, 1865, 1868,
1968
1789, 1798, 1861,
1868, 1877, 1945
(official 1959)
!889
1818, 1848, 1870, 1970
I8I6, IS51
1846, 1857

Effect1-ve
Date
of Precent
Constitution

Estimated Length
of Preaent Cons titution (I-lords)

1819, 1861, 1865

1901

95,000

1836, 1861

1959
1912
1874

12 000
24,500
45,900

1879
1876
1965
1897

62,000
32,800
7,960
20,000

1969

15,200

1945

47,500C

1959
1889
1971
1851
1857

15,000

1662
1776, 1792, 1831,
1897
1861, 1865
1777, 1789, 1798,
1865
1818
1816

aTable updated to January 1, 1972 and slightly revised.
bincluding ttThe Fundamental Orderstt of 1638-39 and the Royal Charter of 1662.
cThis figure excludes the extensive verbiage in the local amendments.
dAs a kingdom and a republic, llawaii had 5 constitutions.

n, ooo

15,000
10,400
11,300
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TABLE 1 (Continued)

S ta te

Number
of
Co nst it u tion s

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

I
U1

I

Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Mich1.9:an
Minnesota
Mississiepi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Ne vada
Ne w Hampshire
New J e rsei
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Da kota

1
4
10
1
4
1
4
1
4
4
1
2
1
2
3
1
4
2I
1

Dat e s of
Ado -e_t ion
1792,
1812,
1864,
1913,
1776,
1835,
1817,
1820,
1866,
1776,
1776,
1777,
1776,

1859
1799, 1850, 1891
1845, 1852, 1861,
1868, 1879, 1898,
1921,
1819
1851, 1864, 1867
1780
1850, 1908, 1963
1857
1832, 1869, 1890
1865, 1875, 1945
1889
1875
1864
1784
1844, 1947
1912
1822, 1846, 1894
1868f
1889

Co ns tt. tu tt. o n :.;
Effe c t iv e
wi th o u t S ubmission
t o Vo t e r s
1792, 1799
1812, 1861, 1898,
1913, 1921
1776

1817, 1832, 1890
1820

1776
1776
1777
1776

Effe c tt. ve
Date
Estimated Len Jtii
of Present of Present Consti Constitution
tution (Words)
1861
1892
1921
1820
1867
1780
1964
1858
1890
1945
1889
1875
1864
1784
1948
1912
1895
1868
1889

8 , 500
21,500
253,800
12,950
40,368
17,2oo e
19,510
15,065
22,286
30,951
22,000
19, 0 00
17,000
12,200
15,001)
24 , 000
5 0 , 000
19 , 375
20, 000

eExclusive of nullifi e d material, which would bring total to app r oximat e l y 34,4 00 wo rds .
fT he constitution of 1776 was revised in 1835, and th e constitution o f 1 86 8 was extensively
revised in 1876, resulting in the claim by some that North Carolina has had 4 constitu t ion s .
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TABLE I

State

I
(j\

I

Numbe r'
of
Constitutions

Ohio
Oklahoma
Ore9:on
Pennsylvania
Rhode Isiand
South Carolina

2
1
1
4
2
7

Soutn oal<ota
Tenne sse e
Te x as

3

Utah
Vermont
Virginia

1
3
6

1vashin9ton
We st Vir9: i n ia
Wisconsin
1vyomin9
Pu e rto Ric o

1
2
1
1
1

Da tes o f
Ado-e_t i on
1802,1851
1776,
1663,
1776,
1865,

I
5

1796,
1845,
1876

1907
1857
1790, 1838, 1873
IS42
1778, 1790, 1861,
1868, 1895
HiS9
1834, 1870
1861, 1866, 1869,

1895
1777, 1786, 1793
1776, 1830, 1851, 1867,
1902, 1970
1889
1863, 1872
1848
1889
1952

(Continued)

Const1,tut1-ons
Eff ect ive
without S ubmissi on
to Vo teI's
1802
177 6, 1790
1776, 1778, 1790,
1861, 1865, 1895
1796

1777, 1786, 1793
1776, 1902

Eff ect1,v e
Es timated Length
Date
o f PI' esent of PI'esent Consti Co n s t i tuti o n
tution ( WoI'ds)
1851
1907
1859
1874
1843
1895

32,400
63,170
23,400
13,750
16,000
33,000

1999
1870
1876

25,000
11,500
46,000

1896
1793
1971

20,600
5,000
17,000

1889
1872
1848
1890
1952

30,000
22,600
11,000
15,600
9,000

TWO CENTURIES OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING

NUMBER OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
American states have probably had more experience in constitution-making and revision than all other governments of the
world combined until the accession of new countries to nationhood during the last decade.
In the course of our national
history to January 1, 1970, the 50 states had operated 141
constitutions, excluding the constitution of Puerto Rico
adopted in 1952 and effective since that date. As Table 1
indicates, the documents in operation at the end of 19 5 8 had
been amended thousands of times, to say nothing of those that
preceded them.
Indeed, during the last two centuries, American states have been the world's principal potential laboratory for experimentation in the formulation of written constitutions.
On the whole, however, there have been relatively few radical departures from a general constitutional pattern.

Table 1 indicates that 49 of the 141 constitutions became
effective without submission to the voters.
It is noteworthy,
however, that 23, or almost half, antedate 1800 and include
most of the constitutions of the original states. The practice of proclaiming constitutions in effect without a referendum continued into the nineteenth century. But, significantly, only seven of the documents that became operative
since the Civil War were not submitted to the voters, and of
these only three since 1900— two in Louisiana (1913 and 1921)
and the Virginia constitution of 1902.

Table 2 groups the states according to the mmber of constitutions adopted through 1968.
Of the 50 states, 40 percent
(19) have adopted only one constitution, of which four are
products of the twentieth century; the organic laws of all
the remaining states in this group, with the single exception
of Massachusetts, were adopted during the nineteenth century.
Ten states have had two constitutions.
Three states have had
three constitutions; ten states have had four; and two states
have approved five basic documents.
The South leads all other
sections of the country in constitution-making, and it is
noteworthy that all states that have adopted five or more constitutions are southern.
Louisiana, with 10 constitutions,
leads all other states.
Georgia ranks second having operated
under eight. South Carolina is next with seven, and then
Alabama and Florida with six.
In large part, constitutional
changes in these states were products of the Civil War and
Reconstruction periods.

-7-
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TABLE

2

NUMBER OF DATES OF ADOPTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
As of January 1,

19 69

One Constitution (19 states)

Alaska
Arizona
Colorado
Idaho
Kansas
Maine
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Montana
Nevada

1956
1911
1876
1889
1859
1819
1780
1857
18 89

New Mexico
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Dakota
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming

18 89

1864

Two Constitutions

California
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Nebraska

1912
1889
1907
1857
1889
1895
1889
1848

1849,
1950,
1816,
1846,
1866,

1879
1968
1851
1857
1875

(10 states)

New Hampshire
North Carolina
Ohio
Rhode Island
West Virginia

1776, 1784
1776, 1868
1802, 1851
1663, 1842
1863, 1872

Three Constitutions (3 states)

New Jersey
Tennessee
Vermont

1776, 1844, 1947
1796, 1834, 1870
1777, 1786, 1793

Four Constitutions (10 states)

Connecticut
Delaware
Illinois
Kentucky
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
New York
Pennsylvania

1638,
1776,
1818,
1792,
1776,
1835,
1817,
1820,
1777,
1776,

-8-

1662,
1792,
1848,
1799,
1851,
1850,
1832,
1865,
1821,
1790,

1818,
1831,
1870,
1850,
1864,
1908,
1869,
1875,
1846,
1838,

1965
1897
1970
1891
1867
1963
1890
1945
1894
1873

TWO CENTURIES OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING

TABLE

2

(Continued)

Five Constitutions

Arkansas
Texas

states)

(2

1836, 1861, 1864,
1845, 1861, 1866,

1868, 1874
1869, 1876

Six Constitutions (S states)

Alabama
Florida
Virginia

1819, 1861, 1865, 1868, 1875, 1901
1839, 1861, 1865, 1868, 1885, 1968
1776, 1830, 1851, 1867, 1902, 1970

Seven Constitutions
South Carolina

1776, 1778,

state)

CI

1790,

Eight Constitutions

(I

Georgia

1861, 1865,

1868, 1895

state)
1777, 1789, 1798, 1861,
1865, 1868, 1877, 1945

Ten Constitutions

Louisiana

(I

state)

1812, 1845, 1852, 1861,
1868, 1879, 1898, 1913,

-9-
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TABLE

3

EFFECTIVE DATE AND AGE OF PRESENT STATE CONSTITUTIONS^
As of January 1, 1972

Constitution

Date

Age

Prior to 1800(3 states)
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Vermont

1780
1784
179 3

192
188
179

1800-1850(3 states)
Maine
Rhode Island
Wisconsin

1820
184 3
1848

152
129
123

1851-1865(7 states)
Indiana
Ohio
Iowa
Minnesota
Oregon
Kansas
Nevada

1851
1851
1857
1858
1859
1861
1864

121
121
115

1866-1875(6 states)
Maryland
North Carolina
Tennessee
West Virginia
Arkansas
Nebraska

1867
1868
1870
1872
1874
1875

105
104
102
100
98
97

1876
1876
1879
1889
1889
1889
1889
1889

95
95
93
83
83
83
83
83
82
82
80
78

1876-1900(15 states)
Colorado
Texas
California
Idaho
Montana
North Dakota
South Dakota
Washington
Wyoming
Mississippi
Kentucky
New York

189
1890
1892
1895

-10-

114
113
111
108
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TABLE

3

(Continued)

Constitution

Date

Age

1895
1896
1897

78
77
75

1901-1925(5 states)
Alabama
Oklahoma
Arizona
New Mexico
Louisiana

1901
1907
1912
1912
1921

71
65
60

1926-1950(3 states)
Missouri
Georgia
New Jersey

1945
1945
1948

27
27
24

1951-1972(8 states)
Alaska
Michigan
Connecticut
Hawaii
Pennsylvania
Florida
Virginia
Illinois

1959
1964
1965
1968
1968
1969
1971
1971

13

South Carolina
Utah
Delaware

aTable updated to January 1, 1972
-11-

60
51

8
7
4
4
3
1
1
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AGE OF CONSTITUTIONS

Table 3 shows the effective date and age of the state constitution.
They range downward from the 189-year-old constitution of Massachusetts, effective since 1780, to the new
Illinois document which became operative in 1971.
As of
January 1, 19 72, the average age of state constitutions was
80.96 years, and the median is 83 years which is the age of
the Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and Washington
Constitutions
Only three states, all in New England, have basic laws dating
from the eighteenth century:
Massachusetts (1780)
New
Hampshire (1784) and Vermont (1793)
Thirty-one or approximately three-fifths were written and adopted during the nineteenth century. Of these, 15, or almost one-third, date from
the period between 1875 and 1900.
Three became operative during the first half of the nineteenth century, seven during
the 15 years from 1850 through 1865 including the Civil War,
and six during the 10-year Reconstruction period.
,

.

Sixteen of the documents are products of the twentieth century,
Five of the 16 became operative during the first twenty-one
years of the present century.
The effective dates of three
are in the four years 1945-1948, inclusive.
The basic law of
the new state of Alaska became effective in 1959, the new
Michigan constitution in 1964, that of Connecticut in 1965,
the second constitution of Hawaii and a new Pennsylvania document in 1968, a new Florida constitution in 1969 and new
constitutions in Illinois and Virginia in 1971.
It is noteworthy that during the period of almost a quarter of
a century, 1921-1945, no state adopted a new constitution, although extensive revisions occurred in Virginia (1928) and New
York (1938)
In the 27 years from January 1, 1945, to January
1, 1972, however, nine of the older states rewrote their constitutions and two territories formulated new instruments of
government as a basis for statehood. As of January 1, 1972,
.

states--approximately two-thirds--were operating with
constitutions that antedated 1900. Most typical of these
were the 21 documents written and adopted during the 35 years
from the Civil War to the turn of the century.
In their
lengthy provisions these constitutions reflect the problems
and popular pressures of the times in which they were drafted
more than any of the earlier basic instruments of American
state government.
34
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LENGTH OF CONSTITUTIONS
The last column in Table 1, above, lists the approximate
number of words in each state constitution and that of
Puerto Rico, as estimated by correspondents who provided
Although most of these figures are
data for this project.
estimates and therefore imprecise, they provide the most
accurate information available and afford a useful general index.

Longest of these documents by far is the constitution of
Louisiana which dates from 1921; its estimated 253,800
words are well over twice the length of the Alabama document, second longest with an estimated 95,000 words.
Shortest, and also one of the oldest, is the constitution of
Vermont with an estimated 5,000 words.
The average length
of the 50 documents was 30,075 words.
If the Louisiana
constitution is excluded in computing the average, the figure
drops to 2 5,509 words, which is approximately three and a
half times the length of the constitution of the United
States with its twenty-five amendments (approximately 7,250
words)
The median of the estimated length of the 50 documents falls between those of Kentucky with 21,500 words and
Utah with 20,600 words.
.

The oldest constitutions are generally the shortest and the
least amended.
All those now effective that date from before 1850 are substantially shorter than the average length
of all state documents.
The most recently written state
constitutions are usually far shorter than the average. All
state documents formulated and adopted within the last two
decades have fewer than 20,000 words, and most of them contain less than 15,000.
The exclusion of much detail from
the nev/er instruments is encouraging to supporters of the
traditional principle that a constitution should contain only
fundamental law.
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CHAPTER II
THE STATE CONSTITUTION AS FUNDAMENTAL LAW
By Robert B. Dishman

Precisely what are the standards by which the draftsmanship
of a state constitution can be judged? Perhaps the most obvious is that a constitution should be just that and not a
legislative code. A half-century ago state constitutions
seemed well on the way to losing their distinctive character
Many of them, especially those drafted
as fundamental law.
after the Civil War, had become loaded down with detailed
provisions more appropriate to the legislature's session laws
or even a city charter. 1 So irreversible did the trend then
appear that a distinguished constitutional scholar concluded
that state constitutions were not to be condemned because
many were no longer fundamental law "in any proper sense."
"A constitution must be judged not by its name," he insisted,
"but by the function which it has to perform. "2 This is wise
counsel, no doubt, but it begs the question of what function
the constitution is to serve.
It is the theme of this study
that state constitutions, by and large, serve the same basic
function as their national counterpart, that of organizing
and delineating the powers of government, whether by limitation, delegation or command.
If, then, they are to provide
the essential frame of government, they must be confined, as
far as possible, to matters of a fundamental and enduring
character.
This leaves the legislature free, within the
broad limits of its authority, to deal with matters which,
however, important, are of more transitory concern.
COKE AND NON-CORE MATERIAL
There are practical as well as theoretical reasons for distinguishing between constitutional provisions and legislative
enactments.
As Frank P. Grad has pointed out, once a subject
has been placed in the constitution, two changes take place:
first, it becomes a part of the state's highest level of legal
authority and second, it is protected against change by the
normal lawmaking process. ^ At the very least both suggest

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
Robert B. Dishman.
"The State Constitution As Fundamental
Law."
Chapter 2 in State Constitutions: The Shape of the
Document, pp. 25-37.
New York: National Municipal League,
1968.
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the wisdom of thinking twice before giving any subject constitutional treatment.
Beyond this, there is considerable disagreement as to what subjects deserve inclusion in a state
constitution and which are better left to the discretion of
the legislature.
The traditional view, expressed in the first
edition of this study, is that the constitution should be confined to fundamentals.
But this, of course, immediately raises
two questions:
what matters should be regarded as fundamental
and, of these, which should be written into the constitution?

Neither question is as simple as it may seem.
In the broadest
sense, a subject may be regarded as fundamental if it reflects
the more or less fixed convictions of the vast majority of a
state's citizens as to what kind of a society it wants. Almost needless to say, the only propositions likely to command
such widespread and deep-rooted popular acceptance are those
which can be stated in general rather than specific terms and
which deal largely with ends, not means.
In every state, it
should be possible to point to a number of propositions which
by general agreement are considered fundamental
the desirability of separating the legislative, executive and judicial
departments, the need for an independent judiciary and a guarantee of equal justice under the law, for example.
No doubt
the consensus on these matters would vary somewhat from state
to state and region to region.
Indeed, on a few unquestionably
fundamental matters, the state's precise commitment to racial
equality or to the welfare state, the local or regional consensus might well run counter to the national consensus.
In
these controversial areas of social policy, it may not be
possible for the state constitutions to give effect to local
sentiment, however strong it may be.

—

A more difficult problem is to decide which fundamentals belong
in a constitution.
Some, obviously, can be left out because
they are not directly relevant to the task of governing, as,
for example, the conviction that parents have an obligation
to support their children.
Others can be omitted because
nothing is to be gained by their inclusion.
Religious freedom is no doubt strengthened by a constitutional auarantee,
but not the right, which is already secure in the common law
tradition, to engage in any lawful trade.
Similarly, the
right to a fair trial, guaranteed in various ways by every
American constitution, is a real boon to the person accused
of crime, but not the largely meaningless admonition found
in the Rhode Island constitution that every man is to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
In deciding which
fundamentals belong in a constitution it is well to remember,
as Ernst Freund pointed out a half-century ago, that "the
written law represents the living constitution but imperfectly.
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Absence of militarism, absence of official caste, decentralized administration, popularized education, great vocational
mobility, absence of sharp sectional or denominational antagonism, a very pronounced consciousness of national achievement and promise these are the things that impress American
institutions with their distinctive character, and there is
neither any possibility nor any need of giving all of them
constitutional formulation. "4

—

In the end, most attempts to confine state constitutions
strictly to fundamentals seem doomed to failure. Only in
Alaska and Hawaii have recent constitution-makers been more
In these newest
or less free to write upon a clean slate.
of states and in some of the oldest, the constitution has
The other
been kept largely free of legislative detail.
states have found it difficult to rid their constitutions of
even the most inappropriate and irrelevant material. Part of
the difficulty is that constitutions have been made intentionThen,
ally more difficult to amend than ordinary legislation.
too, even the most trifling of measures tends to be accepted
uncritically once it is made part of a constitution. When
threatened, it will be defended not only by the now vested
interests which favored it in the first place but also by
"the considerable numbers of persons who distrust all constitutional change. "5 In some states the present constitution
is so weighed down with legislative detail that it would be
much simpler to draft a new document than to revise the old.
In most states, then, a constitution confined strictly to
fundamentals is simply unattainable. As long as what Frank
Grad prefers to call non-core material is not too pervasive,
even the longer, more detailed constitutions can be well
"Constitutional brevity," as he points out, "is
drafted.
only one of several values to be achieved and not necessarily
the most important one."^ Even the Model State Constitution
contains a number of subjects which might have been left-and in some states, indeed, have been left to the legislature's discretion, e. g., state and local finance, public
Like other expressions
schools, civil service and home rule.
public
of
policy, a state constitution cannot help but express
the problems, interests and concerns of its people, even those
which outsiders might not rank as important or enduring. Thus,
Arizona has devoted an entire article of its constitution to
water rights, and Louisiana one to levees, and who is to say
that the emphasis is misplaced? Yet, when all is said, there
is a limit to how much legislative detail a constitution can
absorb without losing its character as fundamental law. Other
things being equal, a brief constitution, one that is limited

—
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to fundamental matters, is better than a long constitution
that contains legislative detail.
The best constitutions may
not be the best because they are brief, but at least it can
be said that, being brief, as most of them are, "they best
meet the needs of state government. "7

PERVASIVENESS OF STATUTORY DETAIL

—

—

Men may differ and frequently do as to whether a particular
provision is appropriate to a constitution, but they should
never be at odds as to what purpose a constitution should
serve.
"A constitution states or ought to state," Justice
Benjamin N. Cardozo once wrote, "not rules for the passing
hour but principles for an expanding future. "8 The early
state constitutions met this test admirably.
They outlined
the functions that the government was to perform and the
political and personal liberties that it was not to invade,
but that, for the most part, was all.
In time, however,
most state constitutions departed from the early models,
federal and state, and took on, in Chief Justice John
Marshall's phrase, "the prolixity of a legal code " 9 Instead
of merely organizing the governmental machinery, the New York
Inter-Law School Committee has pointed out that:
.

The constitutions delimited power with an exactitude that left virtually no further room for its
being used, let alone abused.
Instead of embodying a ripened philosophy capable of projection
into the future regardless of the surface changes
that inevitably occur in a growing society, the
constitutions tended to embody their sponsors
ideas concerning the issues of the fleeting moment, and thus took on the appearance of statute
books. "10

Louisiana:

The Constitution as a Legal Code

To some extent, all state constitutions share this tendency to
incorporate statutory detail, but the most flagrant examples
are those which have attained massive size.
Louisiana, to cite
the largest, has a constitution which in 1964 had more than 400
pages.
Only two pages are required to set forth a bill of
rights, but 22 pages are devoted to the right of veterans and
the needy to receive pensions and welfare payments.
The legislative department was created in nine pages, but another thirteen were required to limit its powers, not counting seventeen
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more pages on revenue and taxation which impose additional
restrictions on the legislative power. The constitutional
officers of the executive department were provided for in
only four pages, but 7 4 pages were needed to provide for a
host of lesser administrative officers and boards and to
Fourteen pages organized a system of
outline their duties.
state courts, but 19 were needed to establish and staff
local courts.

What has contributed most to the swollen size of Louisiana's
constitution, however, is its preoccupation with local
In Article XIV alone, 157 pages are devoted to
affairs.
parish (county) and municipal affairs, not counting the 22
pages concerned with drainage districts and levees in
Articles XV, XVI and XVI-A. New Orleans is declared to
have home rule, or at least a home rule charter, but whatever autonomy it hoped to gain was largely taken away in the
following 43 pages. Altogether, some 62 of the 157 pages in
Article XIV are devoted to the affairs of New Orleans, and
another 40 pages provide in detail for a civil service system
The provision for the
for the state and its municipalities.
construction of highways and bridges is, if possible, even
more detailed.
In a single, 26-page section, the constitution sets up a general highway fund and specifies minutely
the license fee private automobiles are to pay each year,
the tax to be imposed on gasoline and other motor fuels,
the amount of bonds that may be issued and the rate of
interest they may bear, the proportion of the fund to be
used for improving gravel roads and, finally, the places
To
at which bridges and paved highways were to be built.
showmap
point,
a
prevent any misunderstanding on the last
ing which highway routes were to be paved was attached and
made an official part of the section. An advisory board was
also created to keep close watch on the State Highway Commission; and seventeen of its nineteen members are designated,
nine of them by name.
Louisiana's constitution is the only
one in the nation which could be cut down to one-seventh of
its present size, as the Louisiana State Law Institute proposed in 1954, and still be longer and more detailed than
most others.
Examples in Other States

Excessive detail is almost as conspicuous in other massive
constitutions.
The California constitution, which is the
nation's fourth largest, exempts from taxation "fruit and
and
nut-bearing trees under the age of four years
.
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grapevines under the age of three years
and all immature
forest trees
upon lands from which the merchantable original growth timber stands to the extent of 70 per cent of all
trees over sixteen inches in diameter has been removed." The
88-page Texas constitution levies a property tax of five cents
per $100 valuation to raise money for the state's teachers
colleges and agricultural and technological institutions, and
then prescribes to the fifth decimal place the share each
school is to receive.
The South Carolina constitution places
such a severe limitation on the power of local governments to
incur bonded indebtedness no more than 8 per cent of the
assessed valuation of taxable property that it took 24 of
its 7 5 pages of text to provide for necessary exceptions and
provisos.
The Florida constitution 62 pages prescribes "a
uniform system of county and municipal government" in Article III,
section 24, but then devotes most of Article VIII to the details
of government in specified cities and counties.
The same constitution also levies a two-cents-per-gallon tax on gasoline
and then prescribes in detail the formula by which the proceeds are to be distributed. A similar provision, added in
1952, "contains the complete method for administering the
distribution and use of motor vehicle licensing funds dedicated to the County Capital Outlay and Debt Service School
.

.

.

.

,

.

—

—

—

—

Fund. "11

In some constitutions the statutory minutiae is at least colorful.
The Louisiana document names two bridges spanning the
Mississippi River after the late Huey P. Long, and declares
his birthday forever a legal holiday.
In South Carolina the
age of consent is not only given constitutional status but it
is spelled out with startling explicitness
"No unmarried
woman shall legally consent to sexual intercourse who shall
not have attained the age of fourteen years."
In Oklahoma
the public schools must teach the "elements of agriculture,
horticulture, stockf eeding and domestic science," and in
North Dakota, they must teach, "as far as practicable
those branches of knowledge that tend to impress on the mind
the vital importance of truthfulness, temperance, purity,
public spirit and respect for honest labor of every kind."
In two states, California and New Mexico, the state board of
education is required to prescribe the textbooks to be used
in the public elementary schools, but in three other states,
Colorado, Utah and Wyoming, it is forbidden to do so.
In
Texas the legislature is authorized to define and punish
"barratry," and in California, something described in the
caption as "bucketing." In Florida, New York and Wisconsin,
a person may be kept from voting in any election in which he
has bet on the outcome and in several southern states he may
:

,

.
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be disfranchised permanently for such relatively minor offenses
petty larceny (Virginia)
as house-breaking (South Carolina)
12
wife-beating
(Alabama
Carolina).
and
South
or
,

Three states, Arizona, North Carolina and Oregon, provide in
their constitutions for capital punishment, and Arizona even
specifies that "the judgment of death shall be inflicted by
administering lethal gas." In California, lobbying is defined
as seeking to influence the vote of a legislator "by bribery,
promise or reward, intimidation or any other dishonest means,"
and both in that state and in Georgia it is declared to be a
In Tennesee and Maryland ministers of the gospel are
crime.
disqualified from holding seats in the legislature as are
railroad officials in West Virginia.
In Maryland it is also
unlawful to distribute books "or other printed matter not
pertaining to the business of the session" to the members of
the legislature.
In two states the legislature is restricted in the staff it
In Arizona each house is subject to an over-all
may hire.
limit as to number-- fourteen in the House and a number in
The
the Senate not to exceed two-thirds of its membership.
positions are specified by name--in Kentucky one chief clerk,
one assistant clerk, one enrolling clerk, one sergeant at
arms, one doorkeeper, one janitor, one cloakroom keeper and
three pages in each chamber and an extra cloakroom keeper and
page for the House of Representatives.

IMPACT OF EXCESSIVE DETAIL

What difference has it made, one might ask, that constitutions
have become so weighted down with statutory detail? The consequences have been clear, the New York Inter-Law School
Committee pointed out, and they have been serious.
Loss of Flexibility
In the first place, a constitution that has become essentially
a statutory code may be too rigid to cope successfully with
the emerging problems of a dynamic people.
"When legislation
is permitted to infiltrate a constitution," Governor Alfred
E. Driscoll warned the New Jersey Constitutional Convention in
1947, "it shackles the hands of the men and women elected by
the people to exercise public authority "^2
In many instances,
.
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no doubt, the framers of a constitution or the sponsors of
an amendment intended to do just that to shackle the hands
of those entrusted with public authority, particularly the
legislature. At other times the framers seem merely to have
been carried away with an excess of zeal or caution.

—

Many years ago the Oklahoma constitution tried to bring all
freight or passenger carriage under state control by defining
every known form of "transportation company" with great precision.
But years later when commercial air transport became
a reality, the Oklahoma supreme court could find no authority
to regulate intrastate aircraft because the words "transportation company" had been defined so specifically. Here is
an example where, as the New York Inter-Law School Committee
put it, "the detail of definition proved to be the undoing of
the constitutional purpose. "14
Similarly a few other states are still inconvenienced by a
constitutional restriction adopted more than a century ago
forbidding the state to engage in any works of internal improvement.
In Kansas, for example, it was necessary to amend
the constitution twice before the state could construct a
highway system and qualify for federal grants. All other
federal grant-supported programs are administered by political
subdivisions of the state, "frequently," we are told, "on a
piecemeal basis." If Congress should ever require the states
to assume greater responsibility for the soil conservation
and airport construction programs, as the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations recommended in 1955, Kansas would no
longer be eligible to receive federal grants in these fields
until it changed or dropped altogether the "internal improvements" clause. 15

Undependability of Constitutional Shackles
The irony is that not even the most stringent of constitutional
restrictions can be depended upon to keep the legislature in
shackles.
The Ohio constitution, for example, flatly declares
that "the principal of all funds arising from the sale or other
disposition of lands or other property granted or entrusted to
this state for educational and religious purposes shall forever be preserved inviolate and undiminished; and the income
arising therefrom shall be faithfully applied to the specific
objects of the original grants or appropriations." As ironclad as this provision may appear to be, it has been "flagrantly
violated" throughout the state's history.
"Where are these
lands today?" asks Professor Harvey Walker, and he answers:
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"They have been sold. Where is the principal sum which the
money received in the sale represents? It has been spent by
order of the Ohio General Assembly," and he adds, "not for
the support of schools but for the construction of canals. "16
Every subsequent legislature has recognized its obligation to
pay the Ohio public schools 6 per cent interest on the money
it "borrowed," but it appears doubtful whether the principal
will ever be repaid.

Similarly, the Missouri constitution requires every state
board or agency exercising administrative or executive authority to be assigned to some one of fourteen departments.
This
provision is honored, however, only on paper. According to
Professor Robert F. Karsch, many agencies are "in fact entirely
free from any connection with or responsibility to the department concerned." This is true, he says, of the comptroller,
the Conservation Commission, all licensing boards, the Park
Board, the Public Service Commission, the State Savings and
Loan Commission, the state banking, mediation and rehabilitation boards, the University of Missouri, and many others.
In most instances the assignment of these agencies to a
department was left to the discretion of the governor, but
the office of budget and comptroller was made a division of
the Department of Revenue by the constitution itself.
Nevertheless, a few years ago the Missouri legislature took the
division out of the Department of Revenue and "attached it
directly to the governor's own office. "17 This may well
have been a wise move from the standpoint of sound administration, but it most certainly violated the Missouri constitution.

Perpetuation of Archaic Offices
Many states would find it difficult to abolish unnecessary
county and township offices embedded in their constitution.
In all but five states the local justice of the peace has
constitutional status, although in five others the legislature has constitutional authority to abolish the office. 18
Sheriffs enjoy constitutional status in 39 states, constables
in 32 states and coroners in 23.19
In some of the southern
and western states the sheriff, constable, coroner and justice
of the peace still play a key role in the administration of
local justice but elsewhere the offices have declined in
importance and prestige.
Some constitutions make only the barest mention of the offices,
but it is usually enough to prevent a thoroughgoing
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reorganization of county and township government. Even in
New England, where counties have never been important, only
two of the six states, Connecticut and Rhode Island, have
been able to abolish county governinent entirely.
In five
states the constitution still requires a sheriff to be
elected in each county;
in three states--Maine Massachusetts
and New Hampshire--both a coroner and a register of probate;
and in two states Massachusetts and New Hampshire also a
county treasurer and a register of deeds.
In Vermont the
office of high bailiff continues to exist, thanks to the
constitution, although the only duty for which he is paid
is to arrest the sheriff should the need arise.
In all six
New England states justices of the peace still enjoy constitutional status even though they have lost most of their once
considerable power to try minor criminal and civil cases.
Here, as in other parts of the country, the office lingers
on as a reminder of the homespun, lay justice of an earlier
,

—

—

age.

Chronic Need for Amendment
The constitution that is excessively detailed will be in almost
continual need of revision.
"When details are crowded into a
constitution," William B. Munro observed a auarter of a century ago, "the more quickly it loses touch with the social and
economic needs of a rapidly growing community.
The more precise and elaborate its provisions, the greater are the obstacles to the reform of abuses.
Litigation thrives on constitutional verbosity. " 20 The only constitutions which have
been spared the need for frequent amendments are those which
are largely confined to core material.
The federal constitution, for example, has had to be amended formally only fifteen
times since the Bill of Rights was adopted, and Vermont has
been able to get along with its original constitution of 1795
bv adopting only 45 amendments.
At the other extreme, Louisiana
has tried ten different constitutions since its admission into
the Union in 1812, and its present constitution has been amended
no fewer than 460 times since its adoption in 1921.
California's
constitution, now fourth in length among the fifty states, had
to be amended 343 times in its first 60 years.
South Carolina
has had six different constitutions, and its present constitution has been amended more than 250 times since 1895.
In
New York, as elsewhere, most of the amendments were deemed
necessary in order to provide "detailed exceptions to inflexibly detailed determinations that had been imbedded in the constitution with an air of seeming permanence ." 21 Article XIV,
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for example, forbids any trees to be removed from the state's
In order,
forest preserve which is to kept "forever wild."
then, to make it possible to construct ski trails in the area
it was necessary to amend the article twice--once in 1941 to
permit "not more than twenty miles of ski trails 30 to 80
feet wide on the north, east and northwest slopes of Whiteface
Mountain" and again in 1947, to permit similar trails on Pete
Gay Mountain.

Even where, as in the states mentioned above, it has not proved
too difficult to amend the constitution, the voters are frequently required to pass on intricate proposals on which even
political scientists would find it difficult to vote intelliThis may well be a more telling criticism than the
gently.
rigidity which is assumed to be characteristic of bulky,
detailed constitutions.
It may seem to be the essence of
democracy to submit constitutional issues to the voters every
other year or so, but, as the Inter-Law School Committee obFar from strengthening
served, "the appearance is spurious."
democracy, too frequent constitutional referenda may actually
make possible "a sort of minority control that is the very
antithesis of democracy ." 22 in New York the voters have been
called to the polls eleven times in seventeen years to pass
In each case, the vote
on 83 separate proposed amendments.
cast for the amendments fell far short of the vote which is
usually cast for candidates for state office or, for that
The 1943 special
matter, for the mayor of New York City.
election, at which a vacancy in public office was also filled,
made possible a direct comparison. When the votes were
counted, it was found that more than four times as many votes
were given to the candidates for lieutenant governor than
were cast for and against the constitutional measure receiving the largest number of votes.
In some states, it is true,
constitutional proposals are referred to the voters at the
There,
same general election at which candidates are elected.
more votes will normally be cast for constitutional measures
than at a special referendum, but it is at least doubtful
whether the vote is more discriminating.
Surely, the best
way to encourage a larger and more reasoned vote is to cut
down the number and complexity of the proposed amendments.
This is feasible, of course, only where the constitution is
broadly enough phrased so as not to need "the constant therapy
of additional amendments to keep it in running order. "23
The Manacled State

Perhaps the gravest objection to a needlessly detailed constitution is that it impairs the state's capacity for self-25-
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government. To the extent that a government is kept from
doing harm by detailed restrictions on the exercise of its
power, it is also kept from doing good, i. e., in providing
for the needs of its people in the wisest and most effective
way.
This is the dilemma which every instrumentality of
government must face, but none quite so acutely as our state
legislatures.
In every state the legislature is expected to
promote and protect the general health, safety, welfare,
good order and convenience, but often its exercise of the
police power is hedged about with detailed restrictions of
both a substantive and procedural character.
If, for this
reason, the legislature is unable to cope effectively with
the pressing problems of the day, the state has no one to
blame but itself.
Nor can it complain too loudly when the
federal government takes over responsibilities which the
state and local governments have not been allowed to meet
effectively.
In 1955 the Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations concluded that "self-imposed constitutional restrictions" have often been the "underlying causes of state
and municipal pleas for federal assistance."
One way to
arrest the trend, the commission suggested, was to make sure
that our state constitutions "provide for vigorous and re."24 in today's
sponsible government, not forbid it.
world "the manacled state the state that puts a straitjacket and handcuffs on government"--is almost as much an
anomaly in state capitals as in Washington, D. C.25
.

—
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(Emphasis added.)
,

Dodd, 0£. cit.

215.

2.

W.

3.

Op. Cit

4.

Ernst Freund, Standards of American Legislation (University
pT 183
of Chicago Press
Phoenix edition, 1965)

F.

.

,

1-5,

pp.

p.

,

lOff.

,

op. cit

,

1-19.

5.

Grad

,

6.

Ibid

.

7.

Cf. Grad,

8.

Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process
pT 24
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1921)

,

p.

.

p.

,

1-4

Ibid

.

,

pp.

I

4-5.

,

9.

McCulloch V. Maryland
cit

,

17 U.S.

(4

Wheaton)

316

(1819).

2-3.

10.

0£.

11.

Manning J. Dauer and William C. Havard, The Florida
Constitution of 1885--A Critique (Gainesville, Public
Administration Clearing Service, University of Florida,
Reprinted from the University of Florida
1955), p. 14.
Law Review Vol. Ill, No. 1 (Spring 1955).

.

,

pp.

,

-27-

.

12.

Since these are offenses to which, in southern folklore,
the Negro is particularly prone, the suspicion is strong
that the disfranchisement is aimed directly at him.
See
Dayton D. McKean, Party and Pressure Politics (Boston,
Houghton Mifflin, 1949)
p. 66

h
,

13

Record of the New Jersey Constitutional Convention
(Trenton, 1947)

cit

,

I,

7.

14

0£.

15.

Walter I. Sandelius and Doris Greenfield, The Constitutional
Restriction by Which the State of Kansas May not Participate
in Internal Improvements Memorandum No. 8 (Topeka, Kansas
Commission on Constitutional Revision, 1958)
5 pp.

.

,

p.

9

.

,

,

16.

An Analysis and Appraisal of the Ohio State Constitution
1851-1951 (Cincinnati, 1951), pp. 39-40.
This is a report
by the members of the social science section of the Ohio
College Association to the Stephen H. Wilder Foundation.

17.

Letter from Robert F. Karsch, of the University of
Missouri, to the author, July 1, 19 59.

18.

The
and
The
and
the

19.

The sheriff does not have constitutional status in Alaska,
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island and Utah; nor the constable
in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington and Wisconsin. The 23 states in which the
coroner has constitutional status are Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennesee, West
Virginia and Wisconsin.

20.

"An Ideal State Constitution," The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social~Science 181 (September

,

constitutions of Alaska, Hawaii, Missouri, New Jersey,
Oregon do not give justices constitutional status.
legislatures of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Nebraska
North Dakota have constitutional authority to abolish
office.

,

1935)

,

4.

21.

New York Inter-Law School Committee, pp. 9-10.

22.

Ibid.

23.

John B. Bebout, "The State Constitution Within the
American Political System," a staff paper prepared by
the Public Administration Service for the delegates to
the Alaska Constitutional Convention, 1955, pp. 41-42.
-2 8-

24.

Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Report to
the President (Washington, D. C, 1955), pp. 38, 56.

25.

This phrase is by Henry Jones Ford in "The Influence of
State Politics in Expanding Federal Power," Proceedings
of the American Political Science Association (Washington,
D.

C.

,

1908)

,

p.

~"

63.

-29-

-30-

CHAPTER III
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION
By Robert B. Dishman

In no other form of domestic law is draftsmanship so important
Local ordinances may be inexpertly
as it is to constitutions.
drawn, but the remedy is close at hand. Administrative rul-

ings may be needlessly detailed and complex, but expert assistance is usually available to the beleaguered taxpayer, farmer
Poorly drafted statutes may vex the judge and
or businessman.
help make the lawyer prosperous, but the ordinary citizen is
mercifully unaware of "the law" unless he becomes caught in
One might suppose, therefore, that a poorly drafted
its toils.
constitution would be a rarity in the United States, particularly since Americans have had more experience in making conBut such is
stitutions than any other people in the world.
A few are well written and well organized, some
not the case.
are not bad, but many are models of what a constitution ought
not to be.

To speak knowledgeably of what a constitution ought not to be
On this
implies that one knows what a constitution should be.
point there is general agreement among students of constitu"A constitution," J. A, Corry has written, "is
tional law.
no more than the skeleton or essential frame of orderly government.
The constitution defines and provides for the estIt outlines
ablishment of the chief organs of government.
the relation between these organs and the citizens, between
the state and the individual."! If, then, the constitution
is no more than the skeleton of government, the flesh and
blood, the sinews and the nervous system must be provided by
legislative enactments, judicial interpretations and extralegal usages.

INSTRUMENTS OF RESTRAINT?
Some think Professor Corry s prescription cannot be applied
to state constitutions because it ignores a supposedly basic
distinction between state and national authority. The federal
'

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
Robert B. Dishman.
"Essential Function." Part of Chapter 1
in State Constitutions:
The Shape of the Document pp. 14-24
New York: National Municipal League, 1968,
,
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government, it is claimed, is one of delegated and limited
powers; therefore, it may do only what it is authorized to
do by the national constitution.
Each state, on the other
hand, is said to have a government of plenary and inherent
powers which need not be traced to any specific grants in
its own constitution. 2 Unlike the national government,
therefore, a state government, or at least its legislature,
may do anything which is not forbidden by either the federal
or state constitutions.
For this reason, a state constitution is said to be a restraining document, and the federal
constitution a granting instrument.

At first glance this seems to be a plausible interpretation
of the scope of state authority.
In most states the legislative power is defined quite expansively in at least one
section of the constitution, but at the same time it is also
restricted by a number of rather specific limitations. Only
eleven states, in fact, even vest their legislatures with
the police power. 3 Hawaii and Oklahoma extend the legislative power to "all rightful subjects of legislation," and
New Mexico and Oregon to "all powers necessary to the legislature of a free state." Three others, Alaska, Oklahoma and
Virginia, provide that the legislature's authority is not
restricted merely because certain powers have been enumerated
or because, in Virginia, others previously conferred have
been omitted.
In these states, it would seem, the state
constitution is truly the measure not of what the legislature may do but of what it may not do.
INHERENT POWERS OR INHERENT RIGHTS?

Those states which have taken this expansive view of state
authority have had no choice, given the general distrust of
legislatures, but to load down their constitutions with a
large number of detailed restrictions upon the exercise of
legislative power. Yet not all states have done so. The
New England states, for example, have vested their legislatures with rather broad authority and refrained, for the
most part, from spelling out in detail how it should or
should not be exercised.
It is partly for this reason that
these state constitutions as a group are the briefest in
the nation.
The New England example is all the more persuasive because it is founded on the longest unbroken constitutional tradition.
But there are more positive reasons to doubt that any state
In
government can rightfully claim to have inherent powers.
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very limited sense, to be sure, every government, including those whose powers are said to be delegated, has some
authority to govern and to raise and spend money simply beBut those who insist that state
cause it is a government.
authority is inherent mean much more than this; they claim
plenary power for the state government, that is, the power
Certainly those who
to do anything which is not forbidden.
framed our first state constitutions would have scoffed at
As W. F. Dodd pointed out a half-century
the suggestion.
ago, "The political philosophy of 1776 was based very largely
on the notion of social compact and did not recognize the
existence of inherent governmental power in either legislative, executive or judicial department "4 Nor did those who
In
framed the national constitution and its Bill of Rights.
incordrafting the Tenth Amendment, they were not content to
porate the guarantee already part of the Articles of Confederation, that each state retained "every power, jurisdiction and
Instead,
right" which was not delegated to the United States.
forbidden
to
the powers not delegated to the United States or
the states were reserved to the states respectively "ot to
the people."
a

.

THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE AND THEIR LIMITED GOVERNMENTS
In adding these last four words. Congress claimed no more than
our two oldest state constitutions had already claimed for
their own people.
In both Massachusetts and New Hampshire
it is the "people," not their rulers, who "have the sole and
exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign
and independent state."
In the constitutions of four other
states, Kansas, Nebraska, North Carolina and Ohio, all powers
not therein delegated are explicitly declared to remain with
the people.
Even those who hold to the most extreme states'
rights interpretation of the Tenth Amendment usually concede
that final political authority rests with the "states-aspeople," not with the "states-as-government "
.

This is the basic philosophy which permeates every one of our
fifty state constitutions.
Only New York makes no explicit
provision for the sovereignty of the people, but, like all
except three others, its constitution was established by
"we, the people."
In no less than 32 states, political power
is declared to be inherent in or derived from the people,
and, in several others, all government is said to derive its
In at least
just powers from the consent of the governed.
seven states, public officials are declared to be the "trustees and servants" or "substitutes" or "agents" of the people
"7
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and at all times accountable to them. 8
in several states the
rights of the people are to remain "forever inviolate" and are
to be "excepted out of the general power of government. "9
In no state, however, is popular sovereignty proclaimed so
completely as in Virginia.
In its justly famed Declaration
of Rights, which the "good people of Virginia" made "in the
exercise of their sovereign powers," all men are declared to
have "certain basic inherent rights" which cannot be surrendered
in any compact, and all power is declared to be vested in the
people and every "magistrate" is made "at all times amenable
to them."
Their government, therefore, is to be "instituted
for the common benefit, protection and security of the people,"
and whenever it is found to be "inadequate or contrary to
these purposes," a majority of the people "hath an indubitable,
unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish
it."
In exercising its powers, moreover, the government is
reminded that the rights of the people are not restricted to
those enumerated in the declaration, and that the omission of
any right is "not to be construed to limit other rights of
the people not therein expressed" (Art. I, sec. 17).
This
guarantee seems to contradict the claim made elsewhere in
the same constitution that "the authority of the General
Assembly shall extend to all subjects of legislation not
herein forbidden or restricted" (Art. IV, sec. 63)
But if
sovereign power resides in the people and they have surrendered
only enough of it to enable the government to care for their
"common benefit, protection and security," there can be little
doubt as to which claim is to take precedence.
.

THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE
In the United States, clearly it is the people whose rights
are sovereign, not the powers of their government.
At no
time have they surrendered their claim to sovereignty or consented to unlimited government at any level.
On the latter
point there is virtually no disagreement among students of
constitutional law.
Indeed, those who claim plenary power
for state governments explain that it was conferred by the
people in the exercise of their own original sovereign authority.
But this view ignores what Professor Edward S. Corwin
has called the "higher law background of American constitutional law" and the inalienable rights which it purports to
protect.-'-^
It is no longer the fashion to invoke natural
rights and the social compact, but the men who shaped our
constitutional law in its formative stages did so fervently.
In creating a government and empowering it to act, they were
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careful to surrender only part of their natural liberty;
their view of the social contract was Lockean, not Hobbesian.
In this matter, as in so many others, George Washington reflected perfectly the sentiments of his countrymen.
"Individuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty
to preserve the rest." Wisely, the framers made no attempt
to spell out the specific liberties and rights which the
people retained, for reasons which Washington suggested.
"The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained.
It
is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line
between those rights which must be surrendered and those
-^-^
which may be reserved
A Bill of Rights was later
added to the constitution, but it was never intended to be
a complete enumeration of the rights which are entitled to
constitutional protection. This is made explicit in the
Ninth Amendment:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." As Professor Corwin has
pointed out, "This language assumed that there are individual rights of so transcendent a character that they owe
nothing to their recognition in written constitutions, but
that, on the contrary, a written constitution which neglected
to recognize them would be to that extent a defective, an
incomplete instrument of government, and that this deficiency
would have to be made good from some outside source. "^2
.

.

.

In one form or another, the same guarantee is also to be
found in all but a few of our state constitutions, including
most of those adopted in this century.
In twenty-six states
the enumeration of certain rights is declared flatly "not to
impair or deny others retained by the people. "13 in four
others the enumeration is not to be "construed" to deny other
rights which are said to be either "inherent," as in Minnesota, Mississippi and Virginia, or "hitherto enjoyed," as in
Georgia, before the adoption of the present constitution.
In
four more states, as noted above, all powers not delegated
in the constitution remain with the people. l^ Here is explicit evidence that, at all levels, the American government
was intended to be limited.
Not alt rights are specified in
our written constitutions; some are so basic or so familiar
as not to require enumeration.
Together, the Ninth and Tenth

Amendments and their state counterparts express two of the
truths which most Americans still hold to be self-evident-that certain rights may not be impaired by the government,
whether they are enumerated or not, and that certain
powers not violative of these rights may be exercised by the
states if their own constitution permits.
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This meaning could hardly be more plain, yet some Americans
find it hard to accept.
The theory held today by many lawyers and judges is strongly positivist:
The only rights which
limit the powers of government are those which are specified
in the constitution or derived directly and unmistakably from
it.
To substantiate that position, the positivists offer two
separate, though related arguments.
First, it is said, neither
the Ninth or Tenth Amendment, or for that matter their state
counterparts, were intended to be restrictive. Unlike other
guarantees, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments add nothing of substance to our written constitution; they are said to be mere
redundancies.
The point is more readily made against the
Tenth Amendment than the Ninth.
To James Madison, the proposal which later became the Tenth Amendment was "superfluous"
and "unnecessary,"-*-^ and to the Supreme Court it is now a
"truism" stating "that all has been retained which has not
been surrendered "16 go indeed it is, so far as the division
between national and state authority is concerned.
But the
Tenth Amendment is also concerned with a quite different kind
of division of power that between the people and their government and so is the Ninth. As to this relationship, the
two amendments are not superfluous or redundant.!^
Indeed,
they may prove someday to be as essential to our "whole
scheme of ordered liberty" as any of the more specific
guarantees to be found in our written constitutions. The
rights of the people which are enumerated are those which
governments in the past have been most prone to invade.
These, for the most part, seem fairly secure. Not so the
right to privacy which modern governments of all kinds are
increasingly prone to invade. Apart from the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and the quartering of troops in American homes, nowhere does the Constitution
guarantee any general right to privacy, not even in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments with their guarantees of "liberty"
and "due process." Where else should Americans turn to
secure those rights which are not enumerated but to the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments--and to their state counterparts?
.

—

—

UNENUMERATED RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
To the extent that certain basic, though unenumerated rights
are retained by the people, the powers of their government are
necessarily limited. Persuasive though this proposition may
seem to others, positivists will accept it only as a general
admonition, not as a rule of law enforceable in the courts.
Judges have no mandate, it is said, to enforce the unenumerated
rights of the people against the representatives of the people
in the legislative and executive branches.
The only rights
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which can be protected by judicial review are those expressed
somewhere in a written constitution, national or state.
If
judges were to attempt to invoke any unenumerated right, they
would be required to fall back on their own notions of natural
justice since there would be no constitutional text to guide
them.
Understandably, many lawyers and judges are reluctant
to assume such an awesome responsibility.
As Justice Iredell
pointed out as early as 1798, "The ideals of natural justice
are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest
men have differed upon the subject; and all that the court
could properly say, in such an event, would be that the legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an
act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent
with the abstract principles of natural justice. "18 This,
essentially is the position taken by Justice Hugo Black on
the present Supreme Court.
To read unenumerated rights into
the constitution, he insists, is to invoke a "mysterious and
uncertain natural law concept" which he finds "shocking. "1^
This is indeed a powerful argument, but it can be met.
First,
it is not necessary to invoke natural law to protect unenumerMany of these rights--for example, the right
ated rights.
to marry, to have children, and to educate them in the schools
of one's choice are entitled to protection because, in the
words of the Georgia constitution, they have been "hitherto
enjoyed." Others, like the right to pursue any lawful trade,
are firmly established in the common law tradition.
But even
if this were not the case, American judges would find it
difficult not to enforce unenumerated rights.
In other political systems it is left largely to the political (i. e., executive and legislative) branches to define and protect the
rights of the people within the framework of whatever rule of
law may exist.
In the United States that responsibility, for
better or worse, falls largely to judges in the exercise of
their power of judicial review.
No one challenges the obligation of judges to protect the rights enumerated in a written
constitution. What is not always remembered is that, under
the same constitutions, unenumerated rights are entitled to
the same protection.
By the Ninth Amendment, or its counterpart in state constitutions, judges may not construe the
enumeration of certain rights to deny or disparage others
retained by the people. What surer way to deny or disparage
the rights retained by the people than to refuse to enforce
them? However painful it may be, the choice open to judges
is this:
either read unenumerated rights into the constitution or else read the Ninth and Tenth Amendments out of it.

—
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VESTED FIGHTS AND THE SOCIAL COMPACT
Given their choice, most American judges have been willing to
protect what they regarded as the more basic unenumerated
rights.
They have done so, to be sure, with varying degrees
of reluctance and candor.
Early in our constitutional history
it was the rare judge or lawyer who did not appeal to natural
rights and the social compact when it suited his purpose.
Among those who did so on the Supreme Court were Justices
Chase, Paterson, Wilson, Story and Johnson, and Chief Justice
Marshall himself. 20 j^ this matter, as in so many others,
Marshall reflected and at the same time helped to shape our
constitutional tradition.
In Fletcher v. Peck, for example,
he was convinced that the Georgia legislature had acted unlawfully when it repealed the notorious Yazoo land grant, but
he was unsure of the precise grounds on which the court should
base its decision.
The states, to be sure, are forbidden to
pass any law impairing the obligation of contract, but no one
had ever suggested before that a legislative grant was a contract in this sense.
In the end, he had it both ways.
Georgia was "restrained" from repealing the grant "either by
general principles, which are common to our free institutions
or by the particular provisions of the Constitution of the
."21
United States.
.

With Jacksonian democracy came a revulsion against a doctrine
which, in the hands of conservative judges, proved to be more
protective of property than of life or liberty. For more than
a century the prevailing doctrine was ostensibly positivist:
The only limitations on state legislative power were those
specified in the constitution. On occasion, however, powerful and persuasive voices still invoked extraconstitutional
limitations in defense of unenumerated rights. This was
clearly the basis for the Supreme Court's all but unanimous
decision in Loan Association v. Topeka decided in 1875.
"The theory of our governments. State and National, is
opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere," Justice
Miller declared for the court.
"There are limitations on
such power which grow out of the essential nature of all
free governments.
Implied reservations of individual rights,
without which the social compact could not exist, and which
are respected by all governments entitled to the name. "22
In the end it made very little difference to state legislatures how their powers were delimited.
Conservative judges
simply read the unenumerated rights which they valued m.ost
highly into the constitution. Thus, it was no longer necessary to strike down laws impairing vested property rights
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on the ground that they violated the "general principles
which are common to our free institutions"; the obligation
of contract clause, standing alone, served just as well.
Nor, later, was there any need to treat the employer's
freedom of contract as a natural right when it could so
easily be considered part of the "liberty" protected by
So, too, the right of public
the Fourteenth Amendment.
service corporations to whatever rate of return the courts
thought "reasonable" was held to be protected by the requirement of "due process of law."
In this way the "general
principles" of laissez faire became for many years part of
our written constitutions, state and national alike. ^3
THE REDISCOVERY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT

With the coming of the New Deal, of course, laissez faire
lost its status as higher law.
The Supreme Court is no
longer willing to exalt the economic freedom of the businessman and property owner on the grounds, seldom explicit,
that they are represented strongly enough in the political
branches not to be in special need of judicial protection.
Not that the present court is any less willing to enforce
unenumerated rights against the government, state and
Only the beneficiaries of its interventions
national.
have changed; now it is unpopular or underrepresented
minorities who are most likely to be protected in the enjoyment of their rights, whether enumerated or not. There
is one other difference between the new court and the old
in this respect.
The justices now are more willing than
their predecessors to enforce unenumerated rights explicitly
if, as yet, only partially on the basis of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. Prior to the New Deal, whenever unenumerated rights were given judicial protection it was almost always through incorporation or absorption into one or more
of the enumerated rights.
In 1947, however, the Supreme
Court for the first time accepted a claim to an unenumerated
right based on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Among the
"political rights reserved to the people," it ruled, is the
"right of a citizen to act as party official or worker to
further his own political views."
More recently, the Supreme Court has identified one other
basic right retained by the people under the Ninth Amendmentthe right to marital privacy.
The case in question arose
out of the sporadic enforcement of a Connecticut law forbidding anyone to use or to instruct others in the use of
contraceptives. The law, which even the two dissenters admitted was "uncommonly silly," was so broadly drawn as to
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include married couples and their physician. Although the
constitution nowhere guarantees husbands and wives privacy
in their sexual relations, seven of the nine members of the
court agreed that the law was unconstitutional an^^v-'ay
Of
the seven, moreover, only Justice Harlan based his position
The other six justices of
on the usual due process grounds.
the majority were not content to stop there.
Their spokesman
was Justice Douglas.
The right to marital privacy, he pointed
out, is older than the Bill of Rights and, though not enumerated there, it falls within the "zone of privacy" formed by
"emanations" from no less than five of the first ten amendments, including the Ninth.
Justices Goldberg and Brennan,
and Chief Justice Warren, placed even more stress on the
Ninth Amendment.
"To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right to
privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is
not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution," Justice Goldberg declared, "is to
ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever,
This is not to suggest that the Ninth Amendment constitutes
an "independent source of rights" or is made binding as such
on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is to
suggest, "that the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight amendments "25
.

.

Prophecy is hazardous where the Supreme Court is concerned,
but, if the Mitchell and Griswold cases mean anything, it is
If
that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are not redundancies.
this is true, the implications for the drafting of state constitutions should be obvious. As long as the people retain
certain rights not unen\amerated in any written constitution,
national or state, the powers of their government can never
If neither the
be plenary at any level, state or national.
national government nor the state governments can claim inherent or plenary power, their authority must be derived
from the one source which represents most clearly the soverIn short,
eign will of the people a written constitution.
a state constitution is a "granting instrument" in almost
the same sense and to about the same degree as the U. S.
constitution.
And once the distinction between a "granting"
and a "restraining" constitution breaks down, so does the
rationale for evaluating state constitutions by different
standards than the national constitution.
State constitutions may well continue to be longer and more detailed than
the national constitution but not because the national model
is inappropriate.
Some of the reasons for their greater
length are suggested in the next two chapters.

—
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CHAPTER IV
WHAT SHOULD A STATE CONSTITUTION CONTAIN?
By David Fellman

For a variety of historical reasons, and not because of
abstract cogitation, the American people have always regarded the written constitution as the essential basis of
The colonial experience with the
legitimate government.
common law and written charters, to which appeal was constantly made in recurring disputes with the home government;
the concept that the state rested on contract, which dominated political thinking in the eighteenth century; and
the appeal to a higher law as justification for revolution
established for us the proposition that government is not
the state, but only its agent, deriving its just powers
from the consent of the governed as set forth in a written
constitution emanating from the people. Thus, Chief
Justice John Marshall spoke in an authentic American genre
when he wrote in one of his most celebrated opinions:

That the people have an original right to establish,
for their future government, such principles, as, in
their opinion, shall most conduce to their own
happiness, is the basis on which the whole American
fabric has been erected.
THE AMERICAN IDEA OF A CONSTITUTION

Pursuant to a resolution adopted by the Continental Congress on May 15, 1776, the people of the various states
began to write constitutions, and they have been at it ever
since.
The original state constitutions summarized the
political ideas which then prevailed.
It is an interesting
paradox that these documents of the Revolution were

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
David Fellman.
"What should a State Constitution Contain?'
Chapter 8 in Major Problems in State Constitutional Re vision edited by W. Brooke Graves, pp. 137-158.
Chicago:
Public Administration Service, 1960.
,
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essentially conservative in tone; they did not break more new
ground, but sought largely to conserve the prevailing values
They were very brief documents, running from
of their age
about 5 to 16 pages of ordinary print, and they stated very
concisely certain basic principles regarding popular sovereignty, the spearation of powers and checks and balances,
individual liberty and the supremacy of law, and the superiority among governmental institutions of the legislative body
as the authentic voice of the people.
.

-^

In the ensuing years, however, as new states entered the
Union and old constitutions were occasionally revised, these
documents necessarily changed in response to the evolving
patters of American life.
It has well been remarked that
a study of our state constitutions "affords a perfect mirror
of American democracy, "4 since they have always articulated
the varied and changing interests and conditions of the
American people. They reflect the steady growth of executive power, the erosion of popular confidence in the legislature through the multiplication of constitutional limitations, the extension of popular participation in government
as a consequence of the flowering of a democratic spirit,
the rise of corporations to a dominant position in the economy, the Civil War and Reconstruction, the steady growth
of commerce and industry, and the development of vast new
urban communities.
It cannot be gainsaid that the American people have had a
very considerable experience in tinkering with their state
constitutions. Louisiana has had 10 constitutions in its
history, Georgia 8, South Carolina 7, and Alabama 6.
Four
states have had 5 constitutions each, and 8 states have had
4 each.
While 18 states have had only 1 constitution each,
all of them have been amended many times.
There have been
134 state constitutions in all, and it has been estimated
that the present documents have been amended over 3,000
times.
Of existing constitutions, only 7 were drafted before 1850,^ 7 were drawn up between 1851 and 1865, and all
the others date since the end of the Civil War, with the
largest bulge in the curve appearing in the period 18761900.
All but 10 states have constitutions which antedate
1900.
There have been a few general constitutional revisions
in recent years, in New York in 1938, Missouri" and Georgia
in 1945, New Jersey in 1947, and Tennessee in 1953.
The
adoption of constitutions since 1950 by Puerto Rico, Hawaii,
and Alaska has stimulated a great deal of fresh interest in
the whole problem of drafting such documents.'
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Though no two state constitutions are alike in all details,
all of them conform roughly to a common pattern.
First,
there is a preamble, repeating in rather stock phrases certain first principles regarding the nature and purposes of
government. Then there is a bill of rights, spelling out
in familiar language the basic rights of conscience and of
property and the rights of persons accused of crime. The
next three articles usually deal with the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the state government,
in that order, describing their structure, powers, and
limitations.
At the end is an article dealing with the
methods of constitutional amendment or revision and a schedule for the transition to the new dispensation.
In addition,
most state constitutions have articles of varying length and
detail on a wide variety of additional subjects, notably
education, local government, the suffrage, public finance,
corporations, and other business organizations. While the
state constitution generally is not regarded as a grant of
powers to the legislature, since the legislature has all
powers not denied to it by either the federal or its state
constitution," the contemporary documents reflect the modern
interest in new social services by authorizing or even
directing legislative activity in regard to welfare and
health activities, care of the aged, social security, unemployment, workmen's compensation, and the like.

However detailed state constitutions may be, as in the case
of the federal Constitution custom plays a large role in the
actual functioning of state government. No document can say
everything, though some states have over-loaded their constitutions with details.
Some of the most significant aspects
of state government are not provided for in constitutional
language.
Many of the most important activities of the political parties fall within the scope of custom. The party
caucus in the legislature, which may very well dominate the
formal proceedings, is a product of custom, as is the representation of minority parties on legislative committees. The
elaborate body of practices that defines the relationships
between the governor and the legislature is largely unwritten.
CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
If students of contemporary state government agree upon anything, it is that modern state constitutions are seriously

defective and need considerable revision.^ While very little
has been written in a systematic way about the proper contents
of a state cons-titution, -^^ the concensus of informed opinion
hold that most state constitutions need a great deal of
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attention both to style and to content. Thus a committee of
distinguished legal scholars recently reported, after surveythe New York Constitution from the point of view merely of
simplification, that it was "literally amazed by the extent
to which ...[it] contains hollow phrases, defective provisions,
and creakingly antiquated policies. "H After close study of
54 of the 199 sections of this Constitution, it concluded
that 23 of them should be stricken from the document altogether as superfluous or no longer useful, and that at least 18
should be rewritten and shortened substantially "in order to
achieve clarity, flexibility, and understandability " 12
.

Speaking of the Louisiana Constitution, which is one of the
worst and certainly the most long-winded of all, an able legal scholar has written:

A layman who starts out to study the Louisiana
Constitution... is confronted with a Herculean
task... The document will trip, entangle, infuriate and then exhaust him.
The difficulties presented to the inquiring citizen include the vast
detail, the dispersion of subject matter, confusing terminology, inconsistencies, errors,
references to other legal documents, informal
amending procedures, duplication of material,
contradictions and omissions.!^
Such criticisms are standard. A California constitutional
commission found in 19 30 that the state document was "an
instrument bad in form, inconsistent in many particulars,
loaded with unnecessary detail, encumbered with provisions
of no permanent value, and replete with matter which might
more properly be contained in the statute law of the
State. "-'^ A recent painstaking survey of the Florida Constitution called attention to such faults as excessive
detail, obsolete matter, dispersion of materials, inconsistencies and contradictions, the incorporation by reference of materials outside the document^ and errors. 15 jn
1955, a constitutional committee in Oregon recommended
changes for the improvement of syntax, the deletion of
statutory, obsolete, and unnecessary matter, the rearrangement and clarification of mislocated and poorly-worded provisions, the resolution of ambiguities, and the alteration
or removal of the statements of objectionable policies.
Of
the 232 sections of this Constitution, the committee would
leave untouched only 6 6. 1^

The final report (1955) of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations drew attention to the crucial importance
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of the problem under discussion.

It said:

Early in its study, the Commission was confronted
with the fact that many State constitutions restrict
the scope, effectiveness, and adaptability of State
These self-imposed constitutional
and local accion.
limita^-xons make it difficult for many States to perform all of the services their citizens require, and
consequently have frequently been the underlying
cause of State and municipal pleas for Federal assistance
.

And it added:
It is significant that the Constitution prepared by
the Founding Fathers, with its broad grants of authority and avoidance of legislative detail, has withstood the test of time far better than the constitutions later adopted by the States.

The commission concluded that there is a "very real and pressing need for the States to improve their constititions "-^
.

THE PROBLEM OF DETAIL

The most obvious, and in many ways the crucial, fault of state
constitutions is that they are too detailed. They simply attempt to say far too much on too many subjects. This was not
always so.
The Virginia Constitution of 1776 had about 1,500
words; the New Jersey Constitution of 1776 about 2,500 words;
the New York Constitution of 1777 some 3,000 words; and the
had about
longest of them, that of Massachusetts (1780)
of the Model
size
12,000 words, which, incidentally, is the
State Constitution. Today, 37 state constitutions are longer
than the original Massachusetts document. '^ Of the 8 state
constitutions which have under 10,000 words each, 7 were drafted before the Civil VJar. 19 The dubious honor of being the
wordiest of all is held by the Louisiana Constitution, which in
1960 included 201,423 words, and which, since its adoption in
The second long1921, has been swelled with 356 amendments.
est document is California's, which has been amended 321 times
since 1879 and runs to about 75,000 words.
Other very long
state constitutions are those of Alabama (1901) with 57,000
words and 140 amendments; Texas (1876) with 43,000 words and
133 amendments;
Washington (1889) with 36,422 words and 32
amendments; and Oklahoma (19 07) with 35,940 words and 39
amendments.
The newly-revised Missouri Constitution (1945)
,
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has about 30,000 words, and the New Jersey Constitution of
1947 has some 12,500.
The Constitution of Alaska (1956) has
12,000 words; that of Hawaii (1950) 11,412; and that of
Puerto Rico (1952) 8,560.
Clearly, the current accent in
constitution-writing is on brevity. 20

Almost any constitution will supply examples of details
that hardly rise to the dignity of a place in such a document.
The Oklahoma Constitution devotes 20 pages to the division of
the state into counties and the definition of their boundaries (Art. XVII)
has over 300 words on the piddling subject
of free transportation by railroads (Art. IX, sec. 13) and
even stipulates that home economics must be taught in all
public schools (Art. XIII, sec. 7). At the same level of
importance is a provision in the South Dakota Constitution
which authorizes a twine and cordage plant at the state penitentiary (Art. XI, sec. 1) and a clause in the Constitution
of South Carolina which defines what shall constitute a
"durable hard surface" street in the city of Greenville
(Art. X, sec. 14).
Many state constitutions spell out in
precise sums the salaries of public officers and prescribe
the election of a large variety of public officers (e.g., the
Constitution of Texas provides for the popular election of
the inspector of hides and animals and the public weighers.
Art. XVI, sees. 64, 65).
Small wonder that someone recently
suggested to the Kentucky Constitution Review Commission that
a clause be added stipulating that "no whiskey be sold in
the State under four years old and made from 100 percent corn
or rye. No neutral spirits added. "^1 why not?
,

Local government is one of many subjects which state constitutions are apt to treat with excessive detail. For example,
about one-sixth of the long California Constitution is concerned with details of city and county government (Art. XI)
and the Louisiana Constitution devotes 28 pages to the government of New Orleans (Art. XIV, sees. 20-31.1).

Another subject upon which state constitutions lavish words
is public finance.
The South Carolina Constitution sets up
certain local debt limitations and then devotes almost 14
pages to spelling out exceptions (Art. VIII, sec. 7); it also
has 12 pages of exceptions to the revenue provisions (Art. X
sec. 5)
The Louisiana Constitution has several thousand words
on the one-cent-per-gallon tax on nonmotor fuels, even going
so far as to define the term as meaning "all volatile gasgenerating liquids having a flash point below 110 degrees
F...." (Art. VI-A)
Ten per cent of the California Constitution deals with revenue and taxation (Arts. XIII, XVI). 22
The Texas Constitution spells out the upper limit of taxation
.

.
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by rural fire-prevention districts

(Art.

Ill, sec.

48-d)

Many state constitutions have elaborate sections on the highway system, the Louisiana Constitution devoting 25 pages to
Education, elections corpthe subject (Art VI, sees. 20-23).
orations, and court procedure also are given a great deal of
Soiuc constitutions, like that of Delaware (Art. V,
space.
sees 7-8)
incorporate what is in substance a corrupt practices statute. ^-^ The New York Constitution includes all sorts
of minor matters--a section on veterans' preference in regard
to civil service appointments (Art. V, See 6), an elaborate
section on the elimination of railroad grade crossings (Art.
VII, sec. 14), a clause permitting pari-mutuel betting (Art.l,
sec. 9)
long sections on the debt limits of municipalities
(Art. VIII), and elaborate provisions on the bribery of public
officers (Art. XIII, sees. 2-5). Most of these matters belong
in the statute books.
,

,

Why have the state eonsitutions become such wordy documents?
All observers agree that the principal reason has been the
growth of popular distrust of the legislature; and some provisions are really commands to the legislature to make sure
that it does certain things.
For example, the Oklahoma constitution directs the Legislature to revise the statutes
periodically (Art. V, See. 43) and to legislate against monop"
olies (Art. V, sec. 44), and the Illinois Constitution directs
the General Assembly to enact safety laws for miners (Art. IV,
sec. 29)
Many state constitutional provisions reflect the
growing complexity of the social and economic order in regard
to such matters as corporations, public utilities, and social
legislation. Some constitutional provisions, such as those
dealing with social security and labor, were designed to overcome the anticipated opposition of conservative courts.
Court decisions have often been overruled by constitutional
amendments. The triumph of Jacksonian democracy explains the
elaboration of provisions dealing with the suffrage and the
election of more and more public officers. The need for new
governmental machinery to handle emerging problems has led to
the expansion of constitutions to create new administrative
agencies.
The rapid growth of government business in recent
decades has resulted in new constitutional sections dealing
with such topics as the civil service, public works, and the
letting of contracts
.

Very often an item is inserted into a state constitution
because, as in the case of homestead exemptions, the makers
of the document feel that it is particularly important and
should be put beyond the possibility of legislative tinkering.
Furthermore, members of constitutional conventions often get
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into the odd habit of assuming that in some special way they
are endowed with more wisdom and righteousness than members
of future legislatures are likely to have.
Thus, a member
of the Illinois Convention of 1870 declared:
It is assumed that when we depart from this hall all
the virtue and all the wisdom of the state will have
departed with us. We have assumed that we alone are
honest and wise enough to determine for the people the
ordinary, and in many instances even the most trivial,
questions affecting the public welfare; as if the mass
of people of the state of Illinois were not as competent hereafter to select others that are honest and
capable as they were to select us.^'*

In addition, many constitutional provisions represent either
the hopes or fears of special interest groups who want their
particular views nailed down.

Finally, it remains to be noted that a democratic people will
necessarily find the quickest and surest means of having their
way.
In some states it is as easy to amend the constitution
as it is to adopt a statute by the initiative and referendum.
Writing a new constitution, or amending it, has often been
found to be a quicker and simpler method of securing reforms
than legislative action.
The American People, Lord Bryce
observed in his celebrated book on our governmental system,
have a "conscious relish for power," and "there is an unmistakable wish in the minds of the people to act directly rather
than through their representatives in legislation. "25
Of course, the more detailed a constitution is, the more often
it has to be amended.
Thus, it is the fate of a long constitution that in the very nature of things it has to grow longer.
There is simply more to amend.
It follows that wordy constitutions must be changed frequently, so that they get wordier
still.
It is an inexorable vicious circle.
If there is any proposition which meets with approval among
informed students of American public law, it is that most
state constitutions are too long, and that constitutional
verbosity entails many undesirable consequences.
It deprives
the legislature of adequate control over its normal functions.
Governor Driscoll, in his opening address to the New Jersey
Constitutional Convention of 1947, said:
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When legislation is permitted to infiltrate a
constitution, it shackles the hands of the men
and women elected by the people to exercise
public authority. The longer a constitution,
the more quickly it fails to meet the requirements of a society that is never static. 26
That constitutional verbosity leads to infexibility is illustrated in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
holding that the state Corporation Commission had no jurisdiction over air transport ^"7 The state Constitution (Art.
IX, sec. 18) gives the commission jurisdiction to regulate
"all transportation and transmission companies," but unfortunately, it goes on to define the term by listing railroads,
steamboat lines, express companies, and the like. Of course,
when the enumeration was written air transport was unknown.
From a strictly legalistic point of view, the holding that
an enumeration excludes all things not in the list was not
a bad decision, but from a policy point of view it makes no
sense at all.
.

The wordy state constitution is a constant invitation to
For the more
litigation and therefore burdens the courts.
the constitution says, the more bases there are on which to
contest in court the legality of legislative and executive
In fact, courts frequently make rulings they wish
actions.
they could avoid, for after all it is a cardinal principle
of American law that a constitutional provision controls all
For example, the Texas Constituother acts of government.
tion (Art. V, sec. 12) stipulates that all indictments must
conclude with the words "against the peace and dignity of
On one occasion a man was convicted on an indictthe State."
ment that said, erroneously, "against the peace and dignity
of the statute ."
The Texas Court of Appeals felt obliged,
however reluctantly, to set aside the conviction, saying:

However much we may feel disposed to consider a matter prescribed by the Constitution ill-advised or
useless however much we may be inclined to doubt
the propriety of inserting into the organic, fundamental law of the State requisites of forms with
regard to procedure and practice in the courts-the answer is, the people themselves, the source of
all power and authority in a republican government,
have spoken it; and with regard to their ipse dixit
when contained in the Constitution, which is but
the expression of their sovereign will, the courts
can only bow in humble obedience, and say "its est

—

saripta. "^°
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Excessive constitutional detail is bad for many reasons.
It
solidifies the entrenchment of vested interests.
It makes
temporary matters permanent.
It deprives state legislatures
and local governments of desirable flexibility and diminishes
their sense of responsibility.
It encourages the search for
methods of evading constitutional provisions and thus tends
to debase our sense of constitutional morality.
It makes
frequent recourse to the amending processes inevitable.
It
It
hinders action in time of special stress or emergency.
stands in the way of healthy progress.
It blurs the distinction between constitutional and statute law, to the detriment
of both.
It creates badly written instruments full of obsolete, repetitious, misleading provisions.
Above all it
confuses the public, and in fact makes it certain that few
will ever bother to read the state constitution. This is
extremely unfortunate, since one of the main purposes of a
constitution is to educate the public in first principles.
How can the people be expected to respect a constitution they
never read, and which may in fact be altogether unreadable?
Long ago Chief Justice John Marshall made this crystal clear:
,

A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all
the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit,
and of all the means by which they may be carried
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a
legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the
human mind.
It would probably never be understood by
the public.
Its nature, therefore, requires, that
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients
which compose those objects be deduced from the
nature of the objects themselves 29
.

OTHER FAILINGS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Contemporary state constitutions are ripe for drastic revision
for many other reasons:
among them, to purge them of obsolete
or unnecessary words, phrases, and clauses, to correct errors
and eliminate duplications, to rearrange dispersed sections,
to get rid of inconsistencies and contradictions, and to
restate confusing or even unintelligible terminology.
Almost any constitution will supply examples of obsolete and
unnecessary clauses. Even some words are obsolete. There
IS not much point today in calling the legislature a "General
Court," as does the New Hampshire Constitution (Part II,
Art. 2), or in referring to citizens as "subjects" (Part II,
Arts. 14-16)
Nor is there much excuse in our day for such
words as "doth" and "hath" and "dwelleth." No utility is
.
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served by incorporating specific figures for salaries in the
constitution (e.g., Florida Constitution, Art IV, sec. 29),
where the legislature is allowed to change them and in fact
Constitutional provisions forbidding outlawry
has done so.
(e.g., Texas Constitution, Art. I, sec. 20), or dueling
(e.g., Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. XII, sec. 3), or
hereditary privileges (e.g.. West Virginia Constitution, Art.
Ill, sec. 19), or titles of nobility (e.g., Oregon Constitution, Art. I, sec. 29), or the quartering of troops in private
homes (e.g., Nebraska Constitution, Art. I, sec. 18), or
feudal land tenures (e.g.. New York Constitution, Art. I,
sec. 10) are completely obsolete today.

Many constitutional provisions are obsolete because of the
passage of time. Thus the South Dakota Constitution, which
went into effect in 1889, still directs the Legislature to
submit the question of woman suffrage to the voters at its
first session (Art. VII, sec. 2)
Provisions in the Florida
Constitution (Art. IX, sees. 12, 14) granting tax exemptions
to certain interests for a period of years have been obsolete
since the tolling of the period.
The provisions of the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873 on state sinking and reserve
funds are archaic (Art. IX, sees. 11-13).
The clause in the
New Hampshire Constitution (Part I, Art. 6) which authorizes
the towns to support "public protestant teachers of piety,
So also is the West
religion, and morality" is obsolete.
Virginia provision relating to the disabilities of citizens
who participated in the Civil War (Art. VIII, sec. 20).
.

Many state constitutional clauses are obsolete because the
problems to which they were addressed are no longer with us.
For example, the section of the New York Constitution (Art.
Ill, sec. 17) which spells out certain restraints on the
construction of street railways is obsolete because no one
in his right mind would even dream of building a street railway today.
Similarly, the New York provision (Art. I,
sec 13) relating to land transactions involving Indians is
obsolete.
Iowa's limitation of leases to a period of 20
years (Art I, sec. 24) grew out of the antirent disturbances
on the Van Rensselaer manor in New York in the 1840 's, and
is now archaic. ^'^ The West Virginia provision that railroad
officials are not eligible for membership in the Legislature
(Art. VI, sec. 13) is but the echo of a dead controversy.
A staff report of the California Joint Interim Committee on
Constitutional Revision, 1947-1948, listed 81 provisions of
Among
the state Constitution which it regarded as obsolete.
them were a solemn assertion of the right to fish (Art. I,
a
sec. 25)
a prohibition of slavery (Art. I, sec. 18)
meaningless clause of aliens (Art. I, sec 17), a clause deal-.
,

,

-53-

WHAT SHOULD A STATE CONSTITUTION CONTAIN?

ing with emergency relief administration in the 1930 depression (Art. XVI, sec. 10)
and sections dealing with dueling
(Art. XX, sec. 2)
the Chinese (Art. XIX)
taxation (Art.
XIII, sees. 15-1/2, 16-1/2), the election of judges (Art. VI,
sees. 3, 4a, 15, 17, 25)
the powers of San Francisco in
connection with the 1915 World Fair (Art. XI, sec 8a), the
assessment of property damaged by the earthquake of 1933
(Art. XIII, sec. 8a), the salaries of executive officers (Art,
V, sec. 19), and the liquor question (Art. I, sec. 26a).
,

,

,

,

Still other provisions of state constitutions are dispensable
because they are invalid on federal grounds. A number of
state documents still limit the suffrage to male citizens
(e.g., Kentucky Constitution, sec. 145); such limitation, of
course, is contrary to the supreme law of the land.
Several
constitutions forbid the enactment of legislation prohibiting
emigration from the state (e.g., Kentucky Constitution, sec.
but any such statute would be unconstitutional on feder24)
al grounds.
By the same token it is wholly unnecessary for
a state constitution to forbid slavery (e.g., Utah Constitution, Art. I, sec. 21).
Nor is it necessary for a state to
proclaim that it is an inseparable part of the federal Union
(e.g., Wyoming Constitution, Artl
sec. 37), since it has
no choice in the matter.
The provision in the Oregon Constitution (Art. 1, sec. 31) authorizing the legislature to regulate the immigration into the state of persons not qualified
to become citizens and guaranteeing equal rights only to
"white foreigners" is invalid under federal law.
The New
Hampshire provision (Part II, Art. 51) which authorizes the
Governor to engage in war is illegal, and the declaration
that the state has all powers not expressly delegated to the
United States (Part I, Art. 7) is contrary to declared federal law.
,

.

All sorts of constitutional clauses are now unnecessary or
undesirable for a variety of reasons.
It may have been all
right for West Virginia, in 1872, to give the Governor only
five days in which to make up his mind to sign or veto legislation (Art. VII, sec. 14)
but modern conditions require
more time.-''^ Provisions requiring automatic reapportionment
by the legislature (e.g., Pennsylvania Constitution, Art II,
sec. 18) simply do not work.
The relating of representation
in the New Hampshire Senate to direct taxes paid (Part II,
Art. 26) is not consonant with modern thinking.
And a large
majority of state constitutions are out-of-date on the subject of representation in the legislature ^^
,

.

It is wholly unnecessary for a state constitution to declare
(e.g., Texas Constitution, Art. Ill, sec. 42) that the legislature may pass laws to carry the document into effect.
It
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is also unnecessary for the document to declare that statutes

in violation of the constitution shall be declared void by
the judiciary (e.g., Georgia Constitution, Art I, sec. 4,
It is hardly necessary for the constitution to authpar. 2)
orize the legislature to pass vagrancy laws, or to establish
rural fire prevention districts, or to enact laws prescribing
the qualifications of medical practioners (Texas Constitution
Art. Ill, sees. 46, 48-d, Art. XVI, sec. 31).
.

Constitutions often contain meaningless clauses which ought
to be rephrased or deleted.
No one has ever been able to
figure out for example, what the California Constitution means
when it declares (Art. V, sec. 6) that the Governor "shall
transact all executive business with the officers of government....", or when it says (Art. XVII, sec. 2):
"The holding
of large tracts of land, uncultivated and unimproved by individuals or corporations, is against the public interest,
and should be discouraged by all means not inconsistent with
the rights of private property." And what does the Pennsylvania clause (Art. II, sec. 13) really say which asserts that
"the sessions of each House and of committees of the whole
shall be open, unless when the business is such as ought to
be kept secret"?
The tidying up of constitutions would also correct errors
in grammar and spelling and misnumbering.
Quite a few Florida
sections have been misnumbered (Art. V, sec. 49, Art. VIII,
sees. 12-15, 20-21)
and there are two sections 14a in the
Louisiana Constitution. Something of a prize should be
awarded to those who wrote section 71 of Article VII of the
Louisiana Constitution. This article devotes 97 sections
to the subject of the judicial system.
Section 71 deals with
coroners, and declares, "provided, this article shall not
apply to any parish in which there is no regularly licensed
physician, who will accept the office." Taken literally,
this means that such a parish would be removed from the
state's judicial system, and presumably live in something of
a state of nature.
,

There are also contradictions to resolve. Thus the South
Carolina Constitution declares that the General Assembly
"shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof" (Art. I, sec. 4), but
it also says that "no person who denies the existence of a
Supreme Being shall hold any office under this Constitution"
(Art. XVII, sec. 4).
The West Virginia Legislature is directed to enact "proper laws" for the registration of all
voters (Art. IV, sec. 12)
but in the next breath is forbidden to establish a board of registration of voters (Art.
,
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One section of the Florida Constitution decrees
43).
that there shall be no more than 15 judicial circuits (Art. V,
sec. 45)
and a later section creates another one (Art. V,

VI, sec.

,

sec.

51)

.

Another piece of unfinished business is the rearrangement of
badly organized constitutional provisions. One might well
begin with the provision in the New York Constitution (Art. I,
sec. 9) which permits pari-mutuel betting and which is located
in the bill of rights.
In the very same section is a provision that no divorce shall be granted except by judicial
proceedings.
Surely, here are two fish in the wrong pond!
The same document also has provisions relating to the removal
of judges in four different sections (Art. VI, sees. 9, 9a,
10, 17) and excess condemnation provisions in two (Art. I,
Sec. 7 Art. XVIII, sec. 8).
Materials in the Louisiana Constitution dealing with the executive branch are scattered in
17 different articles, taxation in 6, and local government in
7.
One section of the South Dakota Constitution fixes the
per diem pay of legislators (Art. Ill, sec. 6), but 33 pages
and 18 articles later the legislators are authorized to fix
their own salaries (Art. XXI, sec. 2)
Still another bad habit of constitution-makers is the incorporation by reference of all sorts of nonconstitutional documents.
Thus a 1945 amendment to the Georgia Constitution
incorporates a statute enacted by the legislature in 1902
(Art. I, sec. 6, par. 1).
The section of the Florida Constitution which deals with the distribution of the gasoline tax
to the counties incorporates a 1931 statute (Art. IX, sec. 16)
and another section of this document even incorporates by
reference certain resolutions of a county commission (Art.
VIII, sec. 11)
The Louisiana Constitution, which is so rich
in examples of what is wrong with state constitutions, includes
by reference sections of seven previous constitutions, many
state and federal laws, municipal ordinances, and even several
resolutions or contracts of governmental boards. A competent
scholar has computed that it gives some degree of constitutional status to 179 documents. -^^ One section (Art. XIV,
sec. 23.1) dealing with sewerage, water, and drainage in New
Orleans incorporates by reference an 1899 statute which has
been amended 10 times!
.

THE UPDATING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

State constitutions need frequent attention to make sure they
are in tune with the times. ^^ Many traditional clauses in
bills of rights are ripe for re-examination, and some
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deadwood, such as clauses dealing with the right to bear arms,
the quartering of troops, and the granting of titles of
While most of the tradinobility, can be pruned away.
tional guaranties are still acceptable, recently-revised
documents spell out such rights as the right of labor to
organize and bargain collectively, the right of the worker to just compensation and to a reasonable working day,
the right to social security, and the right of employed
minors and women to special protection. 37 while provisions against discrimination are by no means novel, the
newer constitutions are especially meticulous and, indeed,
often quite eloquent on the subject, o There are new
clauses dealing with such current problems as wiretapping-^^
and fairness in legislative investigations.^^ The Model
State Constitution includes a clause which is designed to
strengthen the whole conception of a bill of rights by
specifying that any citizen may go to court to restrain
the violation of any constitutional provision (sec. 113.)

A great many clauses dealing with the legislature need
rethinking, as the interesting suggestions of the Model
State Constitution on this subject would indicate.
For
it directs attention to the very structure of the legislature, with the recommendation of a unicameral in place of
the traditional bicameral body, with authority to sit as
long as it wishes whenever it wishes, and with many suggestions regarding such matters as automatic reapportionment, improvement of committee procedures, and aids to
legislation. ^1 One of the most widely discussed features of
modern state government is the failure of legislatures to
carry out constitutional provisions requiring the periodical reapportionment of the legislative seats.
From the
point of view of population a very large majority of state
legislatures are unrepresentative. Since American courts
refuse to order legislatures to do their constitutional
duty by writ, one solution is to provide for some sort of
automatic reapportionment by a non-legislative body, as
has been done in a few recent instances. ^^

Constitutional articles relating to the state executive are
also subject to widespread debate.
In the words of the
final report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations:
Today few States have an adequate executive branch
headed by a governor who can be held generally
accountable for executing and administering the
laws of the State....
Typically, though not universally, the governor is the nominal chief of a sprawling State administration consisting of scores of
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separate departments, commissions, and agencies....
Few governors have been supplied with modern staff
agencies and tools of management adequate to the
administrative responsibility presumed to be vested in them.^-^

What is required for the state executive branch is concentration of authority and responsibility, functional integration,
the removal of boards and commissions from purely administrative work, the coordination of staff services, and provision
for an independent audit. ^'* While the office of governor has
become much more powerful than it was in the early days of
the Republic, ^^ its power still is kept dispersed and disintegrated and does not measure up to the requirements of
modern administration. The main objective of the sections of
the Model State Constitution dealing with this subject is to
create an adequate governorship by making the executive
branch a reality. An important step in this direction is
short ballot reform. ^^ Other needs of the office of governor
are now being debated:
longer terms of office, control of
department heads, the item veto, power over administrative
reorganization, and more effective budgetary controls.
It is equally necessary to create a judicial department, since
all that most states have today is a congeries of various
types of courts having various sorts of jurisdictions.
Roscoe
Pound has made it abundantly clear that in each state the
whole judicial power should be vested in one single great
court, divided into departments or divisions and containing
a great deal of internal flexibility.^^
Such is the central
point of the article of the Model State Constitution on the
judiciary, for it would make all courts of the state parts
of a unified "general court of justice," consisting of a
single supreme court department and other departments.
The
chief justice would be elected by the voters for an 8-year
term, and he in turn would appoint all other judges for
12-year terms from lists of three presented to him by the
judicial council. After an appointive judge has served four
years, he would have to submit his record to the voters.
In
addition, the Supreme Court would have the rule-making power.
Thus the purposes of this article are to unify the court
system, give it internal flexibility, and give the judges
political independence. Both the Missouri and New Jersey
constitutions have taken important strides in this direction,
as have the new constitutions of Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto
Rico.^° Most state constitutions, however, still have a long
road to travel before they begin to approximate the desired
goal of judicial integration.
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Most other major sections of state constitutions need rethinkCertainly this is true for provisions that deal with
ing.
It is time to reconsider all the restriclocal government.
tions imposed upon the legislature in connection with local
government that often make desirable flexibility impossible ^^
The emphasis in the newer state constitutions is upon local
home rule.^*^ It is also imperative that adequate provision be
made for urgent problems growing out of urban growth, such
as annexation and consolidation of local units, intergovernmental cooperation, city-county consolidation, debt limitations, local budgeting, sliom clearance, and urban renewal.
Equally pressing in a great many states is the question of reviewing the sections dealing with state finance. Here, to6,
the current tendency is to reduce restrictions upon the legislative power and to simplify and liberalize provisions on
this subject. ^-'
.

Finally, attention should be directed toward the amending proIf a state consticedures set forth in state constitutions.
tution is to serve its proper purposes, the door must be open
to change by reasonable procedures ^^ Where the amending process is too difficult, such as the requirement of an extra
ordinary popular vote,^-^ the document tends to get out of
date; on the other hand, if the amending process is too easy,
Ideally,
then the constitution tends to get out of hand.
the amending process should be more difficult than the ordinary legislative process, but not impossibly difficult.
Furthermore, every generation has a right, and indeed an obligation, to review its constitution, and a few documents make
periodic review, or at least its possibility, automatic.-'
Such provisions are altogether consistent with sound democratic theory, for in the last analysis the constitution beFinally,
longs to the people and should express their will.
there has been a highly desirable tendency in recent years
to provide for adequate preliminary spadework through the use
of commissions or other special bodies charged with the function of doing research and writing informed reports on the
problems that are likely to arise. Extensive research preceded constitutional revision in New York in 1938,^^ and
more recently in Missouri, New Jersey, Alaska, Hawaii, and
Puerto Rico. Of course, independent scholars have also
made significant contributions in this field. 56
.

THE QUALITIES OF A GOOD CONSTITUTION
What, then are the proper attributes of a good constitution?
It is difficult to generalize, since a constitution must be
both stable and flexible. Serving as the legal underpinning
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for the commonwealth, it must supply the stability which
orderly government requires; yet it will fail of its pur-,
poses if the door is closed too tightly against change
and adaptation.
Indeed, in many ways the central problem
is to find a proper balance between stability and change.
John Dickinson once wrote:

The largest number of controversies and causes
of dissatisfaction that arise under a written
constitution are connected with the question of
progress.... The function of a written constitution is to provide... a principle and framework of order within which change can proceed
without endangering stability. 57

Furthermore, there has never been an ideal state constitution, and no constitution could possibly be ideal for all
states.
A document which is suitable for the needs of a
maritime state might not do very well for an arid, inland
state.
Also, every viable constitution must necessarily
reflect the power structure of the particular society it
is designed to serve; it cannot and will not function in
a vacuum.
Nor will a good constitution retain its quality
for very long, in our sort of dynamic society, unless it
can be changed to keep up with the times.
Even the Model
State Constitution, which the National Municipal League
first published in 1921, has been revised periodically,
with a fifth edition appearing in 1948, and a sixth under
study today.
Certainly, the first requisite of a good constitution is
brevity.
It is a very great mistake for the authors of a
constitution to attempt to say too much. A constitution is
no place for legal codes or the appeasement of temporary
interests.
It should do no more than set down fundamental
and enduring first principles.
It must describe the basic
framework of government, assign the institutions their
powers, spell out the fundamental rights of man, and make
provision for peaceful change. But it should do all of these
things in general rather than in overly detailed language,
and should attempt no more.
And there is reason to believe
that prevailing conditions are such that the goal of a
concise constitution is now feasible, since courts today
rarely stand in the way of social legislation, there has
been an observable decline in the legislative appetite for
special legislation, the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution sets limits to many types of state misbehavior, and modern means of mass communication are
tremendously important checks upon improper legislation.
An effective free press is probably a more/ efficacious
-60-

WHAT SHOULD A STATE CONSTITUTION CONTAIN?

Furthermore,
check than formal constitutional limitations.
there is a growing public awareness that holding legislators
politically accountable for what they do protects the public
interest more surely than constitutional caveats which hamstring any sort of action.
A second quality of a good constitution is readability, for
one of its central purposes is to educate the public in first
principles.
If it is to fulfill this objective it must be
something the average citizen will undertake to read. It
should therefore be written in good, modern English; obsolete
terminology should be avoided; ambiguous phraseology should
be clarified; and repetitious or contradictory language
should be corrected. The articles, sections, and clauses
should be arranged in a logical and orderly way.
In short,
the constitution should be intelligible to ordinary people,
if it is to command confidence and, indeed, general reverence,
It is not merely or primarily a lawyer's document to be maIt is above everything else a
nipulated in litigation.
people's charter, a statement of their essential conceptions
about government.
It follows that the authors of a constitution should use
familiar language. Americans are old hands in this business,
and have developed over the years
indeed the centuries-certain words and phrases to express basic ideas. These
should be retained, because the familiar is apt to be readily
appreciated and understood. For example, almost all state
constitutions have a provision which forbids "cruel and
unusual punishments." The phrase comes from the English Bill
of Rights of 1689.
It was suggested in the recent New Jersey
convention that the words "excessive and unreasonable punishments" be substituted, but the convention wisely rejected
this proposal.
Since the old phrase and the new said the
same thing, it was correctly decided to use the familiar one.
Surely nothing would have been gained by the change, and in
the process an ancient phrase which has served us well would

—

have been needlessly abandoned.
A sound constitutional revision, even if undertaken on a
comprehensive scale, will never change the basic pattern to
which the American people are thoroughly habituated and which
they obviously want to preserve.
The Missouri Constitution
of 1945 illustrates this point, since it is by no means a
new document, many sections dating from the original Constitution of 1820. Though the new Constitution is shorter than
its predecessor, that of 1875, by some 11,000 words, all of
the traditional provisions were included.
But some antiquated sections were eliminated, a great deal of detail was
dropped, language was clarified and simplified, and many
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provisions were rearranged. New provisions were added to
deal with modern problems relating to agriculture, education,
forestry, health, hospitals, libraries, museums, parks, recreation, and welfare.
This, then, is another aspect of a good constitution, that
it makes provision for emerging problems and reflects the
best in current thinking.
A constitutional convention today
will have to concern itself with problems of urban growth
and metropolitan government, reapportionment, aids to legislation, the short ballot, court reorganization, the extension
of the merit system, revenue sources, debt limitations, the
organization of local government, terms of office, highways,
and the expansion of welfare services, including housing,
reclamation of blighted areas, mental care, conservation,
and the like.
Changes in all these areas are now in the air.

Above all, as the Model State Constitution emphasizes, reality
must be given to the concept of the "department." Every
state constitution goes through the motions of asserting that
power is divided among three departments, but in most states
executive and judicial departments are largely fictions.
Where the governor shares power and influence with 10 other
popularly-elected officials and a large number of quasiindependent boards and commissions, one can hardly talk about
an executive department as a reality.
Nor is a mere congeries
of courts a department in any realistic sense.
And wholly apart from the new problems, there are plenty of
old problems that need rethinking.
Bills of Rights should
be clarified and modernized.
Legislatures should be made
smaller and more representative, and given more effective
organization.
Relations between the governor and the legislature can certainly be improved through institutional changes.
The last word has not yet been said on the subject of the executive budget. The governor's term of office is still a
lively issue in many states.
The best method of selecting
judges is another.
Existing initiative and referendum procedures and amending provisions are ripe for reevaluation
Intergovernmental cooperation can and should be encouraged.
Even the minimum age for voting is now being discussed; after
all, the age limit of 21 years was not decreed in heaven.
Finally, it is desirable that the writers of constitutions
should stick as close as possible to reality and avoid making
claims or staking out generalizations which, though theoretically desirable, are impossible of fulfillment. Otherwise,
people are likely to find a constitution something of a
snare and a delusion.
For example, it is customary for most
state constitutions to state flatly an absolute principle of
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separation of powers between the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches.
But a complete separation of powers
is not possible and is, in actuality, to be found nowhere.
What purpose, then, is served by making unrealistic claims?
In this connection, what the New Hampshire Constitution
(Part I, Art. 37) has to say makes a good deal of sense:
In the Government of this State, the three
essential powers thereof, to wit, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, ought to be
kept as separate from, and independent of,
each other, as the nature of a free government
will admit, or as is consistent with that chain
of connection that binds the whole fabric of
the Constitution in one indissoluble bond of
unity and amity.

This is a wholly reasonable proposition.
As far as possible,
a state constitution should be a reasonable document.
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Art. XIV, sec. 2, and Oklahoma, Art. XXIV, sec. 2.
In
November, 1957, the voters of New York rejected the call
for a constitutional convention to meet in 1959 by a
vote of 1,275,000 to 1,175,000.
The new constitutions
of Alaska, Art. XIII, sec. 2, and Hawaii, Art. XV, sec. 2,
provide for submission of this issue to the voters every
10 years, and the Model State Constitution, Art. XIII,
sec. 1301, would submit the question every 15 years.

55.

See Vernon A. O'Rourke and Douglas W. Campbell, Consti tution Making in a Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1943)
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56.

See, e.g.^ the symposium on "Constitutional Revision in
Texas," 35 Texas Law Review 901-1089 (Oct., 1957).

57.

John Dickinson, "The Constitution and Progress," 181
The Annals 11-12 (Sept.
1935)
,

58.

See Model State Constitution, Art. XI, sees. 1100-03.

59.

Two states have lowered the age limit to 18:
Georgia
Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2, and Kentucky Constitution,
sec. 145; the Model State Constitution, Art. II, sec.
The age limit is fixed at 20 in
200, does the same.
the Constitution of Hawaii, Art. II, sec. 1, and at 19
in the Alaska Constitution, Art. V, sec. 1.
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CHAPTER V
THE STATE CONSTITUTION:
ITS FUNCTION AND FORM FOR OUR TIME

By Frank P. Grad^

The last ten or twenty years have seen an unprecedented wave
of activities in state constitutional revision and reform.
State after state has formed constitutional revision commissions, has convened state constitutional conventions, or has
submitted massive blocks of state constitutional amendments
to the electorate.! Much of the discussion relating to the
improvement of state constitutional documents has worn a
The effort is frequently pictured by
somewhat Utopian cast.
some of the more idealistic civic groups, as well as by some
of the more visionary newspapers, as one of achieving something that comes close to an "ideal" state charter. ^ It is
the underlying thesis of this article that this aim overshoots
the mark, and that in state constitution-making we must be
content with something less than the Platonic ideal; we must
aim rather for a constitutional document that is designed to
enable the state to carry on its work of government today and
in the foreseeable future with efficiency and economy and
with minimum interference by unnecessary restrictions. That
is not to say that a state constitution should be so narrowly
concerned with the state's immediate problems as to turn it
effectively into a prescriptive code of laws for their solutions; rather, the state constitution should be an instrument
of government that, like any good instrument or tool, is
suited to the performance of many tasks and not just the immediate task at hand. Viewed in that light, we are likely to
discover that a flexible and adaptable instrument which helps
us in the solution of today's problems is likely to be flexible and adaptable, with only minor modifications, in managing
tomorrow's tasks as well.
It is precisely the broad and flexible charters of an earlier day that are still useful in today's
circumstances, and it is the charters of the late nineteenth
century which were too closely concerned with the solutions of
many narrowly specific and immediate problems that have become
obsolete and that interfere with contemporary solutions because of their mass of detail and resulting rigidity in scope.

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
Its Function and
Frank P. Grad
"The State Constitution:
Form for Our Time." Virginia Law Review 54 (1968), pp. 928-973
.
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It is common to refer to a state constitution as an instrument
of government, and it has been so characterized here.
An instrument is a tool. The suitability and adaptability of a
tool can only be gauged in the relationship to its set task.
Thus, before we may sensibly explore the proper function and
form of state constitutions for our time it is necessary to
review briefly the changing tasks of government in our states.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE
It is part of the rhetoric of the 1960 's to view the states
as being involved in a losing battle against the encroachments
of the strong central authority of the Federal Government.
Whether couched in strident denunciation by so-called states'

rights politicians, or pronounced with more restraint by state
governors who want a greater share of the tax base for state
taxation or who want blanket grants from the Federal Government not earmarked for specific purposes, the usual assertion
is that power has moved from the states to Washington, that
the states are increasingly compelled to cede authority to .a
strong central government, that the states have become weaker
in relationship to the Federal Government, and that a restoration of the balance between state and federal power--be it by
way of state constitutional reform, state governmental reform,
or wholesale return of powers by the Federal Government to
the states--is necessary for the survival of the federal system and for the survival of the states as viable and independent government entities. 3 This general attitude seems to
rest on a kind of preservation of powers principle--an assumption that there is only so much governmental power to go
around, and that if Washington has more, then the states
necessarily have less.^ Although this notion has the charm
of frequent and homely repetition, it is both simplistic and
wrong.
In fact, government generally, be it federal, state,
or local, has more important and more far-reaching functions,
and in consequence exercises greater powers.
There has been
an enormous increase in the size, interests and functions of
government on all levels. ^ This can be demonstrated not only
by reference to the vast new areas of governmental concern
added to the statute books in the last few decennia,^ but also
in the very size of the governmental establishment.
At this
point, one out of every 5.5 persons gainfully employed in the
United States works for a government.' This compares to one
out of every ten persons so employed in 1929. ^ And, if the
number of persons employed by government may be taken as indicative of the increase of governmental concerns and functions, then it may be significant to note that since the end
of World War II the number of persons employed by state and
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local govermnents has been increasing at a considerablygreater rate than the number of persons employed by the
federal establishment.^
The change in the governmental functions of the state has
been in the direction both of broadened powers and of a
vastly new variety of powers. This increase in state powers
results both from social and technological developments and
from the appearance of new areas of governmental concern,
pioneered by the Federal Government.
In brief, the states
today carry all of the powers and functions that they traditionally performed throughout the nineteenth century, -^^
in addition to the new powers and functions they exercise
in consequence of changes in the pattern of living imposed
by technological, 11 industriall2 and scientificl^ developments,
as well as the considerable changes in people's expectations
about the appropriate functions of government 14 There has
clearly been a change from the nineteenth century attitude
that government functions are primarily regulatory, that its
function is to set the rules of the game and to enforce them
so that they are not broken, but to stay aloof otherwise
from the activities of the people. The shift in the twentieth century, and particularly since the 1930 's, has been
an ever-increasing trend to view the state as a provider of
services and economic security for the people. 1^ It is precisely in the rendition of services, rather than in the established exercise of police power functions, that the greatest expansion and extension of governmental power and function has taken place on all levels of government. And it
is precisely because the Federal Government has led so often
in providing the means for and determining the conditions
under which services to the people are to be provided, that
the expansion of state powers and functions has followed and
has been contingent upon the expansion of federal functions
and assertions of power. 1^
.

It may be useful to review briefly what the states did during
the nineteenth century that they still do now and will probably continue to do for some time to come.
In spite of the
fact that federal law has seen unprecedented expansion in
recent years, the major portion of the population has little
contact with federal law or federal officialdom except perhaps
through the Internal Revenue Service or through the Social
Security Administration. Overwhelmingly, state law governs
interpersonal relationships of a civil and legal nature. 17
The laws of real and personal property, the laws of inheritance, descent and distribution, and the laws dealing with
the duties and obligations of members of a family to one
another, are all governed by the state.
Likewise, compulsory
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education requirements, the conditions in institutions of
public education, and the admission to any number of licensed fields, businesses, occupations and professions, are
all determined by the state.
Contractual and commercial
relations of all kinds are still primarily subject to state
law.
Non-contractual relations, such as those growing out
of tortious conduct and out of a variety of breaches of civil
obligations, are regulated by state law. Criminal law, which
sets the outer limits of permissible behavior and prescribes
the penalties for prohibited behavior, is overwhelmingly
state law; very few citizens have any opportunity, in fact,
to commit federal crimes.
Other examples could be given,
but it is clear that the preponderance of interpersonal
relations and of permissible and impermissible conduct in
our society is subject to state rather than federal regulation today, just as it was one hundred years ago. Even
where interstate transactions are concerned, state rather
than federal law may be controlling.
The Uniform Commercial
Code, where adopted, is state law, 18 and commercial transactions involving negotiable instruments of various kinds
are subject to state rather than federal law, though undoubtedly federal legislation to govern this area would be
constitutionally permissible. 19 Thus it is clear that there
has not been any decrease in state powers and functions in
absolute terms, because the state's traditional police power
and power to legislate and adjudicate in areas involving
traditional aspects of private law remain unimpaired.
But is has been asserted that although states have not
suffered a decline in their powers in absolute terms, they
have suffered a decline in powers relative to the Federal
Government. ^° Again, while this is not the place for a full
examination of this problem, the indications are to the contrary.
In fact, it may even be suggested that the assumption
of new functions by the Federal Government in new and nontraditional fields has resulted in a considerable accretion
of powers to the states, which in some respects may exceed
in quantitative terms the new powers asserted by the Federal
Government. A few examples may help make the point.
In
such newly important fields as the control of environmental
pollution, both water pollution and air pollution, the interest of the Federal Government and the availability of funds
for control activities21 have resulted in an enormous increase
in regulatory agencies throughout the country and are likely
to increase the utilization of devices for intergovernmental
cooperation to a greater extent than had ever before been
considered possible. ^2 so too, in the field of regulation
of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, regulatory control,
first a federal monopoly, has been largely returned to the
,
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States under contractual arrangements with the Atomic Energy
Commission.
To be sure, in many instances the Federal
Government calls the tune and sets the standards that the
states and localities must meet in order to become eligible
for federal assistance, or in order to avoid assertion of
But on the
the federal power reserved in federal law.
other hand, from the point of view of the people in any one
state, the law that is likely to be applied in regulating
the emission of pollutants into rivers and into the air, or
that controls the uses of atomic energy, is likely to be
state or local law, and the enforcing agency is likely to be
a state or local agency, and, what is more, it is likely to
be a new agency or a new branch of an old agency especially
created to carry on the new function or to enforce the new
regulations ^-'
-^

.

Another even more significant example is furnished by the vast
growth of social insurance and social welfare programs in the
past thirty years or so.
Such programs have enormously extended federal, state and local functions, and have done so
in such a way that it may be impossible to ascertain which
level is in fact asserting or exercising power in any given
set of circumstances.
The Social Security system and its
various assistance programs operate in part on the basis of
federal law and in part on the basis of state law and statecreated standards.
The most recent additions to the Social
Security system, the Medicare and Medicaid programs27 (which
are likely to grow into a true national health insurance program in the not so distant future)
are based on federal law
but require the exercise of state legislative and regulatory
powers as well as the exercise of local regulatory and fiscal
powers to keep them operating. 28 Demonstrably, the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid has resulted, not in a decrease
of powers of the state, but rather in the exercise of state
powers which but for the requirements of the federal legislation might never have been used or applied.
,

The field of housing and urban development furnishes another
instance of expanded state functions. Federal law has made
the availability of federal funds for urban renewal and other
housing purposes contingent upon the adoption of a "workable
program" by municipalities that wish to take advantage of
the federal grant. ^0 This workable program requires the
municipality to engage actively in community planning and to
render a variety of municipal services, including, most importantly, the establishment and enforcement of codes and
standards bearing upon the health, safety and decency of
housing accommodations. As a result of workable program

-75-

FUNCTION AND FORM

requirements many states have passed comprehensive housing
legislation, and the increase in municipal lawmaking under
state authorization in this area has been almost unbelievable.
Barely thirty years ago there were some fifty-six
housing codes that set standards for health, safety and
decency in housing. There are now some two thousand. 31 The
result of all this is that at least a beginning has been
made in assuring decent habitation for all of the people in
the nation.
It is true that federal housing legislation
initially could be viewed as an increment to federal power.
But if federal power was increased, so was the power of the
states, and through them, the municipalities, because the
housing standards and regulations that are presently being
enforced in every part of the nation are the standards of
the particular state or of the particular locality, and only
very indirectly those of the Federal Government.
The very fact that the business of government today includes
services and is not limited to regulation results in further
complexities. As long as regulatory power was the main tool
of government, a neat concept of three separate layers of
government could be supported, at least to some extent. The
top layer consisted of the regulatory power of the Federal
Government, delegated to the Federal Government by the states,
but nonetheless supreme by virtue of the supremacy clause of
the Constitution. 32 The second layer state government was
considered sovereign in every aspect except insofar as powers
had been delegated to the Federal Government above.
The
third and bottom layer of local government was treated as
the lowest layer in every respect because wholly dependent
on delegation by the state for its existence; for as everyone knows, local government is a creature of the state and
exists only by grace of state delegation. 33 jt is questionable whether this layer cake diagram was ever a wholly adequate description of government in the United States.
It
certainly is so no more. 34 For although it may be possible
to structure regulatory functions in this hierarchical fashion,
it has proved to be impossible to structure service functions
in this manner.
Cooperative federalism, synergistic federalism,
or other terms applicable to federal, state and local cooperation-^-* reflect governmental interaction, not so much in the
regulatory sphere as in the sphere of rendition of services.
When the Federal Government channels housing or health assistance directly to municipalities, it does not necessarily
undermine the authority of the state, but it does act to some
extent contrary to the "creature concept" of local government.
When states authorize municipalities, both within a state and
across state lines, to combine in regional governments or
agencies for particular governmental purposes, and when the

—
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Federal Government lends its support, both technical and
financial, to such regional combinations, the hierarchic
structure is lost and new charts of lines of authority and
responsibility must be developed. 36 with the ever-increasing
variety of services rendered by government, and with the
dimension of the particular task and the nature of the particular service dictating both the optimum jurisdictional
limits and the best organizational structure, it becomes
clear that traditional units of government may no longer
be appropriate for all purposes, that new authorizations
for new intergovernmental combinations may have to be sought,
and that authority may be needed for flexible alignments for
particular purposes rather than rigid allocations of jurisIn a sense, when the business of government condiction. 37
sists more in the rendition of services than in the enforcement of regulations, the question of whose power is being
exercised, whether the Federal Government's, the state's,
or the municipality's, may become largely irrelevant so long
In this sense,
as the service is being rendered effectively.
state power has not decreased quite simply because at crucial
points it has become indistinguishable from the federal power
that sets the conditions and frequently provides the financial means for the rendition of the service. 38
THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE

ON THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The changes in the distribution of powers among federal, state
and local government and the considerable increase in the
functions of state government have implications for state
constitutions and state constitution-making that cannot be
overestimated. The least we may demand of our state constitutions is that they interpose no obstacle to the necessary
exercise of state powers in response to state residents' real
A constitution which
needs and active demands for service.
meets these needs and demands must be an instrument of government that will enable the state to play its part not only
in the traditional activities of state government, but also
in accepting and advancing the new functions, be they service
or regulatory functions, that grow out of the increasingly
close partnership between state and federal governments.

Any review of the adequacy of a state's constitution must begin,
therefore, not by comparing the state's present constitution
with the more recently adopted charter of another state or with
the provisions of some "model" draft, but rather by systematically
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examining the entire machinery and operation of the state's
government 39 Such an examination is necessary to determine,
first, whether the state's government is adequate to meet the
new and contemporary demands made upon it; second, whether
provisions of the existing state constitution interpose obstacles to, or in some manner inhibit, the proper functioning
of state government; and third, whether, absent such constitutional obstacles or inhibitions to proper performance of
government functions, the improvement of the state's governmental machinery and its operation requires improvement by
constitutional revision or change, rather than by some possibly less difficult or costly method.
.

Since effective state constitutional change requires a detailed substantive examination of how the state's business
of government may best be structured in the light of the
functions it must fulfill and the needs it must serve, the
state constitution-maker must first determine the precise
nature of such needs and functions. One cannot gauge the
effectiveness of the tool unless one first determines the
size and scope of the task at hand.
Following the evaluation of the task and the examination of optimum governmental
structure, the constitution-maker must proceed to the more
technical, drafting-oriented considerations regarding the
contextual form of the constitutional document, which form
the major content of this article.

Before we address ourselves to technical matters of state
constitutional content and form, it may be important to draw
attention to a variable that is frequently overlooked.
Discussions of state constitutional reform and of the changed
role of state government in the federal system frequently
treat the fifty states as though they were virtually interchangeable entities. They are not. The governmental concerns of the state of Nevada are unlikely to reach the complexity, diversity and dimension of those of New York; the
concerns of Virginia are likely to be significantly different,
in many respects, from those of Rhode Island.
States differ,
not only in size, urban or rural characteristics, or the
composition of the population, but also with respect to their
relative political maturity. 40

Although the states are not fungibles, a look at the fifty
state constitutions might almost convince one to the contrary.
The states have often been referred to as laboratories of
government, providing an opportunity for experimentation with
different forms of government and with different administrative structures.
In fact, this has not happened to any considerable extent.
In spite of their enormous diversity, it
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is probably safe to say that the similarities between governmental structure in different states are considerably greater
Regardless of population, all but
than their differences.
one^-'- of the states have bicameral legislatures, and almost
all of the states, whether they cover huge areas, like
California, Texas or New York, or whether they are as miniscule as Rhode Island, are subdivided into counties or simiThe number of counties, generally
lar territorial divisions.
speaking, bears no relationship to the size of the state, and
South Dakota has more counties than does California. 42 Nor
does the size of the legislature bear any particular relation
to the size of the states; New Hampshire, one of our less
populous states, has the largest legislature of any. 43 a
study of state constitutions conveys the impression, largely
born out in practice, that the legislative, executive, and
judicial establishments of the several states are not basic
ally dissimilar, whatever minor structural differences between them there may be.
This is unfortunate because smaller
states simply do not share the larger states' need for elaborate governmental structure. The smaller states' virtual
duplication of the larger states' form of government can
only result in dilution of their quality, because the smaller
states have neither the resources nor the manpower reserves
to compete with the larger states on any realistic level.
The state constitution of the state of Rhode Island should
show considerably greater differences from that of New York
or Pennsylvania than it does.
There is no ideal state constitution but simply the best constitution for any one state
at any given period of time.
Model state constitution drafting, an effort in which this writer has occasionally been engaged
must necessarily try to hit an acceptable average for all of
the states, and must limit itself to sage pronouncements in
the commentary that of course a model is not an ideal, but
needs to be adapted to particular local situations 44
.

Against the background of the individual state differences
and the changing role of the states, individually and collectively, in the new state-federal relationship, it is clear
that no static ideal of state constitutional form can be prescribed.
The most that can be done is the enumeration of
approaches, attitudes and criteria that should be applied in
developing a state constitution in its peculiar place and
time.
Past experience in state constitution drafting, amassed
over some 18 years, enables us to attempt the formulation of
such a set of standards or criteria which, if fairly applied,
is likely to result in a sound constitutional product, suitable for its time and situation, and likely to remain so for
a generation or two.
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THE CONTENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
THE NEED FOR CRITERIA OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

There has long been common agreement that a state constitution should be brief and should limit itself to "fundamentals,"
avoiding all "legislative" matter.
Little progress has been
made, however, toward developing more definite guides to help
the constitution-maker in drawing the distinction.
Unless he
is to be content with the notion that "fundamental matter" is
a matter which he wishes to include, and "legislative matter"
is a term of opprobrium to stigmatize everything he wishes to
keep out, 45 he needs more specific criteria to aid him in
determining what matter is appropriate and what is inappropriate for inclusion in the state constitution.
There are some, in fact, to whom the words "fundamental" and
"legislative" do seem to furnish a sufficient distinction, or
who would rely heavily on the Constitution of the United
States to make their point for them.
Professor Munro for
example, has commented in a much cited article:
,

constitution should confine itself to
fundamentals
This of course begs a question as
to what one means by "fundamentals."
True enough,
it is hard to define, but everybody knows what it
means.
Or, if any one does not, he need only read
the Constitution of the United States to acquaint
himself with an organic document which comes measurably near fulfilling the requirement "^^
A state

.

.

It may be questioned, for example, how far the constitution
for a government of delegated and limited powers can serve as
a satisfactory model for the preparation of a constitution
for a state government of plenary, inherent powers.
The
view that the national constitution furnishes an adequate
guide, however, continues to receive some support. 47
In calling for constitutional inclusion of "fundamental" or
"basic" matter only. Professor Munro echoes earlier commentators, and is the forerunner of many later ones.
In a review
of four late nineteenth century state constitutions--two
framed by older states, Mississippi and Kentucky, and two
by states then recently admitted to the Union, Wyoming and

Idaho--a contemporary observer commented:

One of the most marked features of all recent State
constitutions is the distrust shown of the Legislature.

.

.

.
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Enough of these constitutions has been quoted to
show their manifest faults, their verbosity, and
their omissions.
They all err in incorporating
into the organic law matter that should have been
A constitution should
left for legislation. ...
affirm general principles, leaving details to
legislation. 48
Some twenty years later, another critic, reviewing the entire
trend of late nineteenth and early twentieth century constitutionmaking, remarked:
If we contrast these early specimens of written
constitutions with those adopted in the more recent
years by the States, we are at once impressed by
the fact that the theory of the purpose of a constitution has wholly changed. From being a mere
scheme or plan of government, the constitutions of
later time have become, in large part, codes of
statutory law--if the word "code" can properly be
applied to such formless and unsystematic instruments 49
.

A short while later, critical appraisal of state constitutions
was again encouraged by the preparations for the New York
Constitutional Convention of 1915. Again much emphasis was
placed on brevity and elimination of legislative detail:
First, the constitution should be as short as possible, following the model of the federal constitution, which is little more than an enumeration of
the powers of the various branches of the government,
State conto which was added the bill of rights.
They have been
stitutions departed from this model.
enlarged to indefensible lengths, and by reason of
their enlargement and the inclusion of many legislative provisions, the underlying idea of a constitution as a framework of government has been lost sight
of. 50

The emphasis on the inclusion of "fundamentals" and on the exclusion of "legislative" matter continues to the very present.
Discussion of state constitutions was stimulated from the late
thirties to the early fifties by a major flurry of state conExhortations to conventions
stitutional convention activity.
In
to concentrate on "fundamental" matters were commonplace.
New Jersey, the first pamphlet prepared for convention use
under the auspices of a preparatory committee, entitled What
Should a Constitution Contain?, presents a restatement of the
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"fundamental"
"statutory"^^ distinction, giving some examples of each variety.
So too, the Manual on the Legislative
Article prepared for the Missouri Constitutional Convention
of 1943 contains materials stressing the distinction between
"fundamental" and "legislative" provisions in state constitutions, and emphasizes the point that "legislative" matters
in the constitution, whether in the form of commands or grants
to the legislature, "almost certainly come by interpretation
to be also limitations" upon the legislative power. ^2
similar
exhortations to limit constitutional matter to "fundamentals"
were addressed to the Hawaiian53 and the Alaskan^^ conventions,
and to the more recent convention in Michigan, 55 and will most
probably appear in the published proceedings of the most recent
conventions in Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and Maryland.
All the sources reviewed which lay stress on the "f undamental"-" legislative" distinction appear to share a number of underlying assumptions:
(1) that, although there may be an intermediate area of doubt, there is, on the one hand, a set of
constitutional provisions which are clearly fundamental or
basic, and that, on the other, there are provisions which
are clearly more appropriate for legislation; (2) that the
terms "fundamental" and "legislative" have more or less readily ascertainable and applicable content unaffected by time or
place; (3) that a brief constitution, one that is limited to
"fundamental" matters, is better than a long constitution
that contains "legislative" detail.
The position taken here
is that these assumptions are only partly true, and that a
consideration of the problems and criteria of constitutional
inclusion and exclusion must concern itself with a balancing
of the purposes of the constitution and the needs of government, rather than with an attempt to supply a fixed meaning
for the valuative terms "fundamental" and "legislative."
It
is argued here that although there is a more or less agreed
upon "core" area of constitutional content, criteria of inclusion and exclusion must take account of the needs of government as conditioned by time and place. And although constitutional brevity has generally been found to be of advantage
to state government, it is only one of several values to be
achieved, and not necessarily the most important one.
To put
the last point differently, the best state constitutions are
usually brief but they are not the best because they are
brief, but because they best meet the needs of state government.

—
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SOME ESSENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE

DEVELOPMENT OF CRITERIA
The discussion which follows seeks to aid the framer of a
state constitution in the determination of what subjects are
appropriate for constitutional treatment, and how they are to
be treated, including the degree of detail appropriate.
Recognition must, of course, be given in such an endeavor,
first, to the need for inclusion of certain "core" subjects
which common experience and tradition support as basic for
the proper functioning of state government, and second, to
the practical necessity--depending on the particular circumstances in a state at a given time of including other matters so important to the state as to call for constitutional
treatment.

—

This brings us to a consideration of the significance of
treating a subject in the state constitution rather than
The signifileaving it to be dealt with by ordinary law.
cance is simply this:
(1) it places the matter included in
the constitution beyond change by normal law-making processes,
and (2) it places it at the highest level of the legal auSelf-evident as they may seem, the
thority of the state.
two effects of constitutional, rather than, for instance,
statutory treatment of a subject bring with them a large
The development of criteria for inarray of consequences.
clusion and exclusion thus becomes mainly an endeavor of
weighing these consequences in particular contexts.

Without anticipating the detailed consideration of the matter,
it must be recognized at the outset that the twin effects of
constitutional treatment have consequences which, depending
on the circumstances, may be considered beneficial or harmful.
The enduring quality of a provision of the state constitution
may protect a desirable policy from frivolous changes by the
legislature, or it may delay or prevent the change to a new
and better policy from one embedded in the constitution which
The fact that a
is no longer responsive to current needs.
constitutional provision stands at the pinnacle of the state's
legal authority may protect a major interest of the people
against encroachment by any branch of government, or it may
nullify inconsistent laws or other governmental acts, regardless of their intrinsic merit and regardless of the fact that
changed circumstances may have given them a higher importance
It ought to be added, too,
in a changed scheme of values.
that the beneficial consequences are usually intended, whereas
the harmful ones are, more often than not, unintended and the
Inflexibility in the face of
result of changed circumstances.
changed circumstances results in constitutional obsolescence
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and diminished power to act responsibly on the part of government organs. These factors in turn breed constitutional instability as a consequence of the need for frequent amendment.
In the light of these various possible consequences, the decision as to inclusion or exclusion of particular subjects in
the constitution becomes a matter of weighing the advantages
against the potential costs of inclusion.

CONSTITUTIONAL CORE AREAS
Although it is submitted that the weighing of advantages
against costs of inclusion is operable in respect to all
parts of state constitutions, there are a number of core
constitutional areas as to which, in effect, a common judgment has been made that their inclusion is so necessary to
the proper functioning of state government as to outweigh
the possible disadvantages.
There is considerable agreement on the core provisions a
state constitution is to contain.
Judge Cooley identified
five "basic elements of the constitutional pattern," as
follows
I.

We are to expect a general framework of
government to be designed.
.

II.

.

.

Generally the qualifications for the right
of suffrage will be declared.
.

III.

.

.

.

V.

.

The usual checks and balances of republican
government
will be retained. The most
important of these are the separate departments for the exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial power.
.

IV.

.

.

.

Local self-government having always been a
part of the English and American systems,
we shall look for its recognition in any
such instrument.

We shall also expect a declaration of rights
for the protection of individuals and minorities. 56

Cooley 's first and third categories may be viewed as aspects
of one more general category, for we may include the establishment of "separate departments for the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial power" in the "general framework
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of government."
Cooley recognizes expressly, as some other
writers do not, that these categories do not adequately define what are "fundamentals," for within the basic categories
enumerated there may be provisions which are "non-fundameptal"
and minute in detail in order to "meet particular cases. "^'

Other writers have provided slightly different basic constitutional categories.
Graves finds four essential categories:
a bill of rights, the framework of government, an enumeration
or other statement of the powers of government, and provisions
for amendment. 58 other categories, such as provision for the
fiscal management of the state and its localities 59 have
sometimes been suggested as includible core content. While
the contents of most existing American state constitutions
can hardly be used as a reliable guide, the recurrence of
certain particular essential categories (quite apart from the
degree of detail which may be expended on any one such category) indicates a common level of expectations which ought to
Thus, although the suggestion has
be weighed if not followed.
sometimes been made that a state constitution could operate
with but two basic articles an article to establish a legislature to make all needful laws and to create machinery for
their execution, and a bill of rights to protect the citizen
against excesses of lawmaking or government--other considerations, including traditional reliance on separation of powers,
compel greater elaboration. Without exception, current state
constitutions contain a bill of rights, provisions on election
and suffrage, provisions on the framework of government, including the establishment of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments, and provisions for amendment.
,

—

The most recent expression on core categories of constitutional content is the sixth edition of the Model State
Constitution, 60 which contains substantial provisions in
In addition, the
each of the basic areas just enumerated.
Model State Constitution contains provisions on state and
local finance, public education, civil service and intergovernmental relations. The presence of such provisions does
not indicate a view that these matters can be regulated only
in the state constitution, 61 because all of them could be
adequately regulated--and in fact are regulated in some jurisInclusion of these prodictions by ordinary legislation.
visions in the Model reflects the desire to give some protection to a number of "good-government" provisions deemed
basic and urgent today--local home rule, inter-governmental
cooperation, sound budget and appropriation procedures, merit
system in public employment, and safeguards for public education (including higher education)
While the Model may

—

.
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suffer criticism on the grounds that "good government" details
in a state constitution limit the legislature in the same way
as other special interest restriction, ^2 it is often a sufficient answer to submit that there is a solid enough consensus
on the desirability of protecting most, if not all, of these
policies to justify their inclusion in the constitution in
some brief form.
In terms of the earlier analysis, there is
a willingness to pay the possible cost of their inclusion.
Thus, while there may be some difference in emphasis, there
is no serious disagreement on the basic areas to be covered
by state constitutions, or by any constitution, for that
matter. American and foreign experiences in this area lead
to no radically different results, for protection of individual rights, suffrage, framework of government and methods
of amendment need to be covered in almost all constitutions, ^3
with only one addition for constitutions of governments of
limited powers--such as the Constitution of the United States
namely, an enumeration of the powers delegated.

FACTORS WEIGHING IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONAL INCLUSION
In considering the content of constitutional core provisions
we dealt with areas of governmental concern which are considered so important and enduring that their inclusion in the
state constitution is necessary even at the price which may
be entailed in placing an area beyond change by normal lawmaking processes and at the highest level of state legal authority.
Putting aside until later^^ the reckoning of the
cost of including a subject in the constitution, we are now
concerned with various factors which may argue in favor of
such inclusion.

The first judgment that needs to be made before a particular
provision may qualify for inclusion is whether it is sufficiently important to be given this enduring and controlling
position. The question of the relative importance of the
provision under consideration depends on many factors of
time and place.
Major factors in deciding the question of
importance are popular demand or pressure, the significance
of the provision for effective government, the particular
ecological, geographical or historical factors operative in
the state, and the availability and adequacy of means other
than inclusion in the constitution to achieve the desired
end.

In respect to the weight of popular pressure, it must not be
forgotten in spite of the fact that we are here concerned

—
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with technical aspects of constitution-making--that a convention is a political body, the process of amendment and revision a political process (whether with or without convention)
Consequently,
and a constitution a political document.
have
a role in constitution
"Pressure groups must be admitted to
."65
be stirred to supmay
making.
pressure group activity
popular sentiment
strong
port sound proposals; it may signal a
reflected is
interest
If the
which is a factor to be weighed.
permanent,
and
broad
sufficiently important and sufficiently
with the
interfere
and is expressed in such a way as not to
proper
the
with
reasonable aspirations of other groups and
serious
deserves
function of government, then the interest
attention. 66 it must be said, however, that more is necessary
to warrant inclusion than a mere demonstration of pressures,
and that the satisfaction of some other value ought to be required to convince the constitution-maker that the particular
proposal which has a popular demand behind it is of sufficiently enduring and important character to argue for its
inclusion in the state constitution. The problem here is
likely to be greater in the case of special privileges protected in existing constitutions, for special interest groups
are not likely to surrender constitutionally protected advantages without a fight. However "legislative" and "nonfundamental" the matter may be, a veteran's preference for
civil service employment 6' or the constitutional protection
of pension rights, 68 or the constitutional status of certain
offices no longer essential, 69 are not likely to be easily
dislodged.
.

,

One value which may weigh heavily in favor of inclusion is
the significance of the provision for effective government.
Mention has been made previously of the inclusion of certain
non-core subjects in the Model State Constitution, 70 subjects identified with current notions of good government,
and enlisting in their support a substantial consensus of
informed opinion. These subjects, though not constitutional
core content, are matters of comparable concern in a considerable number of states.
So, for instance, many constitutions cover the subject of local government or home rule,'-'fiscal matters, including matters related to taxation and
local and state tax and debt limits, 72 and the regulation of
civil service.^ While all of these subjects could, as we
earlier noted, be dealt with by ordinary legislation, without special constitutional authorization or limitation, inclusion of these subjects reflects an enduring concern with
recurring issues of government, and an attempt to resolve
them in a more permanent fashion.
Even if such attempts are
not always wholly successful, there is no question that
constitutional protection of home rule may be warranted in a
state where the concerns of the populous cities have not
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fared well in the legislature; that constitutional protection
of a merit system may be warranted in a state traditionally
devoted to the spoils system; or that constitutional establishment of the executive budget and of satisfactory appropriations

procedures may be desirable.

What is considered a significant provision for effective government, necessary for inclusion, is of course in large measure a reflection of the times.
New constitutions written in
the second half of the nineteenth century, at the height of
the distrust of the legislature, contained numerous restrictions on that body, some of which may have been considered desirable steps towards effective government in their time^'* to
the same extent that the short ballot is in ours.
The relative spareness of early state constitutions and of the most
recently drafted ones indicates confidence in the legislature
and in the workings of the representative process generally.
The inclusion of "self-executing"^^ and detailed provisions
with reliance on court enforcement rather than legislative
implementation in particular areas such as reapportionment,
voter registration, home rule or civil service is a response,
sometimes warranted, to adverse legislative attitudes displayed in the past. "76
Other factors weighing in favor of the inclusion of particular
provisions may be closely tied to particular regions and
states by reason of their geographic location or natural endowment, or by reason of particular local traditions or political configuration.
Examples of such constitutional subject
matter are furnished by the extensive constitutional regulation of natural resources in Alaska, ^^ where no constitution
could have been adopted without the inclusion of protections
of fishing and hunting rights demed vital by the people, who
saw their future dependent on adequate safeguards in this area.
A similar consideration--as well as pressure from the Federal
Government compelled the inclusion of the article on Hawaiian
Home Lands (dealing with use of certain lands for the rehabilitation of the original Hawaiians) in the constitution of the
new state of Hawaii. ^^ Considerations of this nature are not
restricted in their operation to new constitutions for new
states, however.
In a proposed revision of the Louisiana
Constitution, which would have reduced that document to one
seventh of its length, the revisers still found it necessary
to retain fairly detailed provisions concerning the regulation and maintenance of levees. ^9

—

Although the discussion of factors in favor of inclusion has
thus far emphasized the requirement that a proposal must be
of sufficient importance (as that term has been described) to
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warrant constitutional status, the second major requirement,
namely that it have an enduring quality, must also be kept
A provision will meet this requirement if it will
in mind.
not be rendered obsolescent by foreseeable social and technological changes.
The consideration of the consequences
of inflexibility of constitutional provisions (presented in
the later discussion of factors weighing against inclusion) °^
is therefore relevant in this context too.

A third important consideration in determining constitutional
inclusion is the availability and adequacy of other means to
achieve the desired end.
Unless there is reason to believe
that the legislature will give active encouragement to the
perpetration of crimes, there is no reason to specify crimes
or fix their punishment^ by way of the constitution, because
ordinary legislation provides an entirely satisfactory alternative.
So, too, the regulation of corporations 82 of banks
and banking practices, 83 of railroads84 and street railroads^^
and of canal companies, 86 the naming of bridges, 87 and the
setting of holidays, 88 are not matters as to which inclusion
in the constitution offers any present-day advantage over
inclusion in ordinary legislation, whatever distrust may
once have prompted such constitutional provisions. A provision should not, of course, be included in the constitution
if the same result can be achieved by including it in ordinary
legislation or by leaving it to be worked out by the executive
or by the courts.
Obviously, there is no need to create a
new executive or administrative agency by constitutional amendment, if such an agency can be created, and made much more
responsive to changing needs, by executive order or by legislation. 89 There is likewise no need to raise a rule of construction (such as the rule that all constitutional provisions
shall be treated as mandatory unless expressly declared to be
directory) to a constitutional principle, particularly when
the rule enunciated would be applied by the courts, absent
other considerations, without such a constitutional presumption. go
•-

,

On the other hand, when the aim can only be achieved by adding
an appropriate provision to the constitution, that fact may
This is most clearly
argue strongly in favor of its inclusion.
the case when an urgently needed and strongly supported piece
Depending on the
of legislation is voided by the courts.
reasons for the court's determination, constitutional amendment may be the only route that gives promise of success within
a reasonable time, or it may even be the only possible route.
The latter was the case when an early workmen's compensation
law was invalidated in New York.^l As read by the highest
state court, the constitution itself stood in the way of the
adoption of such a law, because the constitution required a
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jury trial in the cases in which the compensation system
would have substituted different procedures, and because,
in the court's opinion, the compensation law ran contrary
to due process as class legislation and violated the constitutional protection against the abrogation of the action
for wrongful death and against any limitation of recovery
in such cases.
Under a holding such as this, no amendment
of the law to satisfy the court's constitutional objections
was possible, and the remedy could only be supplied by a
change in the constitution itself. As is often the case
when an amendment is required, the need for the inclusion
of the workmen's compensation amendment arose, at least in
part, out of the presence of provisions of an earlier time,
namely the constitution prohibition of limitations on recoveries for wrongful death, ^^ which in turn had been adopted
following the legislative establishment of such limits during the growth of the railroads.
The prohibition of limitations on such tort recoveries was no more a constitutional
principle of government than the latter-day special authorization of workmen's compensation; the transitory nature of
such provisions designed to meet a special need is evidenced
by the fact that the passage of time renders many of them
obsolete at best and burdensome or discriminatory at worst,
and this condition in turn breeds need for further corrective amendment.

The decision as to whether a particular problem demands constitutional change or is amenable to legislative or other
remedies also depends, to some extent, on whether we deal
with the drafting of a new constitution, especially one for
a new state, or with the revision or amendment of an existing constitution of an established state.
The difference
is apparently due to the enduring character of state constitutions which is shared by its "legislative" provisions,
whether useful or useless, as well as by its core provisions.
The presence of limiting provisions in an existing state
constitution, or the presence of provisions which may give
rise to restrictions in consequence of negative implication,
may require constitutional change as the only possible solution to a problem, whereas, in a state with a "clean slate,"
it could be resolved by other, less onerous means.
An example
is the inclusion of a provision on gambling and games of
chance in the New Jersey constitution. ^3 j^ ig unlikely that
a new state would find it necessary to regulate this matter
in its constitution,^^ but an established state like New
Jersey with a long and contentious history of constitutional
provisions on the subject might have difficulty in revising
its copstitution without reflecting the problem in the document.^-' An existing state which has operated with a
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constitutional debt limit for years will usually find it
difficult to abandon this device, even in the course of a
general revision, ^6 and will have to resort to constitutional
amendment if it wishes to finance a necessary project which
would exceed that limit. ^"^ While it might be a better policy
for the future to abolish the debt limit altogether, the usual
course will be to leave the debt limit intact, and as a matter
of promptness and political expediency, to authorize the finSimilar exancing of the project "outside" the debt limit.
amples may be given in the instance where the limits are imposed by possible negative implication. While a new state
might either not deal with the problem of "excess condemnation"
at all, or else in a very general fashion, a state which in
response to judicial decision had previously given constitutional authorization for excess condemnation for purposes of
slum clearance may find it desirable to seek such authorization for excess condemnation in the context of urban renewal,
lest the latter be considered barred by the possible negative
implication arising out of the grant of the former. ^°
The difficulty of making decisions on inclusion or exclusion
in the case of a long-established state is compounded by the
fact that such a state carries the burden of its past constitutional history.
Some of this history may be embodied in
judicial decisions reflecting particular attidudes and much
of it may be reflected in obsolete provisions of the constitution itself, in provisions reflecting the concerns of an
earlier age. Many provisions which cause difficulties today
are of this kind, such as the many restrictions on fiscal
and spending powers growing out of the panic of 1837, following the rapid expansion of railroad and canal companies with
the aid of public credit or support. ^^
So, too, detailed
corporate regulations in many of our state constitutions
persist, bearing witness to the impact of the Dartmouth
College^^^ case, long after the case itself has ceased to
have any operative legal significance. 101
,

It is easier to keep the subject matter of constitutional
provisions confined to the accepted core area in developing
a new constitution for a new state than to eliminate even
clearly extraneous matter from, the constitution in the course
of revision.
Special interest aside, a further reason, it
seems, is that the inclusion of any matter--whether originally based on sound reason or ill-advised--in a state constitution in and of itself raises it to a higher level, by putting
it beyond the power of the legislature and giving rise to
fixed expectations on the part of its proponents.
Matter
which either is no longer of constitutional importance--or
which never was--thus obtains a privileged status, enlisting
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in its support not only those who have a special or vested
interest in it, but also the considerable number of persons
who distrust all constitutional change, suspicious of all
tinkering with the established system. There may thus be a
substantial popular consensus in favor of the retention of
useless matter, either because of lack of information, or
misinformation, on the number of useless or restrictive provisions in the existing constitution, or because of support
for the constitutional document regardless of its contents
merely because it is the state constitution. ^02 often, too,
useless provisions are retained out of timidity. This may
happen when the inclusion of a provision was first prompted
by real necessity, such as to undo an adverse judicial decision, but where the necessity has long passed.
The adoption of amendments authorizing state workmen's compensation
legislation following the New York decision holding such a
law unconstitutional thirty or more years ago is in point. 103
These rather narrowly drawn amendments were needed then, but
due to the general acceptance of workmen's compensation, they
are needed no longer.
And yet a substantial number of states
retain these enabling provisions largely because of the fear
of what the courts might do now to workmen's compensation
were these provisions omitted in a general revision. Another
example of this nature is the provision found in several bills
of rights that the right to collective bargaining is protected, in spite of the fact that that battle has long been

won.

While all of these examples could serve to illustrate the
cost of the inclusion of provisions in the state constitution,
their purpose here is a different one namely, to illustrate
the considerable impact existing constitutional provisions
have upon the decision whether to solve problems by way of
constitutional change or by way of the ordinary lawmaking
processes.

—

In reckoning the need for the inclusion of particular matter
in the constitution, we must strive to encourage a balancing
of the factors involved.
Is the interest sought to be protected truly a major interest, and do its relatively enduring
nature and the extent of popular consensus on it justify its
inclusion? Are there good and sufficient reasons to believe
that it cannot be adequately resolved by legislative or other

governmental measures, rather than a constitutional remedy?
In short, is the policy involved of such enduring importance
that we are willing to bind ourselves to it more firmly than
by ordinary legislation?
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FACTORS WEIGHING AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL INCLUSION

Having considered the factors and circumstances which may argue
for the inclusion of a provision in the state constitution, we
must now reckon the cost of giving it this enduring and controlling position.
Because of the enduring quality of constitutional provisions,
and because of the considerably greater difficulty in amending
a constitution than in changing other law, constitutional
regulation of a subject is less flexible, and the greater the
specificity of the regulation, the more inflexible it becomes.
"A Constitution that embodies a series of what are essentially
legislative enactments inevitably reduces the elasticity of
government, rendering it less capable of adaptation to unforeseeable changes in the areas of its operation. " ^^'^
The consequence of inflexibility and the resulting loss of
adaptability to change is obsolescence.
This is more readily
observed in the case of what have been referred to above as
"essentially legislative" provisions, but it may affect the
content of "fundamental" provisions as well.
In either case,
the inflexibility and obsolescence of constitutional provisions will diminish the power and the freedom of the government to deal with new situations, and will, by the same token,
decrease its responsiblity for consequences it has no power
to control.
When, from whatever motive, legislatures are denied
power to deal effectively with the emergent issues
of the day, they are absolved of responsibility for
untoward developments. Only by enforcing responsibility, rather than by withholding power, can the
people hope for vigilant government in the public
interest. As Edmund Burke long ago remarked, "It
is not from impotence we are to expect the tasks of
power. "105

The resulting difficulties can only be dealt with by constitutional amendment. The more rigid the constitutional document, the greater the need for frequent amendment is likely
to become.
Excessively frequent amendment, or constitutional
instability, creates situations where amendment breeds amendment in a continuing vicious cycle. -'-Oo

The questions to be posed in considering a proposal for inclusion in the state constitution are whether these adverse
consequences are warranted by its positive consequences, and
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whether the provision is so important as to justify the invalidation of all legislative and other governmental action
in conflict with it.
Some examples may help to point out
the context in which these questions may have to be considered.

The price which must sooner or later be paid for including
particular subject matter in the state constitution may be
demonstrated in the case of contemporary provisions with a
high-minded public purpose. One of these is the provision
on local home rule for cities found in a number of constitutions. ^^^ Demands for city home rule originally arose out
of the malapportionment and consequent rural domination of
state legislatures, 108 i,e., out of a condition which could
not be effectively dealt with in the legislature itself. To
avoid frustration of the desire for city home rule by legislative inaction, constitutional home rule was, justifiably,
embodied in self-executing provisions, containing detailed
lists of city home rule powers, and detailed "procedural"
provisions on the manner of adoption and amendment of home
rule charters.
The inclusion of these details was undoubtedly necessary in the face of legislative hostility or inaction-^"^ (although city home rule, in turn, ran into a considerable amount of judicial hostility, expressed in restrictively narrow construction of home rule powersHO)
Nevertheless, changes in our society are about to render
such enumerations of city home rule powers obsolescent, if
they have not already done so, because enumerations of city
home rule powers are apt to get in the way of metropolitan
regional development, which must seek to combine existing
governmental entities into larger groupings so as to facilitate planning, physical development and services for the
metropolitan region as a whole. With small municipal entities having certain constitutionally protected powers,
the difficulty of establishing larger governmental groupings
increases because home rule municipalities can exercise an
effective veto over measures leading to metropolitan combinations. Hi The obsolescence of enumerated home rule powers
and its resulting limitation on the legislature's ability to
legislate effectively for the government of metropolitan
regionsll2__n^ay become even more apparent as the increasing
urbanization of the country and the reapportionment of state
legislatures create greater pressures for metropolitan regional development.
Thus, political and ecological factors
will, in due course, combine to turn an originally desirable
constitutional provision into an inflexibly restrictive one.
Balancing the immediate needs for municipal self-government
against the possibility of inflexibility and diminished freedom to deal with new situations in the future, there is no
.
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doubt that the home rule advocate of thirty or forty years ago
would have been willing to bear the cost.
It must be questioned,
however, whether groups interested in effective government today
ought to be willing to pay the same price, when the reckoning
seems so much closer.

Another example of the price to be paid for constitutional
treatment of a subject is furnished by another "good government" provision--namely the detailed "self-executing" kind of
provision establishing a merit system in the civil service of
the state. 1^^ As long as the spoils system is still the major
system of employee selection in many states, it may be necessary to write substantial portions of the civil service law
into the constitution.
But the price of doing so may be to
render the legislature and the civil service commission incapable
of coping responsibly with new problems.
A constitutional requirement, for instance, that selection shall be on the basis
of competitive examinations "as far as practicable" H*^ compels
the use of competitive examinations for the employment of personnel with the high scientific or technical competency presently needed in some state jobs, even though such examinations,
though "practicable," are hardly the best way of ascertaining
competency.
In consequence, too many decisions on personnel
policy have to be made or administered by the state's judiciary in the course of constitutional litigation under the
civil service provision. 115 Ultimately, when their existing
home rule and civil service provisions have become so obsolete as to interfere sharply with the powers of government
to meet the changed situation, these states will again have
to resort to the constitutional amendment process.
,

In both of the above examples, inclusion in the state constitution seemed on balance to be warranted, at least at the
time the issue was first presented.
In many of the instances
which follow, a weighing of the factors ought to have resulted
in an opposite conclusion.

Inflexibility and its consequences are most readily and simply
observable in the instances where a constitution has sought
to set specific standards for all times, such as by fixing
the governor si 1" or other officers' salaries 11"^ or by setting
standards of value or coinage. H^ In effect this constitutes
an assertion that the judgment of the convention delegates
(or of other sponsors of such narrow provisions) is "superior
to that of future legislators and will not be invalidated by
changing conditions "119 It is instructive to observe that
one of the few instances in which the United States Constitution
might be considered inflexible and obsolescent is the attempt in
the Seventh Amendment to fix such a permanent monetary standard.
,

'

.
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namely, the guarantee of the right of trial by jury in federal
courts "where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars"--once a substantial sum, but now well below the jurisdictional limits of most summary small claim courts.

The problem of inflexibility and its consequences resulting
from the constitutional regulation of a subject is not restricted
to any particular area of the constitution, and it affects the
contents of core areas as well as areas commonly stigmatized as
legislative.
The constitutional provisions dealing with the
procedures of the legislature itself are in point. Commonly,
state constitutions provide that the legislature shall determine its own rules of procedure, 120 and then deny it the effective exercise of that right by providing for the conduct of
legislative business in such detail as to leave very little to
rulemaking. '-21 While it may be appropriate to settle constitutionally and inflexibly such essential matters of representative government as the kind of majority required to pass a
law, 122 or the vote required to override a veto by the governor, 123 the constitutional requirement of three readings of a
bill is clearly obsolete, 124 and requirements governing the
style to be followed in a bill, 125 or limiting a bill to a
single subject, 126 have caused considerable damage through
invalidation of noncomplying laws on technical grounds.
In another core area, that of establishing the executive department, many state constitutions demonstrate the inflexibility
and obsolescence of "good government" provisions of another
age.
Commonly, these constitutions, after reposing in the
governor the executive power of the state, proceed to undercut that power by providing for the election of most if not
all heads of departments of state government 127 Direct
election of the governor's cabinet undoubtedly represented
"good government" notions of Jacksonian popular democracy and
distrust of a strong executive. 128 with this century's shift
in the nature and complexity of the tasks of government, the
need for strong central authority in the administration of
state agencies has become apparent, and some state constitutions have become a major obstacle to administrative reform.
Current theory of public administration favors an elective
governor who appoints the heads of departments and members of
his cabinet, so that they may be directly responsible to him. 129
Political theory has kept pace with administrative theory, and
the movement away from elective commissioners and heads of department is strengthened by the principle of the "short ballot. "130
.

In the area of the judiciary article, too, a number of specific
provisions have given rise to inflexibility and its related
difficulties. The constitutional creation of separate courts
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rather than a unified court system has given rise to major
administrative problems for the judiciary, with some constitutional courts having outlived their usefulness yet being
maintained by the constitutional requirement, while other
courts in the same state suffer from lengthy calendar delays
and court congestion. 131
in many states, the lower judiciary,
particularly the justices of the peace, are constitutional
of f icers 1-^^ with the result that the inferior court structure cannot be changed by the legislature in spite of the
fact that the complexity of even run-of-the-mill contemporOther adminiary legal issues makes lay judges an anomaly.
strative rigidities in the operation of the courts have been
caused by constitutional provisions depriving courts of all
or a major part of their power to make procedural rules .133
,

Restrictions on the legislature--other than the ones previously referred to in relation to the legislative process
itself--are many and varied.
It must be emphasized that very
nearly everything that may be included in a state constitution operates as a restriction on the legislature, for both
commands and prohibitions directed to other branches of the
governmentl34 or even to the individual citizen^^S will operThe heavy sancate to invalidate inconsistent legislation.
tion of invalidity of inconsistent legislation is one measure
of constitutional inflexibility and the consequent loss of
freedom to deal with new problems.
In the area of fiscal management, for instances, constitutionally fixed policies of another era now hamper the economic development of many states.
So, for instance, restrictions forbidding the state to engage in any works of internal
improvement have hampered necessary development programs, 136
and state debt limits have sometimes interfered with federalstate cooperation. 137 Restrictions on the use of state funds,
property, 138 or creditl39 for private purposes, appearing
quite reasonable on their face, have presented formidable
obstacles to slum clearance and other urban renewal programs
as well as state programs for industrial or economic development. 140 other restrictions commonly include limitations on
taxation which deprive the state and sometimes the localities
within it of the power to levy certain kinds of taxes, or to
levy taxes beyond certain constitutional limits. 1^1 Limitations on spending are just as frequent, commonly taking the
form of constitutional earmarking of funds derived from certain sources, and thereby limiting the legislature's power
to appropriate moneys for needed purposes for which no such
special constitutional provision was made. 1^2 Constitutional
limits on the incurring of state indebtedness or on the manner in which indebtedness may be incurred (commonly with the
combined
requirement of a special referendum on the question)
,
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with limitations on taxing and spending, put the state in a
fiscal strait jacket from which, at times, only drastic constitutional amendment can save it. 1^3
VThile express and detailed prohibitions and limitations form
a major source of constitutional inflexibility, rigidity is

fostered to the same extent by express and direct grants of
power to the legislature.
This result flows from the nature
of the state constitutional document as well as from negative
implications flowing from the powers enumerated.
In constitutional theory state government is a government of plenary
powers, except as limited by the state and federal constitutions.
The state constitution is thus a document of limitation, not of grant or delegation, and constitutional provisions purporting to grant the legislature the power to legislate in a particular sphere are therefore useless, because
the legislature already has the authority.
In order to give
effect to such special authorizations, however, courts have
often given them the full effect of negative implication,
relying sometimes on the canon of construction expressio
unius est exclusio altevius (the expression of one is the
exclusion of another). 144

Article XVIII of the New York Constitution may
afford an apt example of the problem.
It declares the Legislature's and the municipalities'
powers to provide housing for persons of low
income, thus making explicit what might very
possibly have been implied in any case even had
the constitution remained silent.
Twenty years
later a complex of economic and social problems
has developed from the exodus of urban populations, the deterioration of central sections of
many major cities, and the need for large scale
undertakings to rehabilitate commercial rather
than residential areas.
Does the granted power
to engage in "slum clearance" for housing purposes negative the existence of power to deal
with other sorts of urban problems that have
now begun to press for attention?145
Other similar examples may be cited, such as the numerous
provisions authorizing "excess condemnation," limited however
to certain specified purposes, ^46 thereby giving rise inevitably to the negative implication that the state has no power
of excess condemnation in instances not specified.
So also,
provisions authorizing the legislature to pass laws for the
government of certain named types of local subdivisions-such as cities, villages, counties and towns have resulted

—
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in denials of the power to create, and make laws for, other
subdivisions such as special purpose districts ^^"^ The express grant of power to levy certain taxes or to grant certain specified exemptions from taxation has been held to imply that no other taxes could be levied and no other exemption could be granted. 148 The discovery of negative implications arising from express authorizations has been carried
so far as to lead to a holding that where the constitution
authorized the state legislature to remove certain state
officers by impeachment, the legislature could not pass a
law for the removal of such officers for any cause in any
other way.1'^5 A typical example of constitutional inflexibility is the Oklahoma provision which expressly confers
upon the state corporation commissioner the power to regulate
"all transportation and transmission companies" and which
then proceeds to list railroads, steamboat lines, express
companies and other companies engaged in the means of transportation and communication known at the time the provision
was adopted. But in Application of Central Airlines , Jne. 1^0
the court held the commissioner without power to regulate
airlines, since air transportation was not in the list used
Had
to define "transportation and transmission companies."
the authors of the constitution been content to rely on the
general terminology, thereby permitting the legislature to
define the terms to meet the needs of new developments, there
is no doubt that the court would have upheld the commissioner's
jurisdiction over airline companies.
.

The strictures against including "legislative" provisions in
state constitutions are frequently coupled with the advice to
forego including "mere procedural detail." While it may be
important to include directions concerning the method by which
a certain result is to be achieved in the case of constitutional provisions intended to be self -executing the inclusion of such detail almost invariably becomes an inflexible
limitation on the organs of government. An express requirement that a particular procedure be followed will often be
read as a prohibition on the use of other procedures, regardless of whether such other procedures--whether or not discovered later are better designed to achieve the basic purpose. 151
,

—

It is in this context that the amount of detail to be included
Not
in any constitutional provision ought to be considered.
only must the factors of importance and enduring quality be
weighed in respect to any provision in its entirety, but they
must be brought to bear also on its specific detail. A provision which, taken as a whole, serves an important and enduring purpose, may nevertheless become an obsolescent limitation upon effective government, even a barrier to the attainment
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of contemporary aims, if its "procedural" detail fails to meet
contemporary needs. Because minutiae of administration are
subject to more rapid change than major principles of government, obsolescence can be expected to hit them more rapidly
and more sharply than other provisions.
Thus, the principle
that there shall be no taking of property for public purposes
without just compensation endures, while a constitution provision seeking to tie down the method for determining condemnation awards may become a troublesome sore spot. 152 Moreover,
"procedural" provisions are usually drafted with the existing
governmental institutions in mind, and the procedure may be
entirely ill-adapted to a change of governmental machinery in
response to new conditions. One example of this type of rigidity is represented by the numerous provisions delegating certain duties to the sheriff, an office that has seen a great
decline with the emergence of the modern police organization. ^^^

When constitutional inflexibility interferes with the necessities of responsible government, recourse must be had to constitutional amendment. 154 This is true even of the best-drawn,
most "fundamental" constitutions, which will also need revision
and amendment from time to time to reflect new conditions, unforeseen or unforeseeable when first adopted.
It is all the
more true of constitutions which regulate minutiae of government, and which reflect this fact by their great length.
In
dealing with the latter, it is futile to inveigh against frequency of constitutional amendment, because the mass of detailed regulations, with the resulting loss of flexibility
and diminished freedom of the government to act, compels
frequent constitutional amendment to keep the machinery of
the state operating 155 Constant constitutional amendment,
or constitutional instability, is part of the cost we must pay
for including so much in a state constitution.
The cost is
not inconsiderable, for constitutional instability has a number
of undesirable consequences of its own.
One of these is that
the high regard in which the constitutional order is held may
be lessened if constitutional amendment is made to appear a
commonplace 156 a constitution should be more than "a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only. "157
A further consequence is that the amendment process often has
a cumulative or snowballing effect, as amendment seems to beget
amendment. Whenever a narrowly limiting provision is amended
by adding an exception to the limitation, the general scope
of the provision is likely to become even more narrowly limited
in that the stated exception may be taken by implication to
disallow other exceptions not expressly stated. 158 Every detailed constitution thus develops certain sore points which
become the foci for veritable clusters of constitutional amendments. One critic has aptly characterized such provisions as
"constitutional amendment breeders ." 159
.

.
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The cost of regulating a subject constitutionally cannot be
avoided in the long run, but it can be reduced or delayed by
thoughtful constitutional draftsmanship. -^^^ The prerequisite
for such draftsmanship is an appreciation of the problem of
constitutional inflexibility and its consequences. The draftsman must then develop a preference (absent special considerations) for drafting constitutional provisions in general rather
than in restrictively specific language, and an awareness of
certain recurring types of situations in which the language of
a constitutional provision may contribute greatly to, if not
cause, inflexibility.
some recurring problems of this kind may
briefly
referred
to.
Any phrasing which readily gives rise
be
to a negative implication ought to be avoided where this implication ought to be avoided where this implication is not
desired; '°-'- a list of any kind will tend to raise such implications if it is a list of powers, negative implication may
If
limit the government to the powers expressed and no others.
it is a list of specific terms used to explain a general term,
the listing is likely to be construed as all-inclusive, as though
A general term
it were followed by the words "and no other."
undefined may afford a better possibility of sensible construction, while a listing of included specifics may turn out to be
When jurymen were simply defined as "qualified
a strait jacket.
electors" the class could be construed as one subject to open
to admit women as jurors when suffrage was extended to them;-'-"'^
but when "transportation and transmission companies" were constitutionally defined by a listing of included companies
considered exhaustive fifty years or so ago, technology was
bound to catch up and result in leaving airlines unregulated. 16 3
When imposing a duty, it may be good legislative drafting
practice to spell out in some detail which officer and agency
shall carry it out.
It is not such good practice in a constitutional context, however, because to do so either requires
the creation of a constitutional of fice, -'^'^ or the assumption
that the oraanization of the state's administrative branch will
not change. ^^^ In either event, less specificity will make the
provision less inflexible.

—

It might be comforting to be able to say that the draftsman

—

should avoid all "procedural" provisions those which s6t
forth how a particular object is to be accomplished for such
provision may be interpreted restrictively as providing the
only way in which a function may be performed and may, clearly,
In "self-executing"
raise sharp questions of inflexibility.
provision, however, it is essential to include enough detail
to outline the manner in which the object is to be accomplished. '^^ A possible way to avoid excessive inflexibility
may be to authorize the legislature to provide for other
means to accomplish the purpose, in addition to the method
outlined in the constitution.
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Another device to cut the cost in including a provision in
the constitution may be available in certain instances when
the sanction of courts' invalidation of non-complying legislation seems unnecessarily harsh.
In the instance of the
single subject requirement for all acts of the legislature,
for example, the Model State Constitution provides that the
requirement shall not be judicially enforceable thus leaving
it to be enforced by the legislature and the governor, and
avoiding judicial invalidations on narrowly technical grounds

—

.

'-^^

But while the constitutional draftsman may use his skills to
reduce constitutional inflexibility by drafting provisions in
such a way as to give maximum maneuverability to the several
branches of government and by providing enough room for the
application of rational principles of interpretation in the
face of changed circumstances, it must be recognized that the
possibilities are limited. While a good draftsman may sometimes cut the costs of constitutional inclusion, he cannot
avoid them altogether.
_
IN CONCLUSION

The basic inquiry in evaluating any proposal to include a
particular subject or provision in a state constitution should
be whether the value of embodying this proposal in higher law,
beyond change by normal lawmaking processes, is greater than
the cost of so doing.
In the balancing process necessary to
reach a final decision, the importance of the provision to the
people and to the effective government of the particular
state must be weighed against the cost in terms of inflexibility, obsolescence, decreased responsibility of the government,
constitutional instability and the nullification of inconsistent
government action.
In reaching a decision, consideration should
also be given to whether the policy embodied in the proposal is
one likely to endure, or whether it is likely to suffer rapid
obsolescence by reason of societal or technological changes.
Another factor to be considered is whether adequate means
other than inclusion in the constitution are available to
achieve the particular objective.
It is clear that the criteria proposed will require difficult
judgments of degree, and the factors taken into consideration
may be evenly balanced. But in view of the fact that all of
the provisions in a state constitution operate as limitations
on the legislature and on the government as a whole, and in
view of the fact that the cost of including a proposal is likely
to be high in the terms described, the burden of proof concerning
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the need for inclusion should be squarely on its proponent,
and any doubts on the issue should be resolved against inclusion and in favor of the freedom of government to respond
to emerging problems without constitutional limitations,
express or implied.

Development and change are part of government, and even the
most "fundamental" constitutional document, scrupulously
drafted according to all of the above criteria, will occasionally require amendment and revision. A reliable, unobstructive method of constitutional amendment, to enable the
constitution to develop in response to changing needs, will
therefore always remain a necessary part of the core content.
For our age does not share the certainties of John Locke,
who in drafting the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina
made no provision for amendment, but provided instead that
the document "and every part thereof, shall be and remain the
sacred and unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina
for ever. "168
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-106-

.

the owner.
Because the city had taken on a task, the
level of expectations was immediately raised.
Gribetz
& Grad
"Housing Code Enforcement:
Sanctions and Remedies," 66 Colum. L. Rev 1254, 1270, 1274-75 (1966).
,

.

Anderson, supra note

at 196-98.

15.

W.

16.

For an excellent account of basic patterns of the system
of shared powers, see M. Grodzins, The American System:
A New View of Government in the United States 60-88
in which such basic devices as grants-in-aid
(1966)
through functional associations, through related regulatory agencies, and through a pattern of interrelated
laws are discussed.
Also see J. Elazar, supra note 5,
at 67-72 (1966)
Governmental Affairs Institute, A Study
Report on the Impact of Federal Grants-In-Aid On The
Structure and Functions of State and Local Governments
(Submitted to the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1955)

4,

,

;

17.

E.g., Committee for Economic Development, supra note
at 12; T. Eliot, Governing America 733-36 (1964).

18.

E.g., N.Y. Uniform Commercial Code (McKinney 19 64); the
Code has now been adopted in all of the states and in
the District of Columbia.
R. Anderson, Anderson's Uni form Commercial Code (Supp. 1967)

5

.

Const, art I,

19.

U.

20.

L.
3,

21.

E.g., Water Resources Planning Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962
(Supp. II, 1965-66); Air Quality Act of 1967, 81 Stat.
485 (1967), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964); Water
amending 33
Quality Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 903 (1965)
U.S.C. A. § 466 (1957)

S.

8.

§

White, supra note 4, at 3-21; F. Milligan, supra note
at 7; Crihfield & Smothers, "The States in the Federal
System," 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1018, 1019 (1959); Dwinell, supra
note 3, at 1041.

,

.

22.

i

The recent federal legislation dealing with environmental
pollution and resource planning contemplates federal-state
cooperation through grants-in-aid, and interstate and
interlocal cooperation through joint planning activities
and interstate compacts.
For a fairly recent example of
imaginative intergovernmental arrangements in the water
resource field, see Delaware River Basin Compact, approved
by the 87th Congress in 1961, 75 Stat. 688, discussed in
Grad, "Federal-State Compact:
A New Experiment in Cooperative Federalism," 63 Colum. L. Rev 825 (1963).
.

23.

Such agreements are authorized under the Atomic Energy
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1964).
-107-

.

24.

In functional areas where the Federal Government exercises
direct regulatory authority, failure by the states to live
up to federal requirements may cause the federal authoriSuch
ties to displace state regulation and enforcement.
under
the
Air
for
instance,
displacement is authorized,
Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (Supp. 1967), and
In
under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1964).
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of demarcation between federal and state interests
and activities, nevertheless it cannot be denied
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use made of the distinction at the 1958 New York Convention.
46.

Munro, "An Ideal State Constitution," supra note

47.

E.g., R. Dishman, State Constitutions:
The Shape of the
Document 12 (National Municipal League, 1960)

48.

Eaton, "Recent State Constitutions,"
121,

122

6

at 5.

2,
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the provisions of a constitution are fundamental, we
imply that they are relatively more permanent, more
stable, and less subject to the need for frequent change,
than are the provisions of statutory law...." Graves,
"What Should a Constitution Contain?" in 2 New Jersey
Constitutional Convention of 1947 at 1329 (1951)

52.

"Legislative Powers," in Manual On the Legislative Article
for the Missouri Constitutional Convention of 1943 at 52
(Faust ed. Sept. 1943)
The material referred to, selection no. 11, was originally an article prepared for the
delegates of the Illinois Constitutional Convention of
Constitutional Convention, Bulletin No. 8, "The
1920.
Legislative Department."
.

53.

Address by Oren E. Long, Secretary of Hawaii, in 1
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii
1-2

(1960).

.

54.

1 Constitutional Studies 40-42 (Public Administration
Service, 1955)

55.

Remarks by Dr. Pollock,
Convention 33 (1961)

5
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Speaking now on the proper attributes of a good
state Constitution, all of use agree that a
Constitution should be as brief and concise as
possible, logically arrange [sic] and readable.
It should deal only with fundamentals.
Obviously,
it is a good question as to what is fundamental.
But in general I think it is proper to repeat
that we should be more concerned with ends rather
than means.
We should only include what is essential.
Unnecessary statutory detail is the curse
of most state constitutions.
56.

1

Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 91-93

T.

(8th ed.

(1927)

at 91.

57.

Id.

58.

Graves, "What Should a Constitution Contain?" supra
note 51.

59.

Landers, "Taxation and Finance," in State Constitutional
Revision 225 (W. Graves ed. 1960); Anderson, "Constitutional Aspects of Revenue and Taxation in Texas," 35
Texas L. Rev. 1011 (1957)

60.

Note 36 supra.

61.

See id. at 91 (Introductory Comment on Article VII,
Finance)
101 (Comment on Article IX, Public Education)
103-04
102 (Comment on Article X, Civil Service)
Relations).
Intergovernmental
(Comment on Article XI,
,

,

62.

Landers, supra note 59, at 228; also see Bosworth, "Law
Making in State Governments," in The Forty-Eight States;
Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators 85, 89
(The American Ass emb ly 1955)
"When the occasion arises
for the revision of constitutions should one of the
major objectives be the omission of unessential detail
(That this is a difficult request to answer affir...?
matively is shown by the fact that the committee of a
civic organization which periodically revises a model
state constitution regularly crowds their model with
nearly all of the members' favorite reforms. Yet all of
the committee members would probably urge everyone to
keep unessential detail out of the constitution.)"
;

63.

Some comCf. Szladits, The Content of Constitutions:
parative Aspects (Research Report, unpublished. Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University
1963)

64.

Notes 103-59 and accompanying text infra.
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;
.

Bebout, Recent Developments in the Use of the Constitutional Convention in the States 13, September 8, 1955
(mimeograph of Address before the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Boulder, Colorado)
See T. Allen, Jr. & C. Ransone, Jr., Constitutional Revision In Theory And Practice 73-76, 128-30
W. Friedman, The Michigan Constitutional Conven (1962)
tion And Administrative Organization 30-53 (1963)
V. O'Rourke & D. Campbell, supra note 45, at 151-91;
A. Sturm, Constitution-Making In Michigan
1961-1962,
at 103-27 (1963)

65.

J.

.

;

,

.

66.

•

Some such factors were operative, for instance, in New
Jersey, in the inclusion of a provision prohibiting all
gambling unless "the specific kind, restrictions and
control thereof have been heretofore submitted to, and
authorized by a majority of the votes cast by, the
people at a special election...." N. J. Const, art. IV.
The provision implicitly permitted
§ VIII, par. 2.
pari-mutuel race track betting and offered a chance to
legalize "Bingo." The gambling issue, which in New
Jersey has its economic roots in the geographic location of New Jersey between New York and Philadelphia,
and in the resort industry of the state, received more
debate on the floor of the convention than any other
single provision, and failure to resolve the problem, in the
opinion of one observer, might have jeopardized the
entire revision effort.
Baisden, Charter For New Jersey
Constitutional Convention of 1947 at 25-39 (1952)

67.

Index Digest 99-100.

68.

E.g., Alaska Const, art. XII,
XIV, § 2; N. Y. Const, art. V,

69.

§
§

7;
7.

Hawaii Const, art.

Index Digest 306-10 (Covering detailed regulation of
justices of the peace)
931-36 (Covering regulation of
the office of sheriff.)
,

70.

See text at notes 60-62 supra.

71.

Index Digest 714-36.

72.

Id.

at 967-84.

73.

Id.

at 93-100.

74.

E.g., McMurray, supra note 49, at 209-14; also see Eaton,
"Recent State Constitutions," 6 Harv L. Rev. 53, 109-17
(1892)
"One is tempted to inquire whether [the] convention expected the State Legislature to consist of fools
and knaves."
Id. at 117.
:
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.

.

.

;

75.

See, Grad, Judicial Doctrines of Construction Affecting
Constitutional Provision 15-25, in The Drafting of State
Constitutions: Working Papers for "a Manual (mimeograph.
National Muncipal League 1967)

76.

See e.g., Bromage supra note 37, at 240-44 (home rule)
Fordham, Legislative Redistricting by Nonlegislative
Agencies (National Municipal League 1967) (reapportionment)
Note that the more recently proposed "Model
Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule, "prepared by Jefferson B. Fordham for the American Municipal
Association (1953)
and based on the Local Government
article of the Model State Constitution reflects in
large measure a response to overly restrictive judicial
attitudes to home rule displayed in the past, moving
back from a self-executing provision to greater reliance
on the legislature.
,

J.

.

,

,

77.

Alaska Const, art. VIII.

78.

Hawaii Const, art. XI.
73 Stat.

See Hawaii Statehood Act

§

4,

(1959), as amended, 74 Stat. 422, 423 (1960)
(requiring adoption of this provision as a condition
to the admission of Hawaii as a state)
79.

5

Louisiana State Law Institute, Projet of a Constitution
for the State of Louisiana with Notes and Studies 599624

(1954).

80.

See text at notes 110-53 infra.

81.

See, e.g.. Index Digest 425 (bribery relating to elections),
487 (lotteries)
494 (bribery of governor)
644 (bribery
of legislators), 682 (libel).
,

82.

See id.

at 112-28.

83.

See id.

at 49-54.

84.

See id.

at 874-85.

85.

See id.

at 885-86.

86.

See id, at 57-60

87.

La.

88.

Id.,

89.

F.

,

Const, art. XIX, §§ 23, 24.
§

22.

Heady, State Constitutions:
The Structure of Admini stration 8-9, 12-13 (1961); B. Rich, State Constitutions
The Governor 12-16 (1960)
Rich, "The Governor as Administrative Head," in Salient Issues of Constitutional Revi sion 98-114 (J. Wheeler ed. 1961)
:

;

90.

See Grad, supra note 75, at 11-12.
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.

91.

;

Ives V. South Buffalo Ry.
201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431
See Inter-Law School Committee, Report on the
(1911)
Problem of Simplification of the Constitution, Staff
Report No. 1, Special Legislative Committee on the Revision and Simplification of the Constitution, N. Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 57, at 52-58 (1958) [hereinafter cited as InterLaw School Committee Report]
discussing the New York
workmen's compensation amendment, N. Y. Const, art. I,
,

.

,

§

92.

18.

E.g., N. Y. Const, art. 1, § 16 (prohibiting abrogation or
limitation of wrongful death action)
Other states forbidding limitations on the amount recoverable in compensation, are:
Ariz. Const, art. II, § 31; id. art. XVIII, § 8
Ark. Const, art. V, § 32, amend. 2 6; Ohio Const, art. 1,
art. II, § 35; Okla. Const, art. XXIII, § 7;
§ 19a; id.
Pa. Const, art. Ill, § 21; Utah Const, art. XVI, § 5; Wyo.
Const, art. X, § 4.
.

93.

Note 66 supra.

94.

Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Alaska succeeded for the most
part in avoiding the kind of specific, detailed limitations on state or local taxation and borrowing that
have interfered with the development of flexible fiscal
policies in many states. Bebout, "Recent Constitution
Writing," 35 Texas L. Rev
107l' 1085 (1957).
.

Hawaii dia, nowevex impose a aeut. ximii:, which, though
flexible enough for the present, may become troublesome
in the future.
Hawaii Const, art. VI, § 3.
,

95.

Consider N.Y. Const, art. I, § 9, which prohibits all
gambling except pari-mutuel betting on horse races, and
which extends local option on Bingo games run by certain
enumerated nonprofit organizations. The provision which
is part of the bill of rights and shares the section with
the right to petition and assembly had its origin in
the constitution of 1846, was amended by the constitution
of 1895, was retained in the revision of 1938, and had
the local option on Bingo added by amendment in 195 7.

—

—

96.

See e.y.^ Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 37; Michigan in its
most recent constitution (1963) liberalized debt limit
provisions, but retained many of its earlier procedural
restrictions. Mich. Const, art. IX, §§ 14, 15.
A similar course was taken in the 1968 proposals of the
limited constitutional convention in Pennsylvania.

97.

See, e.g.^ Mo. Const,

98.

Compare Alaska and Hawaii, which have no such constitutional authorization, with New York, which provides for
excess condemnation in two places, N.Y. Const, art. IX,
(1963 amendment) (in connection with public uses
§ 1(e)
for local government), and art. XVIII, § 8 (in connection
with low income housing and slum clearance)

art.

II,
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§

37a.

:

99.

100.

See notes 136-43 and accompanying test infra.

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)
.

.

101.

The Dartmouth College case held that a corporate
charter was a contract, and that, in consequence, the
state of New Hampshire could not modify it, because
to do so would impair the obligation of a contract.
Numerous state constitutions thereafter included
special provisions reserving the state's power to
revoke corporate charters and to modify or repeal
general corporation laws.
See Index Digest 116; InterLaw School Committee Report 102-04.

102.

T.

Allen, Jr. & C. Ransone, Jr., supra note '65, at
17, 52-53 (in regard to the Tennessee convention of
1953); Keith, Methods of Constitutional Revision 4144 (mimeograph, Bureau of Municipal Research, University of Texas 1949)
But see T. Allen, Jr. & C.
Ransone, Jr., supra note 65, at 135, stating that this
factor was not influential in Georgia prior to the
1944 revision, because the old constitution had been
amended over 300 times.
.

103.

Notes 91-92 supra.

104.

Inter-Law School Committee Report 6. An earlier commentator has made the interesting point that restrictions intended to operate against abuses of executive
power have ended up as restrictions on the legislature,
McMurray, supra note 49, at 219.

105.

Inter-Law School Committee Report 8.
See also R.
Dishman, supra note 47, at 23; J. Fordman, The State
Legislative Institution 26 (1959)
The only conclusion warranted by the realities
of the state constitutional order is that the
legislatures are hamstrung, by numerous limitations on their powers. What we have, in short,
is a serious comprise of the philosophy of representative government. There is little prospect
of lifting the state legislative institution to
the level of quality and performance that we
ought to expect of it until we give it man-sized
authority.
It is responsibility that builds
character in individuals and the same can be
said of governmental institutions.
Responsibility bespeaks commensurate authority.
To the same effect, see State Legislatures in American
Politics 47-52 (A. Heard ed. 1966)
.
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,

106.

See B. Abernethy, Constitutional Limitations on the
Legislature 18-26 (1959); Note. "California's Constitutional Amendments", 1 Stan. L. Rev. 279 (1949).

107.

See Index Dige st 714-36.

108.

J.

109.

See note 76 supra.

110.

Richland, "Constitutional City Home Rule in New York",
54 Colum. L. Rev
311, 313-14 (1954).

Dordham, supra note 105 at 21-22.

.

111.

Bromage, supra note 37, at 240, 250-52; Kresky, "Local
Government," in Salient Issues of Constitutional Revision 150, 151-52 (J. Wheeler, Jr., ed. 1961).

112.

The approach espoused in the Model State Constitution
art. 8, which is based on J. Fordham, Model Constitu tional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule (1953)
would more easily permit metropolitan combinations because it grants municipalities all powers of selfgovernment subject to limitations which may be imposed
by the legislature.
Thus, the legislature is not prevented from dealing with metropolitan problems by
general law.

113.

E.g., Calif. Const, art. XXIV, § 5 which expressly
provides that the constitutional civil service pro
visions shall be self-executing.
See also Ga. Const,
art. XIV, § I, 1111 1, 2; Mich Const, art. XI § 5
On
the necessity for self-executing civil service provisions, see 3 Louisiana State Law Institute, supra
note 79, at 499-510.

,

.

114.

La. Const, art. XIV, S 15; N.Y. Const, art. V, § 6;
N.J. Const, art. VII, §I,
2; Ohio Const, art. XV,
1(

§

10.

115.

Model State Constitution 102, art. 10, comment; B
Abernethy, supra note 106 at 76-77.

116.

See, e.g., Ariz. Const, art. V, § 13 ($4000); Ark.
Const, amend. 37(2) ($10,000); Fla. Const, art. IV,
($3500); Idaho Const, art. IV, § 19 ($3000);
§ 29
La. Const, art. V, § 5 ($7500)
Mont. Const, art.
VII, § 4 ($5000); N.M. Const, art. V, § 12 ($5000);
Okla. Const, sched. 15 ($4500) ("except as provided
by law"); Wyo Const, art. IV, § 13 ($2500).
;

.
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117.

See e.g.. Index Digest 43 (salary of auditor), 257
685 (salary of
(salary of judges of highest court)
lieutenant aovernor)
,

.

118.

"In all
E.g., Mass. Const, pt. II, ch. VI, art. Ill:
conthis
mentioned
in
cases where sums of money are
silver
in
computed
stitution, value thereof shall be
See
at six shillings and eight pence per ounce...."
'gasoline,
term
"The
also La. Const, art. VIA, § 1:
benzine, naptha or other motor fuel' is defined as
meaning all volatile gas-generating liquids having a
flash point below 110 degrees F., commonly used to
propel motor vehicles or motors."

119.

Inter-Law School Committee Report

120.

Index Digest 669.

121.

J.

122.

Index Digest 609.

123.

Id.

124.

Id.

125.

Index Digest 602-03.

126.

Id.

7.

Fordham, su^va note 105 at 54-56.
599-618.

See Index Digest

at 614-15.

at 606-08.
See J. Fordham, supra note 105 at 55:
"State legislatures have no choice as to existing
requirements; they have to violate them in order to
get their business done."

at 603-04; Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More Than
One Subject", 42 Minn. L. Rev 389 (1958).
.

127.

Heady, supra note 89, at 8-12; B. Rich, supra note
at 12-16; Willbern, "Administration in State GovernTheir Tasks as Policy
ment" in The Forty-Eight States:
Makers and Administrators 111, 115-19 (American Assembly
1955)
F.

89,

,

.

128.

Most of present state constitutions were written during
the two or three generations when the strength of
Jacksonian democracy was at its highest. This was the
period when the standard prescription for the ills of
democracy was more democracy.
It was felt that the way
to assure responsiveness to popular wishes was to provide for popular elections.
Some of the most important
of the early officials of state government, such as the
Attorney-General, the Secretary of State, and the
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.

.

Treasurer were subjected to popular election. Then
as some of the other functions of state government
increased in importance, the heads of the agencies
administering these functions were also made elective.
While the long ballot has grown so shockingly long
that this tendency to add elective offices has been
largely stemmed, it is very difficult, often impossible,
to "lower" an agency head from elective to appointive
status
Wilbern, supra note 127, at 115.
See also Pollock,
"Election or Appointment of Public Officials," 181
Annals 74 (1935)
129.

Heady, supra note 127, at 2-4; Lambert, "The Executive Article," in State Constitutional Revision 185,
188-90 (W. Graves ed. 1960).

130.

Commission On Intergovernmental Relations, supra note

F.

24,

131.

at 42-45.

"Organization of Courts," in 2 New Jersey, Con stitutional Convention of 1947 at 1583, 1588-91 (1951)
Romani, "The Courts," in Salient Issues of Constitu tional Revision 115, 117-19 (J. Wheeler, Jr., ed. 1961).
Pound,

;

132.

Index Digest 306-10.

133.

Index Digest 324.
See Romani, supra .note 131, at 126-29
Also see Schnitzer, "Judicial Administration," in 2 New
Jersey, Constitutional Convention of 1947 at 1651 (1951)

134.

B.

135.

E.g., State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre
Corp., 114 Mont. 52, 132 P. 2d 689 (1942).

136.

Index Digest 573-74; see Pinsky, "State Constitutional
Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach," 111 U. Pa. L. Rev
265,
281, 305 n.l67 (1963); Comment, "Wisconsin's Internal
Improvement Prohibition:
Obsolete in Modern Times,"
1961 Wis. L. Rev 294.

See text at note 69 supra.

Abernethy, supra note 106, at 76-78; McMurray, supra
note 49, at 211.

.

.

137.

B.

Abernethy, supra note 106, at 56-57.
At the present time, several states find themselves unable to act on flood control under
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federal aid because of the fixed debt limits imposed
by their consitutions
rn 1935, the State of Pennsylvania almost lost $81,883,806 in Federal Work Relief
money because of its constitutional inability to borrow
more than $1,000,000, and because of its further constitutional prohibition against amending the constitution more frequently than once in five years.
.

138.

Index Digest 977-78.

139.

Id.

140.

See B. Abernethy, supra note 106, at 54-60; Pinsky,
supra note 136, at 277-93.

141.

Index Digest 999-1001, 1007-08.
supra note 106, at ^^2-54.

142.

tl.g.y

at 950-51, 952.

See B. Abernethy,

The Alabama constitution earmarks the funds derived from gasoline taxes, (Ala. Const, art. XX A,
amends XXI, XLII, LXVI XCIII), motor vehicle taxes
(art. XX, amends. XI, XCII)
poll taxes (art. XIV,
§ 259, amend. CXI), income (art. XXII, amend. XXV),
sales tax (amend. CXVII)
See B. Abernethy, supra
note 106 at 60-65; Landers, supra note 65, at 229.
,

,

.

143.

An article written in 1935 called attention, for
instance, to the unrealistic Pennsylvania debt limit
of one million dollars, adopted in 1873, when the
total cost of running that state's government had been
In drawing attention to other
seven million dollars.
fiscal limitations in the Pennsylvania constitution,
the writer called for constitutional revision to provide for greater elasticity to the demands of government. Margiotti, "Why We Must Revise the Pennsylvania
Constitution," 181 Annals 19, 23-24 (1935). Today,
almost a generation later, the selfsame restrictions
are still part of the Pennsylvania constitution, except that numerous amendments have been added to provide
for special debts and bond issues to meet state needs
for public works and other purposes.
The problem will
be alleviated if the 1968 Convention proposal becomes
law.
Another example of the need for drastic revision
in this area is pointed out in 3 Louisiana State Law
Institute, supra note 79, at 133:
"One of the principal causes of amendments to the 1921 Constitution has
been the dedication of revenues or the incurrence of
debt." To deal with the problem, the suggested revision would abolish the provision for dedicated revenues and provision for incurrence of debt by referendum,
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.

.

.

.

and make other changes eliminating a mass of detailed
restrictions and exemptions.
See 2 id. at 201-22; 3
id. at 135-233 (1954)
.

144.

Freund, "The Problem of Adequate Legislative Powers
Under State Constitutions," in 5 Acad. Pol. Sci. Proc
98,99 (1915):
"Almost every word of the constitution,
though it purports to be enabling, is apt to operate
in some way as a limitation upon legislative action."
See Grad, supra note 75, at 31-39.
.

145.

Inter-Law School Committee Report 7-8.

146.

Index Digest 462-64.

147.

See Tex. Const, art. Ill, § 60.
Until 1960 the provision authorized the legislature to pass laws providing for workmen's compensation for county employees.
In 1962, an amendment was necessary to enable the
employees of other political subdivisions to receive
workmen's compensation.

148.

E.g. J Evans v. McCabe,
(1932)

164 Tenn.

672,

52

S.W.2d 159

.

149.

Robison v. First Judicial Circuit Court, 73 Nev. 169,
313 P. 2d 436

(1957)

150.

199 Okla.

151.

See County ex rel Grauman v. Fiscal Court, 273 Ky
674, 117 S.W.2d 918 (1938) (voiding an act authorizing
the use of voting machines because of a constitutional
provision that voting be by "secret official ballot")

^^z.

See Inter-Law School Committee Report 22-24.

153.

Cf. Pock, Consolidating Police Functions in Metropolitan
Areas 6-15 (1962, to the effect that it is impxDssible
to use the county for police consolidation in view of
the entrenched position of the outmoded sheriff system.
Seey e.g.y People ex vet. Walsh v. Board of Commissioners, 397 111.
293, 74 N.E.2d 503 (1947), holding
invalid a law authorizing county commissioners to
appoint a staff of janitors for the court building,
since it interfered with the sheriff's common law
powers as custodian of the premises. Acaordy State
ex rel. Johnston v. Melton, 192 Wash. 379 73 P. 2d 1334

300,

185 P. 2d 919

(1947).

.

(1937)
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.

.

"Some Implications
tutional Amendment for the Draftsman,"
of State Constitutions, Working Papers
(mimeograph. National Municipal League
See generally Grad,

155.

McMurray, supra note 49 at 213-14.

156.

T.

157.

Smith v. Allwright, 32 U.S. 649, 669 (1944)
dissenting opinion)

158.

Harbert
(1946)

v.

&

C.

.

of State Constiin The Drafting
for a Manual
1967)

154.

Allen, Jr.

.

Ransone, Jr., supra note 65, at 135.
(J.

Roberts,

County Court, 129 W. Va. 54, 39 S.E.2d 177

.

159.

The phrase was coined by John Bebout, formerly Executive Director of the New York Temporary Commission on
the Revision and Simplification of the Constitution,
presently director of the Urban Studies Center,
Rutgers--The State University (New Jersey)

160.

See generally Grad, Notes for a Manual on the Drafting
of State Constitutions, in The Drafting of State Constitutions, Working Papers for a Manual (mimeograph,
National Municipal League 1967)
.

Grad, supra note 75 at 38.

161.

F.

162.

Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 A. 825 (1921)
But see People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 319 111. 403,
150 N.E. 290 (1926) where the court, making reference
to the intention of the framers, construed similar
wording to exclude women from jury lists.

163.

Application of Central Airlines, 199 Okla. 300, 185
P. 2d 919

(1947)

164.

See text at notes 77, 140, 161 supra.

165.

F.

Heady, supra note 89, at 12-13.

166.

F.

Grad, supra note 75 at 21-23.

167.

Model State Constitution

168.

"Fundamentals Constitutions of Carolina," in Select
Charters and Other Documents Illustrative of American
History 1606-1775, at 149 168 (W. MacDonald ed. 1899).

§

4.14.
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CHAPTER VI
THE STATE CONSTITUTION
ITS NATURE AND PURPOSE

By Paul G. Kauper

INTRODUCTION
A convention consisting of popularly elected delegates will
soon undertake its important task of studying the Michigan
constitution of 1908 and probably, after due deliberation,
proposing a revised constitution for submission to the
state's electors.
Most of the time and energy spent by the
delegates will be devoted to the treatment of specific
areas and problems involved in restating the state's organic law.
It is important, however, that the delegates in approaching
these specific tasks be guided by a sense of perspective
and an overall view as to the nature and purpose of a state
constitution both in relation to the structure of our federal
system and in relation to the internal purposes served by the
state's constitution.
It is the purpose of this monograph
to suggest considerations and standards that may prove helpful in orienting delegates to the nature of the task they
face and the decisions they must make.

Any person writing on this subject must at the threshold enter
a caveat--there are no scientific norms or pre-determined
answers to be elicited from a Delphic oracle in respect to
the basic assumptions underlying a state constitution and
giving meaning to its status and purpose, to the principles,
express or implicit, that should be incorporated in a constitution, and even less to the specific and concrete problems that call for solution.
A state constitutional convention elected by the people is free to fashion any kind of
document it pleases, subject only to restraints imposed by

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
Paul G. Kauper.
"The State Constitution:
Its Nature and
Purpose." Constitutional Convention Research Paper No. 2.
Detroit:
Citizens Research Council of Michigan, 1961.
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THE STATE CONSTITUTION:

ITS NATURE AND PURPOSE

the constitution of the United States as the supreme law of
the land and subject, of course, to having its work ratified
by the state's electors.
The delegates will find that there
are no single, correct answers to most of the large and important questions confronting them. These are matters of
opinion and judgment, and honest differences of view can
readily be entertained.
In respect also to the fundamental propositions and premises
regarding the essential purpose and functions of a state
constitution, differences of opinion may exist, and any writer
offering suggestions must do so with a sense of modesty and
with an awareness that he is at best expressing an opinion
and making suggestions.
A recognition, however, of the
possible diversity of views of a number of matters should not
obscure the consideration that history, tradition, experience
and current trends in constitution revision, and the informed
judgment of scholars and concepts of government fundamental
to American constitutional thinking do furnish a basis for
opinion and judgment and that on many of these questions a
fair degree of consensus is to be found.
-^

THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION

The idea of a written constitution defining the structure of
government and enumerating the rights of the people as a
limitation on the powers of government is deeply-rooted in
Anglo-American history. England, to be sure, has no written
constitution in the sense in which Americans conceive of a
constitution, but English history furnishes antecedents for
the idea of reducing to writing, that all may see and know,
fundamental propositions relating to the liberty of the
citizen and determining the relationship between the government and the governed.

Magna Carta, extracted by the barons from King John in 1215,
and designed to define the barons' rights which the king
agreed to respect, is usually regarded as the first of the
significant documents which had a pervasive and enduring
influence in the shaping of the constitutional tradition both
in England and America.
Other notable documents have, over
the years, made their contribution to English constitutional
history, such as the Bill of Rights of 1628, the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679, and the Bill of Rights of 1689.
These fundamental documents were concerned with asserting
the rights of the citizens, and apart from their contribution
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both in England and the United
of crisis when men's liberties
symbols and rallying points in

constitutional liberties
States, they have in times
were threatened served as
defense of freedom.

American Beginnings

When the colonists came to this country under charters
granted by the Crown it became necessary to define by the
terms of the charter the skeleton structure of government.
Here was planted the seed of the idea that the fundamental
structure and organization of government, as well as a
declaration of the rights of the people, should be incorporated in a written document recognized to have a basic
and organic character and, indeed, to have the quality of
a fundamental law superior to ordinary laws and enactments.
Space does not permit a detailed treatment of the early
charters which in retrospect may be viewed as embryonic
constitutions.
It is enough here to trace briefly the further evolution that saw the rise of indigenous American
constitutional documents, and here one may mention particularly the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut of 1639 which
Lord Bryce calls "the oldest truly political Constitution
in America,"^ and the Frame of Government of Pennsylvania
of 1682 which was "in substance a colonial constitution
promulgated by Penn as sole proprietor."^

Mention should also be made of the significant Mayflower
Compact of 1620, signed on shipboard by the Pilgrim Fathers
and resting on the assumption that men may by compact among
themselves determine how they shall be governed. The notion
of a constitution as a compact resting on agreement and
consent of the people states a fundamental facet of American
political thinking.
Prior to the rupture with England in 1776 the conspicuous
elements in the basic documents of the colonial period were
the establishment of systems of representative government
and the declaration of basic rights.
The struggle with
England gave great impetus to the process of constitutional
development as reflected in the adoption of documents which
in their more complete statement of individual rights and
the greater elaboration of a form of government resting on
the consent of the people furnished the immediate prototype
of modern state constitutions.
In the years 1776 and 1777,
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having declared their independence of England, all but two
of the thirteen colonies fashioned their own constitutions.^
The written constitution, thus, became the expression of
popular sovereignty and the people's right of self-government.

Culmination Of An Idea
The adoption of the state constitutions preceded the drafting of the Philadelphia convention of 1787 of the constitution of the United States which established the federal
system under which we now operate--a system under which
governmental power is divided between the federal or central
government and the fifty states of the Union. The U.S.
constitution and the bill of rights adopted not so long after
its ratification may be said to represent the climactic
culmination of the idea that the basic frame of government
and the reserved rights of the people shall be reduced to
writing in a document recognized as the supreme law.
It should be recognized that factors in addition to precedents
furnished by English constitutional history and the influence
of the colonial charter as a form of fundamental law contributed to the written constitution as epitomized in the constitution of the United States. This constitution established
and structured a federal system of government and was premised on a separation of powers within the federal government.
A distribution of powers between a central government
and constituent states in a federal system, and a well-defined
separation of powers within a government cannot be achieved
on a constitutional basis except pursuant to a written docu-

ment

.

The tradition established by the early state constitutions,
the precedent furnished by the constitution of the United
States, and the situation created by the operation of the
federal system, resulted inevitably in the adoption of a
written constitution by each new state when it entered the
Union.
In fact no new state may be admitted into the Union
until its constitution is adopted and submitted to congress
for approval.

FEDERALISM AND THE STATE CONSTITUTION
That Michigan is one state among fifty comprising the Federal
Union or the United States of America is a paramount consideration in determining the nature and function of its constitution,
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This is a matter that goes to the question of sovereignty
and the source of the state's power to adopt its own
constitution as well as to limitations that must be recognized on the powers of government exercisable by the state.
It has been said that the United States constitution "looks
to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible
States."
But each state of the Union, while indestructible and possessing a distinctive constitutional status and
a sphere of constitutional autonomy, is not a completely
sovereign state in the usual sense of the word. Because
of the delegation of certain powers, express and implied,
to the central government, the express denial of certain
powers to the states and the implied denial of others, and
the recognition in the U. S. constitution of rights of the
person that can be enforced as a matter of federal constitutional limitation against the states in dealing with their
own citizens, Michigan is not a sovereign entity in the
full sense of the word.
On the other hand, the central government does not possess
sovereign powers in full measure either.
In the sphere of
foreign relations and in the handling of foreign affairs it
is recognized as a sovereign nation among the family of
nations, but internally it is limited by the powers delegated to it under the constitution.

A Sovereign People

The Tenth Amendment makes explicit the theory of federalism
on which the constitution rests.
"The powers not delegated
to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively,
or to the people." Disregarding theoretical difficulties
in the concept of sovereignty, it may be said as a practical
matter that in respect to the powers over internal matters,
sovereign power in the sense attributable to metaphysical
political entities is shared by the central government and
the states.
But even more realistically, and in recognition
of the view that government exists by consent of the people,
one may say that all ultimate sovereign power is vested in
the people of the United States who ordained and established
the constitution of the United States and who by this document allocated the spheres of governmental authority between
the central government and the states.
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The Power And The Duty

Regardless of the view one takes respecting the place and
nature of sovereign power under our federal system, the
practical and important consideration emerges that under
this system the people of each state are vested with the
constitutional power and, indeed, the duty, to fashion a
system of government effective within the state's territorial jurisdiction. This government is to be subject to
such restraints as the people see fit to impose as well as
to the restraints resulting from the federal character of
our system.
It is often said that the states possess the so-called
"residual powers"; i.e., the powers of government not
expressly or impliedly delegated to the central government.
This is not quite accurate since the states may act in
some areas of power delegated to the federal government as
long as the latter has not acted to pre-empt the field and
thereby foreclose state legislation on the subject. Perhaps
the most accurate statement of the matter is that each state
enjoys the constitutional freedom to exercise the general
powers of government subject to the U.S. constitution, the
laws enacted by congress in the lawful exercise of its
powers, and treaties made under authority of the United
States.

The States And The Federal Government

Enough has already been said to demonstrate the important
position of the states under our federal system. They have
a constitutional status that cannot be impaired by the federal government and exercise far-reaching and important
governmental responsibilities. There has been witnessed in
recent years, to be sure, a steady and progressive expansion
in the powers exercised by the federal government.
For
many purposes the important locus of power has shifted from
the states to the federal government.

Broadened interpretation of the commerce power has resulted
in federal hegemony in the regulation of economic affairs.
The broad fiscal authority of the federal government,
combining a virtually unlimited power to tax incomes, as
well as impose excises of various kinds with a constitutionally unlimited borrowing power and a broad and indeterminate
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independent power to spend for the general welfare has resulted in increased reliance on the federal government for
its intervention and assistance in areas within the primary
jurisdiction of the state.
Moreover, a progressively broadened review by the United
States supreme court of state legislative, administrative
and judicial acts for the purpose of protective rights
secured on the national level under the Fourteenth Amendment, notably under the due process and equal protection
clauses, has resulted in further subordination of the
states to the central authority.
In all these aspects the recent decades have witnessed a
substantial transformation in the nature of our federal
system.
These developments have, indeed, created pessimism
in certain quarters as to the continued vitality and integrity of the federal system and doubts as to the continuing
place of the states within the system. Some may go so far
as to say that the federal system with its theory of limited
federal powers and recognition of the constitutional status
of the states has become obsolete.

Importance Of The States

It is easy, however, to develop or portray a distorted or
pessimistic picture. The truth is that the states continue
to occupy a place of great importance and responsibility in
our scheme of things.
The bulk of the criminal law and the
whole system of private law and its administration, local
government, education, public health, highways and traffic
control continue to be primary responsibilities of the
states.
And the states continue to exercise significant
regulatory power in important areas of economic life not
withstanding the controls exercised by the federal government over the vital segments of the national economy.

Each of the states has its own taxing, borrowing and spending
powers, subject to such restraints as are imposed by its own
constitution. Despite the expanded activities of the federal government, the states continue to find themselves faced
with many large tasks and responsibilities. The need for
increased regulation resulting from the urbanization and
industrialization of our society and the constantly growing
demands upon government for additional services to meet
public needs particularly in the fields of education, highways, public health, housing and recreation have resulted

—

—
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in the intensification of functions performed by the states

and their local
state and local
which in itself
and their place

units.
The total taxes exacted annually by
units of government have reached a volume
suggests that any requiem over the states
in our system is premature.

The Expansion Of Federal Power

Several factors have contributed to the expansion of federal
power. One is the elementary and indisputable factor that
many of our problems requiring governmental attention have
grown national in scope and transcend the power of the states
to deal with effectively.
This is particularly true of the
regulation of commerce and business. The expansion of federal power has been commensurate with the nationalization of
vital phases of American life. A second and related factor
is that as a result of improved means of transportation and
communication the nation has shrunk in size with a resulting
greater awareness of national needs and interests and a
greater sense of national community. State boundary lines
have lost significance for many purposes.
Finally, the hard fact must be faced that pressure for federal assistance and intervention, particularly financial
assistance, is attributable in substantial measure to the
failure of the states to function adequately and effectively
in discharging their responsibilities within the spheres of
their constitutional competence. This is a point deserving
particular emphasis for it bears directly on state constitutions and the need for their revision.
It is safe to predict that the continued vitality and integrity of our federal system, having in mind particularly
the position and function of the states, will depend in
substantial part on how effectively the states discharge
their responsibilities.
If the states fail to measure up
to their tasks either through inertia, or because the
structure of government is inadequate to meet modern needs,
or as the result of disabilities they have inflicted upon
themselves in their own constitutions, the movement for

increased federal intervention will gain added momentum.
At present the fault lies in large part with state constitutions which have not been revised to keep pace with the
times
To establish a form of government responsive to the will of
the people, organized to deal effectively with the problems
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of our day and equipped with powers adequate to meet
state's needs is the sobering responsibility faced by a state
constitutional convention. The Michigan constitutional convention in proposing a constitution which when ratified by
the people will make possible the kind of government just
described will not only make a great contribution to good
government in Michigan but in doing so will make a contribution to the continued vitality of our federal system.

THE STATE CONSTITUTION

-

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

American constitutionalism presupposes certain basic principles that find expression either expressly or impliedly in
state constitutions as well as the constitution of the United
States.
Some of these are so fundamental and familiar and
their implications so plain that they need not be developed
at length.
That political power rests ultimately in the
people, that the popular will is reflected in the constitution and the institutions of representative government
designed to serve the interests and welfare of the people,
that the organs of government are subject to the limitations
imposed by the people and by the rights retained by them,
that a constitution is fundamental and supreme law and that
the courts in the exercise of the power of judicial review
have the responsibility and the duty to uphold this fundamental law and to refuse to enforce legislative and other
acts of government found to be in conflict with it--these
are all propositions that need no elaboration.
The matters
discussed below warrant more extended treatment.
Legislative Powers
A theoretical difference distinguishes the legislative powers
of congress under the constitution of the United States from
the pov/ers of a state legislature.
Subject to an exception
recognized by the courts in respect to the handling of foreign affairs, the powers of the federal government are delegated powers, and it must find authority for what it does
in express or implied grants of power under the constitution.
Legal Theory
In respect to the states, however, respectable authority
supports the theory that, subject only to the restraints
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derived from the constitution of the United States or from
the state's own constitution, the government established by
the state's constitution enjoys all the general powers of
government, and that, therefore, an express enumeration of
legislative powers is not required in a state constitution.
To put the matter in another way, the state constitution, and
this is particularly relevant to the legislative power, is
viewed primarily as a limitation on power and not a grant.
In order to justify the exercise of a given power, a legislature established pursuant to a state constitution is not
required to point to powers granted to it in the constitution.
Theoretically this means that if a state constitution
did nothing more than establish a legislative body, this body,
despite the absence of any specific grants of authority, can
enact general laws in the exercise of the police power, levy
taxes of various kinds, borrow and spend money and condemn
property for public use, as well as do many other things
embraced within the concept of the general powers of government.

This theory has not gone unchallenged, however. The argument
is made that under the Tenth Amendment the powers not delegated to the federal government and not prohibited to the
states are reserved to the states and to the people that
ultimate sovereign power rests in the people; and that since
the organs of state government must find their authority
in powers conferred by the people, there is no basis for
assertion of power by any organ of state government except
It should be noted, however,
as conferred by the people.^
that consistent with this idea, it is fair and proper to say
that the people of a state in establishing the basic organs
of government have impliedly delegated to those organs,
including the legislature, the general powers of government
within the sphere of the state's constitutional competence,
subject to the restraints imposed by the constitution and
the other express provision found in it.-'-'^
;

Historical Practice,
In any event, what ever the correct theory on this matter,
it is true as a matter of history and experience that state
constitutions are not viewed solely as limitations on power
but in respect to many matters are a positive grant of authority. Frequently specific legislative powers are spelled
out, often out of an abundance of caution, in order to make
clear that no limitations stated in the constitution or rights
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recognized under it should stand in the way of legislative
power to deal with a given problem. Thus, an amendment to
the iMichigan constitution in 1920 (Article V, Section 29)
was prompted by doubts, generated by judicial decisions of
that vintage, as to whether the state's police power extended
to the regulation of the hours and conditions under which men,
women and children might be employed. Frequently, also, provisions designed as limitations, either by their wording or by
construction, are found to be limited grants of power to deal
with the particular subject. The result then is that state
constitutions include both grants and limitations of power.

Detailed Eniimeration Unnecessary.
As a practical matter it would be a sound principle of constitution making and draftsmanship to spell out the general legislative powers such as the police power and the taxing, borrowing, spending and eminent domain powers in broad terms, subject
to limitations expressly stated as limitations or necessarily
derived as limitations from the declaration of rights. Enumeration of detailed powers to deal with specific situations
should be avoided.
An enumeration of detailed powers is
unnecessary, adds to the bulk of the instrument, and may also
have the unexpected result of being an implied limitation and
denial of powers not enumerated.
Thus, in regard to the police
power it is enough to say in recognition of the reach of this
power, as established by modern judicial decisions, that the
legislature shall have the power to enact laws it deems
necessary and proper to protect and promote the public health,
Certainly,
safety, morals, convenience and general welfare.
it is not necessary to say that the legislature has the power
to regulate trade, industry, the professions and use of property,

Unless a constitutional convention undertakes the necessary
and virtually impossible task of attempting to spell out all
the legislative powers, it should be made clear that the enumeration of certain powers shall not be construed as a denial
of the overall power of the legislature, subject to limitations
stated in the constitution, to enact all laws it deems appropriate to promote the well being and prosperity of the people,
including laws necessary and proper to the execution of the
enumerated powers
The Separation Of Powers

Based on Montesquieu's celebrated analysis of governmental
power, the principle of the separation of powers is a classic
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part of American constitutional thinking and practice. Accord
ing to this theory, the powers of government can be classifiea
into three categories the legislative, the executive, and the
judic:Lal powers.
In the interests of a wise distribution of
power and to assure a system of checks and balances whereby
no single department will unduly extend its powers, these
three powers are committed to their respective departments,
and no department shall exercise powers committed to the other
two departments.
The theory in its general features is still
valid.
It is not the business of the executive to enact laws
or of the legislature to conduct trials of persons accused
of crime.
But recognition of validity of the general theory
should not obscure the fact that a rigid separation of powers
is not possible.
Particularly in our day, with the widespread use of administrative agencies that often combine several functions, any theory of complete separation of powers
is untenable and unworkable.
This situation should be faced
when constitutions are revised.

—

The present Michigan constitution (Article IV) after declaring that the powers of government are divided into three
departments:
the legislative, executive and judicial, further states that no person belonging to one department shall
exercise the power properly belonging to another, except
in the cases expressly provided in this constitution.
The
recognition that exceptional cases may be expressly recognized in the constitution tempers the rigidity of this
provision.
But constitution makers may not anticipate all
the situations where some departure from the separation
principle is warranted.
It may be more suitable simply to recognize the separate
departments in the constitution, and leave the implications
of the separation principle to be worked out on the basis of
experience and judicial construction.
In any event the
constitution should allow for some flexibility here.

Closely related to the separation principle is the principle
of nondelegability of legislative power.
Legislative power
is to be exercised by the legislature.
The executive and
administrative agencies are not to make laws.
In the abstract this states an excellent principle. But again, as a
practical matter, in view of the necessity of confiding in
the executive and in administrative agencies the power to
make rules and regulations to implement legislative policies,
an absolute adherence to the non-delegation principle is
unworkable.
Courts now sanction delegations where the
general policy is declared by the legislature and where
statutory standards serve to guide and limit the exercise
of administrative discretion in the implementation of
statutory policy.
In view of the vast expansion of the
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administrative arm of government and the subjection of
citizens to the authority of these agencies in areas
touching on many vital interests, it would be appropriate
to include in a state constitution an express provision
stating the general circumstances under which legislative
power may be delegated and the limitations to be observed
by the legislature in making any delegation.
THE CONSTITUTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL AND ENDURING

INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT
The questions of what specifically should be dealt with in
a state constitution and the purposes to which a state
constitution should be directed are questions which depend
for their answer on the choice of a basic approach to constitution making. Most students of the subject agree that
the constitution should serve the purpose of a fundamental
organic document establishing, defining and limiting the
basic organs of power, stating general principles and
declaring the rights of the people. This points to the conclusion that the constitution should not be an elaborate
document; that it should be a relatively compact and economical in its general arrangement and draftsmanship; that
details should be avoided; and that matters appropriate for
legislation should not be incorporated into the organic
Chief Justice Marshall stated this idea in classic
document.
form in the course of his famous opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland
A Constitution to contain an accurate detail of all
the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit,
and of all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of a prolixity of a legal
code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.
It would probably never be understood by the public.
Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects
In considering this question, then,
themselves...
we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are
.

expounding

-'-'•
.
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Justice Cardozo stated the matter more succinctly:
A Constitution states or ought to state not rules
for the passing hour but principles for an expanding future. ^
The early state constitutions embodied the idea that a constitution should establish a general frame of government, setting forth general principles and avoiding the detail which
mistakes a constitution for a statute or legal code. And
the constitution of the United States is a superb model of a
compact, organic document that is logically arranged, internally coherent and drafted with the object in mind of
stating broad, fundamental, and enduring purposes.
The Trend Toward Detail

Despite the admirable pattern established by the earlier
documents, the general trend throughout the nineteenth
century was to make state constitutions, by the process either
of revision or amendment, much more detailed and elaborate
and in many cases prolix documents which incorporated matters that could well have been left for the ordinary lawmaking processes. '-^ The distinctive character of a constitution as the fundamental or basic law, superior to ordinary
laws, underwent a change.
A number of factors contributed
to this result.
Undoubtedly the acceptance of the theory
of popular participation in the law-making process played
a major part.
It must be remembered that state constitutions, as compared
with the constitution of the United States, can be amended
with relative ease.
In the usual case a state constitution
can be amended by affirmative majority vote at a popular
election on a proposition placed on the ballot either by the
legislature or initiated by citizens by petition. The power
to amend the constitution by simple majority vote is no
different from the power of the people to vote on legislative
propositions initiated by citizens' petitions.
It is not
surprising, therefore, that the distinction between the constitution as fundamental law, on the one hand, and ordinary
statutory law, on the other, tended to become lost in the
process
In some situations a relatively simple amendment process
offers an easier method for securing legislation than the
usual legislative process.
Moreover, the tendency toward
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inclusion of greater detail in state constitutions, and
particularly the inclusion of restrictions on the legislative power, notably the taxing, borrowing and spending
powers, reflected a distrust of the legislature and an
unwillingness to vest it with broad general powers in
these areas.
The inclusion of what are essentially statutory matters in a state constitution has its defenders.-'-^
It is argued that the distinction between what is fundamental and what is non-fundamental is not always clear.
No precise or scientific line can be drawn to distinguish
Moreover, if the people
and fence off the fundamentals.
of a state feel that a particular matter, otherwise
appropriate for legislative determination, is so important
that it should be incorporated into the fundamental law,
who can say that they are wrong or unwise? This is a
matter of choice and judgment.
The Need For Restraint

Notwithstanding these contentions, a good case can be made
for limiting the state constitution to the essentials or
fundamentals and avoiding inclusion of matters ordinarily
reserved for the legislative process. The state constituIt is
tion is by definition the state's fundamental law.
judicially enforceable as the supreme law of the state,
subject of course, to federal limitations, and takes
precedence over ordinary laws and administrative acts. The
purpose of a constitution as historically conceived is to
establish the basic order of government. The constitution
loses much of its distinctive significance as the basic and
enduring instrument of government when the process of constitutional amendment or revision is used as a substitute for
legislation.
Furthermore, the effect of incorporating what are essentially
legislative matters in a state constitution is to undercut
the legislative process and to limit the area of legislative
responsibility and discretion.
It is more difficult to remove what is essentially a statutory provision from a constitution than it is to incorporate it in the first instance.
Despite change of circustances or results not anticipated,
the legislature is powerless to correct the situation.
Insofar as these provisions are effective, they often operate
with a crippling effect on the power and responsibility of
the legislature to deal adequately with problems pressing
for solution.
The only recourse in this event is again to
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amend the constitution, and a large part of the prolixity
and bulk of state constitutions is attributable to piecemeal and usually detailed amendments spelling out power to
deal with specific situations notwithstanding previously
imposed limitations that have been demonstrated to be too
rigid and unworkable. The inclusion of rigid restrictions
on the legislative power creates other problems.
History
demonstrates that they frequently become a challenge to
harassed and well intentioned legislators to find ways and
means of circumventing the constitution.
Yet a constitution is a document that should be honored and respected.

Placing curbs on governmental power is understandable. This
is one of the essential purposes of a constitution and this
is a reason for including a declaration of rights.
But it
is another matter to cripple the legislature in the exercise
of essentially legislative powers where judgment and discretion in meeting current problems are required.
A state
constititution designed to meet modern needs moves in a
negative direction if premised on an unwillingness to entrust
the people's representatives with powers adequate to their
tasks.
Improving the legislative process, attracting able
men to the legislature and equipping them with the means
and facilities conducive to well-informed and responsible
discharge of their tasks is a more constructive approach to
the problem of responsible government than the process of
popular law-making by means of constitutional revision or
amendment or the placing of rigid constitutional limitations
on the exercise of legislative powers.
This is not to suggest that some limitations on generally
stated legislative power are not desirable. But any limitations adopted should not be narrowly conceived, should
permit flexibility, should be carefully examined in light of
their restrictive power on the legislature to meet not only
today's problems but tomorrow's as well, and should be drafted with a clarity that will make it unnecessary to resort
re'O'^atedly to the process of litigation in order to determine
their meanina.
The Importance Of Popular Understanding

Finally, regarding the general question whether the constitution should be a relatively compact instrument limited to
constitutional fundamentals or an elaborate and detailed
document, it is worth mentioning that a significant element
ol" value in a written constitution is that it is a document
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which citizens should be acquainted with, which they are
ready and willing to read, and which they can understand.
The briefer and more compact the document, the m.ore
Converselikely it is to be read, studied and understood.
ly, a long document replete with details does not invite
the attention of the average citizen or reward his efforts. 15
With due regard then to the conception of a state constitution as establishing the basic order of government and
concerned only with the fundamentals, what are the general
areas that must be considered and should be the focal point
for debate and consideration in a constitutional convention?
The writer at this point has no intention of stating in
detail the provisions he would regard as essential to a model
constitution. Others have attempted this task.-*-^ Attention
here will be focused on the frame of government, the
declaration of rights, and the amending process.
THE FRAME OF GOVERNMENT
The first fundamental objective is to establish the organs
of governmental power, to define and distribute authority
among them, and to state limitations on these powers.
Although attention is usually directed at the outset to the
three departments of government--the legislative, the executive and the judicial--it may be suggested that the electors
of the state are the primary organ of power, both because
they in the end establish the constitution and because they
elect the legislative representatives and other officers
who operate the government. Turning then to the electors,
a necessary function of the constitution is to define voting
qualifications.
Secondly, the questions of direct participation by the electors in the legislative process by means
of the referendum and initiative and the mechanics of these
processes require attention. Finally, it may be suggested
that since political parties are vital to the voting process
and the operation of representative government, attention
may well be given in the constitution to their status,
organization and responsibilities.

Apart from the electorate and the three departments of
government, the other organs or bodies that may be vested
with constitutional status are public corporations. These
may be divided into two categories:
(1) municipal corporations and other local governmental units including counties,
townships, ahd metropolitan districts and (2) public
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corporations organized for specific purposes such as the
state universities.
With respect to both classes, the
questions respecting constitutional position and authority-including in the case of those in the first class the important
questions of home rule status--are matters of basic concern.
The larger part of the constitution necessarily centers on
the three departments
The Legislature

Here are the important organization and procedural questions
are whether the legislative body shall be bicameral or
unicameral; the scheme of legislative apportionment; the
qualifications of legislators; the time and method of their
election; their term of office; method of determining
compensation; and the mechanics of the legislative process.
These are all vital organic matters and a number of them
necessarily require treatment in some detail.

Questions respecting the substance of the legislative power,
its reach and the limitations upon it have received attention
earlier in this monograph and it is unnecessary to repeat
here what was said earlier about the necessity or desirability of spelling out legislative power.
The question of
express limitations on legislative powers has also been discussed in connection with the proposition that the constitution should be limited to the fundamentals and that the
whole problem of stating limitations on legislative powers
should be carefully examined lest the legislature be curbed
too severely in the exercise of its power and responsibility
to meet tomorrow's as well as today's problems.
The search here should be for limitations that are flexible
and that admit of departure without the necessity either of
piecemeal constitutional amendments that add bulk and complexity to the constitution or of forced judicial interpretations
that undermine the limitation and weaken the dignity of the
document and the respect that should be entertained for it.
A more flexible type of limitation, for instance, is one which
fixes a borrowing limit on a formula basis that takes account
of assessed property values or other variable factors and in
turn permits borrowing in excess of this limit either by a
special majority vote of the legislature or on approval of
the electorate.
The same type of limitation can be made applicable to the taxing power. The principle of permitting
the raising of debt limits and tax limits by special vote of
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the electorate is already recognized in Michigan in respect
to local units of government.

The Executive
The office of the governor; his qualifications; time and
manner of election; term of office; fixing the method of
determining compensation; and his general powers and duties
Probably the most
are the central items of interest here.
critical questions in respect to the executive department
are whether the constitution should spell out in some detail
the other branches of the executive department, as well as
state administrative agencies, and whether the other important executive officers should be elected or appointed.
Much current thinking supports the idea that the number of
elected state officers should be reduced; that in the
interests of unified responsibility the governor should have
the power to appoint heads of the principal executive departments; that details in regard to the organization and duties
of departments should be avoided; and that either the legislature should be authorized to detail the organization of
the executive department, as well as create state administrative commissions and agencies as needed, or that the
governor be vested with power in these matters subject to
legislative veto.
The Judiciary

Here the important questions relate to the organization of
the judicial department; the structure of the court system;
whether judges shall be elected or appointed; the method of
election or appointment; the term of office; the fixing of
compensation; and the general authority of the Michigan
Supreme Court in respect to such matters as rule making and
A primary considerthe supervision of the lower courts.
ation that affects a number of these questions is to assure
as far as practicable by constitutional means the independence of the judiciary.
An important problem requiring
attention is whether the judicial system (the types of
courts and their respective jurisdictions) shall be spelled
out or whether the constitution shall outline the general
structure and vest power in the legislature to fill in the
details

-143-

THE STATE CONSTITUTION: ITS NATURE AND PURPOSE

THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Article II of the Michigan constitution, entitled "Declaration of Rights," enumerates in some detail the constitutional
rights that serve as limitations on the exercise of governmental power. These are rights that are "declared" and
reserved by the people, not rights created by the constituttion. Of the declaration of rights it may be said, to use
the eloquent words found in an opinion of the Michigan
supreme court:
Here the people have erected their safeguards, not
only against tyranny and brutality, but against the
oppression of temporary majorities and the rapacious
demands of government itself. Here are found words
that are beyond words, principles for which men have
died and reckoned not the cost.
It is a charter
heavy with history, pregnant with the pride of a
free people. '-'
The inclusion of a declaration of rights conforms to the
principle deeply rooted in American constitutional history
and experience that the basic rights of the citizen are of
such importance as to require recognition in the fundamental law and thereby receive the added protection furnished by the process of judicial review.
Indeed, the earliest
of English and American constitutional documents were
concerned primarily with asserting the rights of persons
as against the arbitrary and despotic acts of those clothed
with the powers of government.

Protection Of Rights In The Federal System
Reverting again to the federal nature of our system, the
question may be raised whether, since basic rights of the
person aire already protected against impairment by the states
under the constitution of the United States, notably under
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, further recognition and protection of
rights under a state constitution is really necessary.
This
question admits of a ready answer.
It is true that a citizen
can claim against his own state the protection secured to
him under the constitution of the United States of his socalled fundamental rights and that he is similarly protected
against arbitrary discrimination at the hands of his own
state government. But these fundamental rights, both of a
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procedural and substantive character, do not embrace all the
rights presently enumerated in the Michigan constitution.
Thus the United States supreme court has said that the right
to jury trial, the privilege against self-incrimination and
freedom from double- jeopardy in the sense in which these
rights are protected against the federal government, are not
essential to due process of law and are not included among
the fundamental rights.
But these are all recognized under
the Michigan constitution and surely no one will be heard to
contend that they should be eliminated. Moreover, some of
the fundamental rights protected under the constitution of
the United States do not have the same scope as corresponding
rights enumerated in the state constitution.
,

It must be remembered that a state supreme court is free to
give such freedoms as freedom of speech or of the press or
the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, when
recognized in the state constitution, a reach that transcends
interpretations given the fundamental rights by the United
States supreme court.
The general theory of the supreme
court's interpretation of the due process clause, seen as a
federal limitation on state action, is that this assures
minimum standards of protection. A state should, therefore,
feel free to develop its own higher standards.
The supreme
court has held that consistent with the constitution of the
United States a state may authorize advance censorship of
movies. But a state by its own constitution may see fit to
prohibit all forms of censorship.

State Protection Of Rights
The proposition that each state should by its own constitution declare and protect basic rights, even though minimum
protection is already afforded by the constitution of the
United States, is reinforced by another important consideration.
Mention was made earlier of the trend toward further
centralization of power at the hands of the federal government, including broadened review by the United States supreme
court of the actions of state legislatures, administrative
agencies, and courts for the purpose of protecting fundamental rights and freedom from discrimination based on race
or color.

A study of the cases coming before the court illustrates
that the failure of the states in many instances to respect
minimum standards of justice--and this has particular
relevancy in respect to the administration of criminal
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justice--accounts for increased federal intervention in
matters over which the states have primary authority and
responsibility.
Recognition by each state in its own
constitution of the basic rights of the individual and
this not limited to the minimum standards derived from the
constitution of the United States and a policy and program
of effective protection of these rights by all state agencies
including preeminently the state judiciary, offer the surest
guarantee of maximum state responsibility and autonomy in
this area and a corresponding minimum of federal intervention.

—

—

In any revision of a state constitution, the existing
declaration of rights should be examined to determine whether
some provisions are no longer necessary, whether some should
be clarified or expanded, and whether new basic rights
should be recognized.
It may be suggested, for instance,
that the provision of the Michigan constitution (Article II,
Section 7) prohibiting peacetime quartering of troops in
any home without the consent of the owner is no longer
relevant.

A right of vital current significance is the right to equal
protection of the laws, and, more particularly, the right
to be free from governmental action which discriminiates
on the basis of race, color, religion or national ancestry.
This right is protected at the national level by the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Any right
to the equal protection of the laws under the Michigan
constitution derives from the provision (Article II
Section 1) which states that all political power is inherent
in the people and that government is instituted for their
equal benefit, security and protection.
The question may
be raised whether on revision an explicit equal protection
clause should be adopted and along with it a specific provision prohibiting the deprivation or denial of right on
the basis of race, color, religion, or national ancestry.
The Bill Of Rights As A Limitation On Governmental Power

The classic concept of basic rights in the American constitutional tradition is that these rights are retained by the
people as against limitations and infringements by actions
of the government.
The rights a persons has against third
persons are defined by common law and statute. These are not
ordinarily regarded as constitutional matters. The principle
that a state shall not deprive a person of his life without
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due process of law is a constitutional matter, but constitutions do not make it a crime for an individual to take
another's life. This is governed by the criminal laws.
If all civil rights, in the sense of rights which a person
may assert against his fellow citizens, were to be incorporated in the constitution, the distinction between the
constitution as fundamental law defining the frame of
government and the relation of the government to the citizen
and the general laws of the state defining rights and
obligations arising out of private relationship--would be
lost.
Adherence to the basic purpose of constitution
suggest, for instance, that laws dealing with employeremployee relations, such as laws declaring a right of
collective bargaining or declaring a right to work regardless of closed shop agreements, and laws prohibiting discrimination by private persons in such fields as employment
or housing, etc., are properly reserved for legislation and
should not be made constitutional matters.

—

—

—

Declaration of any such rights against private persons
would necessarily have to be accompanied by details limiting and controlling the right, all matters best left to
the legislative process.
Once the door is opened for
enumerating and defining rights in the field of private
relations, it may be expected that a number of special interest groups will be pushing for recognition of their own
particular interests.
Social and Economic Rights

Somewhat related is the question whether the conception of
basic rights should be expanded so as to include not only
the traditional types of rights that operate as a restraint
on governmental power but also social and economic rights
premised on claims of a duty owed by the state to assure
certain benefits to its citizens.
Mention may be made of
welfare relief, old age assistance, health benefits, public
housing, education and recreation.
A state is free to
declare such rights in its constitution, or, putting the
matter conversely, to impose a duty on the legislature to
provide benefits of this kind.

Michigan has long recognized for reasons peculiar to the
importance of schools in a self-governing society that the
legislature is under a duty to maintain a system of tuitionfree primary schools. -'-° But whether in deference to present
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trends favoring increased public services and benefits, new
economic and social rights should receive constitutional
sanction is another question.
Rights of this kind, stated
in a constitution, are "programmatic" in character.
They
are not judicially enforceable and require legislative acts
for their implementation.
To define the limit and scope
of these rights is necessarily reserved for legislation.

Discussion of rights of this character at a constitutional
convention and of the kinds of rights to be enumerated will
necessarily excite extended debate on such broad subjects as
free enterprise, socialism and the welfare state.
A constitutional convention must ask itself the question whether
consideration and discussion of these matters is not more
appropriately reserved for the legislative forum. The
people through their elected representatives in the legislature are free to fashion their own destiny in this respect
and to adopt the controls and provide the public services
needed in response to the temper and spirit of the times.
What is relevant and important, constitutional-wise, is that
the legislature be recognized to have the power to adopt
legislation and programs to promote the general welfare
and to have the choice of means suitable to this end, subject
only to such restrictions as the people have seen fit to
impose by express limitations and by the rights they have
reserved. 19
TEE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION OR AMENDMENT

Just as the establishment of a state constitution rests in
the first instance on the authority and will of the people,
so also must opportunity be allowed for future amendment
or revision and approval of the same by the electors.
A
constitution should state the means and processes for such
amendment or revision.

State constitutions commonly authorize amendment by means of
popular vote on propositions submitted by the legislature or
initiated by citizens' petition in accordance with procedures
defined by the constitution. They may also require that the
question whether a convention of popularly elected delegates
be called to consider constitutional revision be submitted
to the electors at regularly stated intervals.
The relative ease with which state constitutions are amended,
with the result that state constitutions have grown bulky
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and the constitutional amendment process often resorted to
as a substitute for the law-making process--a point stressed
in an earlier section--suggests the question whether restrictions should be placed on the amending process in the
interest of assuring the status of the constitution as the
fundamental and more enduring law.
This is a matter requiring careful study and attention.

The amendment process should be neither too difficult nor
too easy.
To suggest limitations on the amending process
is to enter upon a sensitive area, since it is one of our
traditions that a constitution resting on the will of the
people should always be freely subject to amendment by
expression of the same popular will.

Thought may be given, however, to the possibility of limiting the amendment process in respect to certain parts of
the constitution.
One suggestion, for instance, is that
all amendments relating to certain specified legislative
powers, such as the vital fiscal powers, either originate
with the legislature or, if originated by citizens' petition,
be subject to disaffirmance or modification by a two-thirds
majority of the legislature upon declaration of an emergency
by the governor.
The important point is that a constitutional convention give
serious thought to the problem of whether the process of
constitutional amendment can be limited in such a way as to
preserve the constitution's character as the state's basic
fundamental enduring law, while at the same time keeping
open necessary and adequate channels for changes in response
to the popular will and consistent with the theory of the
people's sovereignty on which the constitution rests.
Unless this is done and no matter how admirable and compact
a document the convention produces, it is fair to predict
that within a fairly short time the familiar story of
frequent amendments and use of the constitutional amendment
process as a substitute for legislation will be repeated.

CONCLUSION

Extraordinary changes have taken place since Michigan's
constitution was last revised by the convention which met in
1907.
The state's population has tripled, the state has become highly urbanized and industrialized, means of transportation and communication have undergone radical changes,
governmental regulation and public services have expanded and

-149-

THE STATE CONSTITUTION:

ITS NATURE AND PURPOSE

proliferated in ways not dreamed of in 1907, cind the social,
economic and political problems the state faces are vastly
different and far more complex.
Patterns of government
adequate to meet the relatively simple needs of 1907 are no
longer responsive to today's conditions.
The organs of government must be vested with powers adequate
to their tasks and responsibilities in fashioning and administering policies that are directed to the end of promoting
the general welfare as determined by a preponderant public
opinion in the context of new and changing circumstances.
And, on the other hand, the vast expansion of governmental
authority, the broadened areas of public service, and the increased demands placed upon citizens by regulatory and tax
laws, make it equally imperative that the safeguards of
representative government in its various institutional aspects, of the rule of law, of the reserved rights of the
people, and of the restraints designed to prevent the
arbitrary and irresponsible exercise of power be preserved
and strengthened.

The constitutional convention of 1961 will not be starting
from scratch.
The state of Michigan has an extended constitutional history and tradition that began with the adoption
of the first constitution in 1835.
Any revised constitution
must keep faith with the past and with what has been determined by experience to be the enduring values of a government resting on the consent of the people. To fashion a
fundamental order of government that preserves the continuity
of our constitutional tradition by holding fast to that
which is good, but which will be adequate to meet not only
today's but also tomorrow's needs this is the large,
challenging and difficult task that faces the constitutional
convention of 1961.

—

Various interests and points of view will be represented at
the convention.
Differences of opinion will emerge on many
vital questions.
Comprises will be made. Whatever the
ultimate solutions to concrete problems, however, it is
important and imperative that the delegates approach the task
with open-nindedness, with an awareness that they will be
framing a document designed to serve the best interests of
all the people, and with the understanding that a constitution
is a basic document centered on the fundamental order of government and, therefore, a document which should be designed
with an eye to relative permanence and stability.
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In the end, the convention must submit the results of its
deliberations to the state's electors for approval. To merit
this approval, a proposed revision of the constitution must
be a document that can be read and understood by citizens
and which in meritorious features commends itself to the
people as a worthy instrument for the furtherance of effective and responsible government directed to the end of serving and promoting the common good.
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CHAPTER VII
WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL SIMPLIFICATION INVOLVES

The Temporary State Commission on the Constitutional Convention was directed, by the statute that created it, to study
among other things the possible "simplification of the
constitution."^ In its first interim report the Commission
declared as one of its four principal objectives an examination of "the feasibility of simplifying the state constituion, to identify potential areas for simplification and
to state the advantages and disadvantages of such simplification. "^
In furtherance of that purpose the Commission
authorized an Inter-Law School Committee on Constitutional
Simplification, the members of which were drawn from the
faculties of eight law schools of this State, to carry
forward the necessary studies.

WHY SIMPLIFY?
Before the feasibility of simplification is lengthily discussed, its purposes must be identified.

Occasionally the thought has been expressed that the fundamental law of the State should be made "readable," so that
the "average citizen" may easily understand the governmental
system of which he and his fellow citizens are the ultimate
masters.
This goal is not likely to be reached by a document that must with some precision describe and delimit the
powers of numerous organs of the State.
To be sure, no
public document should be so burdened with detail, prolixity,
inconsistency, and confusing jargon that, as has been said
of another state's constitution, it "will trip, entangle,
infuriate, and then exhaust" any one who examines it.^ But
no matter how simplified it may become, the New York Constitution will probably never have wide circulation as bedside
reading matter.
If the desirability of simplification is to
be meaningfully rather than merely sentimentally considered.

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
New York (State) Special Legislative Committee on the Re"What
vision and Simplification of the Constitution.
Constitutional Simplification Involved." Chapter I in
The Problem of Simplification of the Constitution pp. 1-15
Inter-Law School Committee Report No. 57, 1968.
,
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it must be evaluated in light of the basic nature of the
document whose simplification is sought.

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The federal government is generally understood to be one of
limited powers.
The Constitution of the United States of
America confers power; it embodies grants from the preexisting sovereign states.
Save for those grants, no federal power would exist.

State constitutions, by contrast, originated not so much as
grants but as limitations upon power.
In theory the people's
government in the states possess all powers not ceded to
the federal government or qualified by a federal constitutional provision.
The purpose of state constitutions has
always been to place boundaries upon what might otherwise
have been deemed an unlimited governmental authority.
New
York's Constitution, like the basic charters of its sister
states, began as a general formulation of the people's consent to be ruled.
Organs of government were established to
effectuate the purposes declared and their powers were defined.
At the outset, state constitutions were not elaborate documents.
Virginia used only 1500 words in its Constitution
of 1776, and New York's first Constitution, adopted in the
next year, contained only some 3000.
The early draftsmen
made little attempt, as one authority has remarked, "to
enact a code of laws under color of framing a constitution."
They sought instead to deal with fundamentals.
The governments they created were not intended to do much governing.
Fearful of executive power because they resentfully recalled
abusive acts by colonial governors, the people of the new
states gave little authority to their chief executives.
Insistent upon preserving their hard-won freedom, they incorporated in their constitutions "bills of rights" that
forbade legislative invasions of political and personal
liberty.
Little more was then thought to be necessary.
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LATER DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTION-MAKING
The early constitutions tended to be drawn (as was the
federal constitution) in general terms that provided guide
The passing years,
lines rather than inflexible blueprints.
however, saw a notable change in the scope and style of
American state constitutions. Specific language and elaborately detailed prescriptions appeared in increasing
quantity.
Instead of delineating the functions of state
government, the constitutions began to direct precisely
Instead
how the work of government was to be accomplished.
of merely organizing the governmental machinery, the constitutions in many instances took over the task of operating
Instead of establishing safeguards against abuses of
it.
power, the constitutions delimited power with an exactitude
that left virtually no further room for its being used, let
Instead of embodying a ripened philosophy
alone abused.
capable of projection into the future regardless of the
surface changes that inevitably occur in a growing society,
the constitutions tended to embody their sponsors' ideas
concerning the issues of the fleeting moment, and thus took
on the appearances of statute books.
A constitution, it has been said, "is supposed to represent
an attempt at stating the accumulated wisdom of the ages on
the subject of government, while statutes are a contemporary
effort to deal with problems of a current nature."^ When
the constitution-makers of the Nineteenth Century became less
concerned with the wisdom of the ages and more concerned with
problems of a current nature, they were reflecting neither
ignorance nor malice.
In part, rather, they were reflecting
their mounting distrust of the legislature of their generaAnd in part, too, they were reflecting hopes of various
tion.
special interests that policies they cherished could be protected
against future attack by being imbedded in the constitution.
The new currents in constitutional development began to be
The
felt most strongly in the period following the Civil War.
odor of corruption then hung heavily over legislative assemblies throughout the nation. Venality, buttressed by
ignorance, prejudice, and inept organization, much too often
prevented dispassionate consideration of public problems by
Justice Cardozo, it
the people's supposed representatives.
is said, once remarked that a constitution should try to
But
state principles of government for an expanding future.
when constitutional conventions came together in the suspicion-laden atmosphere of those days, men's minds were inescapably fixed upon the known and troubled present rather
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Out of bitter disillusion
them upon the uncertain future.
The
grew the resolve to forestall legislative wickedness.
peoples of the several states, as was noted by the shrewdly
observant Lord Bryce, desired in that period "not only to
do a thing forthwith and in their own way rather than to
leave it to the chance of legislative action, but to narrow
as far as they conveniently can (and sometimes farther) the
The guiding principle, as
sphere of the legislature."
Henry L. Stimson later noted with tart disapproval, came
"You must not give a man power to do right for fear
to be:
he will do wrong. "^
In the Twentieth Century a new force began to make itself
felt in shaping state constitutions.
Fear of the legislature had already expanded the detail and swollen the size
of the constitutions.
Now fear of the courts led to yet

further expansion.
In the present centruy increasingly insistent demands have
been made that state government provide services and afford
protections little sought after in bygone days when government was regarded with a hostile eye.
In the beginning,
the people at large had rather applauded governmental inaction.
But the increasing complexities of an urban and
industrialized society aroused movements for positive
programs for workmen's compensation and other forms of
social insurance, for public assistance, for health services, for educational facilities, for housing, and so on.
Could these survive judicial scrutiny if the legislature
were to respond favorably to the popular demands.

—

The Court of Appeals had in 1911 declared the first Workmen's Compensation Law to be unconstitutional.
Its
decision had been promptly overridden by constitutional
amendment.
In the mid-Thirties, as preparations were being
made for the Constitutional Convention of 1938, the ferment
of "social reform" was much in evidence.
Equally in
evidence was the initial resistance of the Supreme Court of
the United States to the legislative experiments of the time,
While the tide had in fact begun to turn before the Convention net, the public mind was still filled with the spectre
of "the Nine Old Men" who could set at naught statutory
attempts to meet deeply felt needs.
And so it was but
natural that in New York, as in many other states, the Constitution began to blossom with affirmations of legislative
power to act in newly identified ways.
Restraints were
thus sought to be placed not, as in the past, on the judgment of the Legislature, but upon the judgment of the courts.
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Two currents--fear of the Legislature and fear of the
Judiciary have, then, combined to produce a veritable
torrent of legal verbiage. The upshot of the matter in
the State of New York is that the Constitution has grown
until in its officially printed form it covers 164 pages
and contains fully ten times as many words as the relatively terse document that launched the state government on
its course.

—

CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT

Whatever may once have been the justification for distrust
of the Legislature and impatience with the Judiciary,
attitudes toward these branches of government have undergone marked changes in recent decades just as, in earlier
times, the fear of gubernatorial power had been moderated
by events
Three things joined to lessen apprehension of legislative
First, in point of time, was the decline of
misdeed.
special legislation, with all its potentialities for favorSecond, was the Fourteenth Amendment
itism or oppression.
to the Federal Constitution which strongly reinforced the
principle of equality before the law, and thus compelled
a change in what had been the more blatantly obnoxious
patterns of state statutes. Third, was a growing awareness
that public protection lay much more surely in holding the
people's representatives accountable for what they might do,
rather than in seeking to constrict their power to the point
that they could do nothing at all. Nobody became utterly
convinced that highmindedness invariably dominates legislative proceedings, and that improper motiviations have forever been excluded from the lawmaking process. But there
has been a mounting belief that, in the words of a greatly
respected former Attorney General of Pennsylvania, "Modern
means of communication and facilities for disseminating
information through press and radio constitute a far more
effective check on improper legislation than almost any
restriction the present constitution contains. The risk of
corruption today is incomparably less than the disadvantage
of depriving legislative bodies of the power to remodel
their statutory law... in accordance with the dictates of
good government and changed times. "° Concern about the
Legislature's imperfections has not vanished; but it has
found its expression not so much in the negatives of the
Constitution as in positive efforts to improve legislation
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by strengthening legislative personnel, organization, and
procedures
As for the courts, they themselves largely set at rest the
fear that judges, uninformed about current realities, might
invalidate legislation aimed at improving economic or
social dislocations.
Commencing in 1937 the Supreme Court
of the United States began consistently to uphold the
constitutionality of statutory innovations. Minimum wage

controls, child labor regulations, unemployment compensation
and other forms of social insurance, labor relations laws
--these and other enactments were successively sustained
when attacked as violative of the due process or equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Concern lest the
Judiciary usurp the policy-choosing role conferred on the
people's elected representatives quickly abated as one after
another of the challenged statutes passed unscathed through
the courts
In sum, the basic reasons for a vastly elaborated constitution have been significantly modified (if, indeed, they
have not vanished) as time has passed. Nevertheless the
State Constitution remains in all its bulk in parts an
anachronism or, at best, a reminder of the force once
possessed by no longer potent fears.

—

But to say that a constitution is long and detailed,
"statutory" instead of "fundamental," is merely to describe
rather than to evaluate. We turn now to consider whether
considerations other than pure aestheticism argue in favor
of simplifying the complex and lengthy New York Constitution.
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF EXCESSIVELY

DETAILED STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Inflexibility
A Constitution that embodies a series of what are essentially
legislative enactments inevitably reduces the elasticity of
government, rendering it less capable of adaptation to unforeseeable changes in the areas of its operation. As Governor Driscoll put the matter in an address that launched the
New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947, "When legislation
is permitted to infiltrate a constitution, it shackles the
hands of the men and women elected by the people to exercise
public authority. The longer a constitution, the more quickly
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it fails to meet the requirements of a society that is
never static."^

The shackling effect of some constitutional provisions is
obvious and calculated. Thus, the detailed treatment in
Art. V, Sec. 6 of veterans' preferences and credits, bearing on civil service appointments and in Art. VII, Sec. 14,
the elaborately limited authorization to the Legislature
to raise money for railroad grade crossings elimination are
examples (chosen from many) of intentional inflexibility.
The sponsors of provisions such as these make, in essence,
a forecast that their judgment will be superior to that of
future legislators and will not be invalidated by changing

conditions

Direct grants of power to the Legislature constitute a less
apparent, and no doubt unintended, source of inflexibility.
Not long ago, for example, the people of Oklahoma were
startled to discover that no state authority possessed jurisdiction over aviation companies within that state. The
Constitution had in fact empowered a state agency to regulate
transportation companies, which were defined with great precision to assure that no known type of freight or passenger
carriage would escape from control.
Years later, when airlines made their appearance, the detail of definition proved
"Aircraft
to be the undoing of the constitutional purpose.
transportation," said the Oklahoma Supreme Court, "is not
expressly nor by necessary implication within the meaning of
the words 'transportation company' as used in the Constitution," and hence there was no power to regulate it.
Similarly, a specifically spelled out power of taxation may
negative the existence of power to tax in any other way, despite intervening changes in business practices and the
introduction of entirely new technologies. As a New York
judge declared a century ago, "Every positive direction contains an implication against anything contrary to it."--'This proposition has led most students of the problem to
favor broad rather than tight phrasing lest constitutional
grants of authority to act be found, in the end, to be restrictions instead. Article XVIII of the New York Constitution may afford an apt example of the problem.
It declares
the Legislature's and the municipalities' powers to provide
housing for persons of low income, thus making explicit what
might very possibly have been implied in any case even had
the Constitution remained silent.
Twenty years later a complex of economic and social problems has developed from the
exodus of urban populations, the deterioration of central
sections of many major cities, and the need for large scale
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undertakings to rehabilitate commercial rather than residential areas.
Does the granted power to engage in "slum
clearance" for housing purposes negative the existence of
power to deal with other sorts of urban problems that have
now begun to press for attention?
Decreased Responsibility
The residents of modern states have long since discarded
the Jeffersonian view that that government is best that
governs least. They recognize that governmental inaction
may itself be a form of action and not necessarily the
action best calculated to achieve socially desirable ends.
Their constitutions, however, have not typically been drawn
in a way that has allowed for adjustment to the unforeseen
need being in this respect unlike the national Constitution,
which Chief Justice Stone warmly described as "a continuously
operative charter of government "^^ This has had side effects
that are possibly as significant as the resulting inefficiencies themselves.
The opinion has often been stated that the
inclusion of detailed legislative materials and of extensive legislative restraints within constitutional texts has
impaired the tone of state legislatures.
"Responsibility,"
Justice Brandeis asserted in a much-quoted opinion, "is
the great developer of men."-'--^ When, from whatever motive,
legislatures are denied power to deal effectively with the
emergent issues of the day
they are absolved of responsibility for untoward developments. Only by enforcing responsibility, rather than by withholding power, can the
people hope for vigilant government in the public interest.
As Edmund Burke long ago remarked, "it is not from impotence
we are to expect the tasks of power."

—

.

A second important consequence of perhaps overly-detailed
state constitutions has been the accelerated passage of
responsibility from the states to the federal government.
"The manacled state the state that puts a strait- jacket
and handcuffs upon government, "-^^ is in poor position to
protest when problems with which it cannot cope are taken in
charge by national agencies.
Growing concern about the increasing centralization of governmental power, with its
consec^uent diminution of the role of the several states, led
President Eisenhower to appoint a Commission on Intergovernmental relations. Seeking the causes of the deteriorating
stature of the state governments, the Commission reported
in 1955 as follows:

—

Early in its study, the Commission was confronted
with the fact that many state constitutions restrict the scope, effectiveness, and adaptability
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of state and local action.
These self-imposed
constitutional limitations make it difficult for
many states to perform all the services their
citizens require, and consequently have frequently been the underlying causes of state and
municipal pleas for Federal assistance.
It is significant that the Constitution prepared
by the Founding Fathers, with its broad grants
of authority and avoidance of legislative detail,
has withstood the test of time far better than
the constitutions later adopted by the states....

The Commission believes that most states would
benefit from a fundamental review and revision of
their constitutions to make sure that they provide
for vigorous and responsible government, not
forbid it ...

Constitutional Instability

A third consequence of excessive constitutional detail has
been constitutional instability. The Constitution of the
United States has endured for 170 years, during which long
period it has been amended but twenty-two times including
the ten amendments that were virtually contemporaneous with
and a condition of its adoption.
As an extreme contrast reference may be made to the Constitution of Louisiana, which
adopted ten constitutions during the first 135 years of its
existence, and amended its tenth constitution 219 times in a
quarter of a century.-'-^ New York is a much more moderate
state than Louisiana, having had only five constitutions during its whole existence.
In the scant nineteen years betweeen the revision of 19 38 and the end of 19 57, however, 64
amendments were submitted to the electorate, and of these 56
were approved.
This frequency of amendment is in itself an indicator of
objectionable particularity in the basic charter of the
State.
New York's laconic neighbor, Vermont, with a constitution of less than six thousand words, has adopted only
forty amendments though its constitution has been in force
since 1795; Massachusetts, which has preserved its original
constitution, has managed to get along for 180 years with
fewer than double the number of amendments found to be
necessary in New York in the few years since 1938. For the
most part the amendments acted upon in this State have been
framed as detailed exceptions to inflexibly detailed determinations that had been imbedded in the Constitution with
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an air of seeming permanence.
Pari-mutel betting on horse
races became allowable by virtue of a constitutional amendment; ski trails thirty to eighty feet wide were made permissible on the north, east, and northwest slopes of Whiteface Mountain in 1941, but yet another constitutional
amendment was necessary in 1947 to allow ski trails to be
built on the slopes of Peter Gay Mountain; bonus legislation
favorable to war veterans was enacted, in the guise of a
constitutional amendment in 1947 and was further developed
by a second constitutional amendment in 1949; manipulation
of the limits of debt that may validly be contracted by the
state's municipalities had to be achieved by repeated constitutional juggling rather than by statutes enacted in
the light of current information; absentee voting procedures
could not be established by the Legislature, but required
constitutional amendment.

Typically, the constitutional problems to which voters were
asked to turn their attention were not of a basically important nature. They infrequently dealt with the State's
central organization or with the most urgent issues of the
day.
They dealt, instead, with the sorts of policy judgments that are by no means beyond legislative competence.
The fact, however, that "the people" were themselves to pass
upon these many constitutional proposals somewhat relieved
the Legislature of responsibility for carefully considering
their wisdom.
Moreover, the electorate has by no means been in an advantageous position to engage in constant revision of the Constitution.
Frequent constitutional referenda give the
appearance of "democracy"; but the appearance is spurious.
In truth, the submission of amendments at general elections
makes possible a sort of minority control that is the very
antithesis of democracy.
Consider, for example, the election
of 1943.
3,476,226 votes were cast in that year in the
special election of a Lieutenant Governor.
Six constitutional amendments v/ere submitted to the voters at the same
time.
The largest number of votes cast upon any one of the
six proposals (combining the for and against votes) was only
In 1945, when once again the electorate was summoned
839,717.
to pass upon six separate amendments, constitutional change
concerning a detail of voting regulations was achieved with
the approval of less than nine per cent of the registered
voters.
Throughout the whole of the State in 1953 far fewer
voters were recorded on any constitutional proposition than
were cast in New York City alone in the mayoralty election of
that year. Eight constitutional propositions confronted the

-164-

WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL SIMPLIFICATION INVOLVES

voters in 1949; eight more in 1951; nine in 1953; ten in 1955,
So many matters, sometimes of intricacy though not of much
emotional content, are not likely to be thoughtfully considered by an electorate whose attention is focused on competing
candidacies for office.

Obsolescence, Repetition, and Confusion

Despite the frequency of constitutional overhauling in New
York, the very length of the document increases the likelihood of imperfections. The technicalities of drafting style
and arrangement require and will no doubt receive much
lengthier consideration than can be given here. Nevertheless,
we deem it proper to observe that the involvements and convolutions of the present Constitution have led to retention
of outmoded, duplicative, and badly phrased provisions.

Later sections of this report will closely examine constitutional sections that have little seeming relationship to
Illustrative of obsolete provisions that
modern conditions.
remain chiefly because superfluous words are easily overlooked in an already overwordy document, are the limitation upon
land transactions involving Indians (Art. I, Sec. 13), and
the restraint upon the construction of street railroads (Art.
The state constitutional provision concernIll, Sec. 17).
was inserted in 1777, when the early
lands
ing Indian
confronted
by powerful and possibly hostile
settlers were
may conceivably have applicability
provision
the
tribes; today
eastern
part of Long Island, but it
in
the
acres
to some 300
no change at all in the
there
had
been
though
is retained as
advocate
it 180 years ago.
John
Jay
to
moved
that
conditions
State's major
constituted
the
railroads
once
street
Surface
the records
to
according
Today,
transport.
means of public
street
surface
local
Commission,
no
Service
the
Public
of
railroads operate in the entire State; no application to
lay new street railway trackage has been made in the last
twenty years; yet, the Constitution still devotes 140 words
to defining the Legislature's power to authorize new construction without taking into account the possible significance of
vast changes. These instances by no means exhaust the cataThey sufficiently
log of readily dispensable provisions.
suggest, however, that much deadwood could be pruned from the
Constitution if it were now to be redrafted as a fundamental
charter of government.
Excess condemnation of land is dealt with in Art. I, Sec. 7,
and again Art. XVIII, Sec. 8; removal of judges is discussed in three separate sections of Art. VI; power to provide
for the needy is conferred by Art. VII, Sec. 8; and again,
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to make assurance doubly sure, by Art. XVII; the subject of
divorce is dealt with in Art. I, Sec. 9, where it is lumped
together with such wholly unrelated topics as the right of
peaceable assemblage and the wrong of selling lottery tickA reader of the Constitution is left with the uneasy
ets.
feeling, stirred by such haphazard arrangements as those
just cited, that no editorial hand had proved itself
capable of mastering the constitutional bulk.

Ready examples of slipshod or confusing phraseology may be
found.
More is at stake here than mere technical artistry.
"Litigation thrives on constitutional verbosity "'' The
multiplication of detailed provisions leads almost certainly to discrepancies in language that becloud intent and
breed uncertainty. Thus, for example, the present Constitution contains at least thirty separate references to local
governments.
They are described by such varied terms as
"county, city or village," "any political subdivision of
the state," "subdivisions of the state," "civil divisions
thereof," "county, city, town, village or school district,"
"municipal or other corporation," "cities and incorporated
villages," and m.any others. No doubt some of these variations are purposeful. Others, one suspects, are more or
less accidental.
The same may be said of the dozen or more
references to public officers of one sort or another. At
times the surrounding text indicates a reasonably clear intent to focus on local officials; at other times, one is
baffled to know whether both state and local officials are
embraced by the language used. In either case the question
inevitably arises whether the Constitution might not be a
more effective document if it contained fewer--and more
carefully selected--words
.

THE FEASIBILITY OF SIMPLIFICATION

Removal of obsolete provisions, rearrangement of related
sections, and reshaping of language would improve and shorten
the Constitution.
But this would still fall far short of a
genuine simplification, which connotes concentrating on
the b£.sic .problems of government, avoiding of the more ephemeral issues, and eliminating of highly specific directions.
Some observers doubt the feasibility of achieving true
simplification. Commissioner Robert Moses, himself a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 19 38, has, for instance, written:
"Unfortunately the experience of the past
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in attempting to compress and eliminate constitutional detail
Immense difficulties are in the way."-'-°
is disappointing.

This sort of skepticism is readily understandable. One may
well wonder whether, for example, the religious groups that
abhor gambling would yield to the complete disappearance of
the anti-lottery law that masquerades as a constitutional
provision in Art. I, Sec. 9; or whether the veterans organizations would support excision from the Constitution of special civil service preferences and credits that could as well
be provided by statutes; or whether the labor movement would
readily surrender the constitutional affirmation that labor
is not a commodity, that hours and wages in public works
should be regulated, and that employees are entitled to bargain collectively--all of which are securely established
propositions even without the support of Art. I, Sec. 17;
or whether conservationists would yield to cutting from Art.
XIV, Sec. 1, the requirement that certain areas "shall be
forever kept as wild forest lands," even though the requirement has repeatedly been modified by later amendments and is
subject to further dilution in the future. New York has not
suffered quite so extensively as have some states from constitution-making by special interests.
It does not duplicate
such absurdities as Oklahoma's constitutional requirement
that home economics be taught in all public schools. -^^ But
the New York Constitution does embody the strongly held views
of a number of powerful groups that may sturdily resist any
change that might threaten the dominance of their ideas.

Nevertheless the effort to achieve simplification may be
fruitful if it is pushed forward by practical hands, rather
than made in a purely doctrinaire manner.
First of all, thought must be given to the possibility of
avoiding an all-or-nothing approach. Conceivably some suitable device may be found for giving special force to certain
policy choices while not endowing them with all the force
of constitutional provisions.
The New Jersey Constitutional Convention of a decade ago
faced a problem not wholly unlike that which will confront
New York when it next undertakes constitutional revision. A
strong sense of self-restraint was operative within the New
Jersey Convention.
From the first the delegates had been
urged to avoid becoming legislators.
The Governor in an
opening address had, for example, suggested that if they felt
an uncontrollable impulse to write statutes instead of a constitution, they should submit a supplemental report in the
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nature of a presentment, to be forwarded by the Governor to
the Legislature for its consideration.
A similar possibility
lies open to New York's constitution-makers.
A more positive suggestion was made some years ago by Professor Munro.
Noting how many state constitutional provisions
had lost their utility because of changing conditions, he
proposed that an "administrative code" should be created to
contain many items that might otherwise be included in the
Constitution, such as election provisions, local government,
tax matters, procedures for borrowing, civil service, and
the like.' The code, he maintained, should be prepared by
the Constitutional Convention and submitted by it to the
people for approval along with the Constitution itself.
Amendment of an administrative code could be achieved upon
recommendation of the Governor and a two-thirds vote of the
Legislature. This, he wrote, "would give the code a greater flexibility than the constitution, while keeping it on a
different plane from the usual run of statutes. The Code,
in a word, would represent an organic enactment, standing
midway between constituent and ordinary legislation ." ^^

Variants of this suggestion readily occur. The revisers of
a constitution have the power to write on a clean slate.
If
they choose to do so, they may prepare a "basic" constitution
that will be amendable only by the long and difficult processes prescribed; and at the same time they can offer a
series of perhaps less immutable conclusions that could be
altered in the future by more wieldy methods. They could,
for example, stipulate that some propositions may be changed
if two successive Legislatures concur in the need; or that
other propositions may be amended by an extraordinary majority.
The point of the matter is that ill considered and
hasty actions by perhaps transient majorities can be forstalled by means other than the oometimes hurtful rigidities of
an inflexible constitution.
The second point to be borne in mind, if a doctrinaire
approach is to be avoided, is that there is no infallible
method of determining what segments of the Constitution are
truly "basic" and what ones are merely "legislative" in
nature.
A section by section analysis is likely to be more
useful than a sweeping definition that will inevitably be
given different applications by persons whose interests differ.
In an effort to assist in objective evaluation, we present
as an integral part of our report a careful critique of
many debatable parts of the present Constitution. We have
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sought to indicate the reasons, so far as they may be
ascertainable, for the incorporation of a particular
provision in the Constitution; we have reviewed the
consequences, for good or ill, of its having been included; we have shown how the same matter has been
dealt with elsewhere; and, finally, we have indicated
the results that would follow if a provision were now
to be eliminated or substantially altered.

Simplification, if it is in fact to be achieved, can
come only through a cool appraisal of the desirability of
preserving the existing body of constitutional detail.
The paragraphs that follow will, we hope, facilitate that
sort of appraisal.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE STATE CONSTITUTION WITHIN THE

AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Fifty-five citizens of Alaska will gather at College on 8
November 1955 for the purpose of writing a Constitution, a
charter which will represent one additional link in a chain
leading to ultimate statehood. Almost 170 years ago, fiftyfive men sat through sweltering summer heat in Philadelphia
and produced a document which is the oldest written constitution in the world today--the Constitution of the United
The difference in miles, years, and climate covers
States.
an unbroken span of geographic, economic, social, and political growth without parallel in modern history.
The Alaska
Constitutional Convention is in keeping with that great gove;rnmental tradition.
The writing of constitutions has always and in every circumstance been a serious matter, for a constitution is the fundamental law of a nation, embodying those principles which
underlie the government.
In more common language, it is the
body of rules that govern the playing of the governmental game,
The rules may be complex or simple, though the latter is to be
preferred; but rules they are, and the authority of government
is circumscribed by and subservient to them.

American tradition requires that the constitution shall be a
written one.
It is, in American theory, the contract by which
the people, from whom all political power flows, agree to establish a government and to surrender to it the authority
which they wish it to exercise.
It is designed to establish
the principles upon which the political system rests, to lay
out the broad plan of governmental structure, and to prescribe
the limits of governmental power over the individual.
It is
a contract among free people subject to change only with the
people's consent.
To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the Alaska Constitutional Convention will be charged with stating "principles of government

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
Public Administration Service.
"The State Constitution within
the American Political System."
Chapter I, Volume 1 in Consti tutional Studies (Alaska), pp. Vol. 1, 1-49.
Prepared on behalf of the Alaska Statehood Committee for the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Convened November 8, 1955, Juneau, Alaska.
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for an expanding future."
Such is the import of a constitution
and great is the responsibility of those who undertake to be the
authors of such a document.

PLACE OF THE STATES IN THE FEDERAL UNION

When Alaska becomes a state, she will assume the obligations
and receive the privileges of a member of the American federal
union.
Certain defined relationships between Alaska and other
states and between Alaska and the national government will be
brought into being. Alaska will become, in the words of Chief
Justice Chase, a member of that "indestructible union of indestructible states. "2
The Distribution of Governmental Powers
As developed in the federal Constitution and by years of practice, American federalism has distributed the powers of government between the central government on the one hand and the
state governments on the other, with this distribution of
power formalized in the Constitution so that changes in that
distribution can be accomplished only with the consent of both
nation and states.
This distribution of power between nation
and states in a written document has been one of the most im-

portant circumstances of American constitutional existence.
The theory of this distribution of power in the American federal
system is not a difficult one to understand. The distribution
has its rationalization in the idea that national problems
should be met by the national government and that state and local problems should be handled by state and local authorities.
The federal government has been granted what are known as
"delegated" or "enumerated" powers.
Thus in Article I, section
8, there are listed almost a score of powers which the central
authority may exercise the power to coin money, establish post
offices and post roads, lay and collect taxes, and regulate
foreign and interstate commerce, for example.

—

Some other possible areas of governmental activity are denied
by the Constitution (1) to the central government, (2) to the
states, and (3) to both.
The federal government may not, for
example, try a person for a crime against the United States
unless that individual has been duly indicted by a grand jury;^
states may, and some do, indict by information for crimes committed against state law.^ In the second category, one may
note that the states may not enter into treaties or alliances
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with foreign nations, coin money, or grant letters of marque.^
Both the states and federal government are specifically prohibited from passing ex post facto laws or bills of attainder,^
nor may either authority levy taxes on exports
.

Those powers remaining after the grant of delegated or enumerated powers to the national government has been made, and after
certain prohibited areas have been set up, are said to be "reThe states are governments of residual
served" to the states.
powers; so far as the national Constitution is concerned, no
listing of their powers can be found. Yet the powers reserved
to the states are numerous and substantial:
exercise of the
police power, 9 education, setting of voting qualifications,
and many others may be mentioned.
The powers of the states
of the United States are not "paper" powers.

Within the framework of its delegated powers, the federal
Congress may enact laws deemed "necessary and proper" to carry
out the delegations granted to it.
These so-called "implied
powers" are necessary and proper concomitants of the specific
enumerations of Article I, section 8. Through the device of
the doctrine of implied powers the federal governm.ent has, of
course, greatly extended its authority down through the years. 10
By utilizing its power to regulate interstate commerce, for example, the federal government regulates methods of transportation and communication never envisaged in their wildest flights
of imagination by the Framers of the Constitution.
When operating in an area of authority properly within its province, the federal authority is paramount to any conflicting
state legislation or action.
Constitutional phraseology on
the point is clear:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall
be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, anything
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding.
The interpretations of the United States Supreme Court, from
the days of John Marshall, 12 have clearly established that
state laws or activities must yield when in conflict with a
constitutional exercise of federal power.
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Relationship of States to Federal Government
The men of 1789 were well aware that in thus distributing the
powers of government they were providing for a dual system of
They were, however, unwilling to give powers to
authority.
the central government without some guarantees, constitutionally
manifested, that the central government would not take over the
states and make of them mere administrative unit-^^.
to that end
they provided that the national government was to afford protection against invasion by foreign powers and was to give aid
upon request of the state in case of domestic violence or
catastrophe of such serious character that the state could not
cope with it.
The Framers of the national Constitution specified a guarantee of territorial integrity:
no state was to be
divided into two or more states without the consent of the
state legislature and the Congress, nor were two or more states
to be combined into one without the consent of the State legislatures concerned and the Congress. 13
The Framers specified, too, that it should be the duty of the
United States to guarantee to every state a "republican form
of government. "1^ The federal courts have refused to give
meaning to this clause, declaring the question to be a "political" one not susceptible of judicial interpretation.
The
Supreme Court has said that "it rests with Congress to decide
what government is the established one in a State ... as
well as its republican character."!^ Thus if Congress seats
the congressional delegation from a given state, that state
may be said to have a "republican" form of government.

There is a further meaning of the clause, however, as applied
to the Alaskan situation.
The many bills introduced in recent sessions of Congress calling for the admission of Alaska
and Hawaii as states have specified that their constitutions
"shall be republican in form. "16 Practically speaking, this
phraseology makes Congress the arbiter of the point and means
that a constitution which it accepts will be deemed automatically "republican in form." The phrase as used in the
various pieces of proposed enabling legislation, then, might
conceivably be employed as a political handle by some opponents of statehood when the question of Congressional approval
of the Alaskan and Hawaiian constitutions arises.
In addition to the three constitutionally specified obligations of the national government to the states, there are

many other obligations which the national government has
assumed by statute down through the years. The variety and
number of these statutorily defined relationships need not be
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of concern here except for the realization that they do exist
in considerable number and that they are in many cases of far
greater importance to the economic well-being of the states
One may note,
than the constitutionally specified obligations.
for example, that the numerous federal grant-in-aid programs
are typical examples of federal obligations contingent upon a
state meeting eligibility requirements for a particular type
of grant.

The Internal Responsibilities of States
Of particular pertinence in the case of Alaska is the generally
recognized concept of American government that a state of the
federal union should be capable of maintaining internal peace
The phrase "capable of self
and order within its borders.
government" is a bit trite but nevertheless expressive of this
The holding of the Alaska Constitutional Convention is
idea.
demonstration
that the citizens of the Territory consider
a
themselves capable of meeting their responsibilities to the
federal union in this important respect.

Responsibilities of States to Each Other
There is yet another aspect of responsibility which a member
In order
state of the American Union assumes upon admission.
for such a union to operate satisfactorily, working relationThough
ships must be established among the various states.
an individual state's jurisdiction is generally confined to
the area within its borders, there must be at least a minimum
recognition by the other states of an individual state's
powers in specifically designated fields.
The Constitution of the United States specifies, therefore,
that "full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other
state. "17 Interpretations of this clause are not entirely
without dispute, but the general statement may be made that
the import of the section is to require each state to recogThe
nize the legal processes and acts of every other state.
section is, in many ways, the kingpin of a federal system;
only by such a mutual recognition can such a system operate
Without enforcement by other states, will, deeds,
at all.
contracts, and similar instruments would be empty vehicles in
many situations; men might move from state to state, evading
judgments against them and making state law an object of
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ridicule.
The points of greatest strain on the full faith and
credit clause today involve divorce, non-support, and alimony
cases
A second constitutional obligation which the states owe is
that of a recognition of the interstate provileges of citizens. 18
Citizens of the United States may travel freely from
state to state without undue interference.
They may change
their state of residence and engage in the common occupations
without discrimination. 19 Generally speaking, the section
binds ^he states to accord to citizens of other states the
same rights as they give their own in protection by the governmen- of ordinary property and business affairs and individual rights, and in access to the state courts.

A third obligation constitutionally imposed is that of interstate rendition or extradition.
Though the constitutional
phraseology requires that a fugitive from justice crossing
state lines "shall be delivered up" upon the demand of the
executive branch of government of the state from which he fled,
the courts have held that the language is not mandatory. ^0
Thus governors have on occasion refused to allow the extradition of persons where there was reason to believe extradition
might result in a miscarriage of justice.
Aside from these constitutionally imposed obligations, the
states have recognized that cooperation on a voluntary basis
has been necessary for the solution of common problems.
The
states have agreed to obligate themselves in many different
types of circumstances.
Perhaps the best known of these devices is the interstate compact, an agreement between two or
more states which is approved by Congress.
The interstate
compact has most commonly been used in the settlement of
boundary disputes, though it has been the device for settling
other problems, such as control of mutual river and marine
resources, as well. 21 On a wider basis, simple cooperation
between state officials has solved many difficulties without
the necessity of resort to formal instruments of agreement.
National organizations of state officials, such as the National
Association of Attorneys General, have served as clearing agencies for information.
The device of uniform state laws has
been proved workable in a limited number of fields. 2 2 All of
these various methods smooth out interstate relationships, and
help to insure the workability of the federal system.
The Electoral Functions of the State

States perform important functions in the national electoral
process. As members of the Union, they cast votes in the
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Electoral college for the President and Vice-President of the
United States. The number of such votes in each case equals
the total niimber of members of each state's Congressional
delegation. The states elect two United States Senators each
and a number of representatives determined on the basis of the
state's population.
The Constituent Functions of the States

Each state of the American Union has important responsibilities in the process of amending the national Constitution.^-^
All amendments to the Constitution have thus far been initiated
Ratifiby a two-thirds vote of both houses of the Congress.
cation is by three-fourths of the state legislatures or threefourths of state conventions called for the purpose of passing
Congress sets the method of ration the initiated amendment.
fication. All amendments save the Eighteenth have been ratified
by state legislatures; the Eighteenth by state conventions.
It is possible that the states may play a part in the process
of initiation, though the exact legal details are in some
dispute among students of the subject. The Constitution provides in somewhat ambiguous language that two-thirds of the
state legislatures may request the national Congress to call a
national convention for the purpose of proposing amendments to
Recently an unsuccessful attempt was made
the Constitution.
to utilize this method to initiate an amendment to the Constitution providing for limitation on the percentage rate of
national income taxation.

ADMISSION OF STATES TO THE UNION
Procedure
Under Article IV, section 3, of the national Constitution the
sole power to admit new states lies with the Congress. Normally there have been five steps involved in the process:
(1) establishment of a territorial government; (2) request by
the Territory to the Congress for admission; (3) passage by
Congress of an "enabling act" which sets out the procedure for
framing a state constitution; (4) framing of the state constitution; and (5) passage by Congress of a resolution of admission.

Yet there have been many exceptions to this procedure. Texas
and California did not pass through territorial status.
Fifteen states have entered the Union without enabling acts,^'*
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and of these four have gained statehood after Congressional
approval of state constitutions drafted in the absence of enabling acts. 25 The ultimate step of passage by Congress of a
resolution of admission, which in effect approves the proposed
constitution, is the important and vital one in the entire
process.
Admission under such circumstances is as effective
as though Congress had specifically authorized the proceedings
in the first place.

Congressional Limitations as Conditions for Admission
The present-day doctrine that "equality of constitutional right
and power is the condition of all the states of the Union,
old and new, "26 did not find favor at the Constitutional Convention in 17 89.
The Convention voted nine to two to delete from
a draft of Article IV a clause which would have written the idea
of equality (previously expressed in the Northwest Ordinance of
1787 passed by the Congress under the Articles of Confederation)
into the Constitution.
It was very definitely contemplated
that states would be admitted on an unequal basis. 2 7 History
and tradition wrote a different answer, however, and the general
rule operative down through the years has been that new states
are admitted to the Union on the same plane of political and
legal equality as the older ones. 28 Louisiana, in 1812, was
the first state to be admitted with the specific proviso that
the new state was admitted "on an equal footing with the original states. "29 The language has been followed in all subsequent acts of admission, saving only that of Texas.
And in
the latter case, the Supreme Court has fuled, in effect, that
the omission was not significant.-^'^
The fact that states are admitted on an equal footing does
not, however, prevent Congress from specifying conditions of
admission.
Statehood may be withheld if these conditions are
not me-z.
Once the state has actually become a member of the
Union, however, conditions which are strictly internal in
character cannot be enforced against the state. Thus the Congressional act admitting Oklahoma in 1907 specified that the
state capital should not be moved from Guthrie before 1913.
In 1910, the capital was moved to Oklahoma City.
The United
States Supreme Court held invalid the restriction which Congress
had attempted to impose on the location of the capital, on the
ground that this was a matter for the state's internal decision. 31 President Taft vetoed in 1911 the act admitting
Arizona, stating his objection to a state constitutional provision allowing the recall of judges.
The disputed provisions
were removed from the constitution, the state was admitted, and
the provisions promptly restored to the constitution by the
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people of Arizonal
sible.

No legal grounds for objection were pos-

If on the other hand the limitation which Congress specifies
is clearly one within the regulatory power of Congress, the conThus the authdition is then enforceable as against the state.
ority which Congress has to regulate coininerce with the Indian
tribes is not inconsistent with the doctrine of the equality
of states, ^2 ^nd conditions in the New Mexico enabling act
which prohibited the introduction of liquor into Indian territory were held valid. -^3

Again Congress has the power to make disposition of the public
In the New Mexico enabling act
lands of the United States.
certain lands were granted to the new state with the provision
that they be held in trust for enumerated purposes; the United
States Attorney General was charged to enforce the trusts in
appropriate proceedings. After admission, New Mexico attempted
to use 3% of the proceeds of the trust property for advertising
The Supreme Court, which apparently saw
the state's resources.
little need for extended discussion, held that the state's action could be enjoined and that the provision in the enabling
act was a valid one.-^'^
A promise extracted from Minnesota at the time of admission
was interpreted to prevent the state from taxing lands that had
been tax exempt at the time of admission. The Court ruled that
an agreement in reference to property was a contractual matter
between the Congress and the prospective state and involves no
question of state status. -^^

Congressional Restrictions and the Alaska

Constitutional Convention
Questions of the power of Congress to place limitations on
Alaska as she seeks admission to the Union are of considerable
Reference to the
importance to the Convention at College.
various pieces of enabling legislation which have been introduced in Congress to start Alaska on the highroad to statehood
show a great number and variety of proposed restrictions, some
The
of a serious nature and others matters of small moment.
Convention will want to consider these proposed requirements
with a view to deciding which appear to be of a fundamental nature insofar as future decision by Congress on the acceptability
It must be remembered
of the Alaskan Constitution is concerned.
that the national House of Representatives and the Senate have
The
each passed an Alaskan statehood measure in recent years.
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Convention will probably desire to design some constitutional
language, or perhaps enact a Convention ordinance, in the case
of those restrictions which generally appear in one form or
another in all, or most, of the bills.
Some of these provisions are non-controversial or deal with
questions the answers to which are practically foreclosed.
Declarations that (1) the Delegates shall declare that the
proposed State of Alaska shall adopt the Constitution of the
United States, (2) the Alaskan Constitution shall be republican in form, (3) the document shall make no distinction in
civil or political rights on account of race or color, (4)
the constitution shall not be repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States and the principles of the Declaration of
Independence, and (5) that the constitution shall provide that
no person who aids or belongs to any party who advocates the
overthrow of the government by force and violence may hold public office, may be followed with little argument. ^6 similarly
the general pronouncement in S.49, section 203, H. R. 2535,
section 20 3, and in the other statehood bills that the constitution "shall provide" that "no law shall be enacted respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for the redress of grievances" merely repeats the time honored formula of the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
Some of the requirements set out in recent Alaska and Hawaiian
statehood acts are, however, of more far-reaching consequence.
The fourth paragraph of section 203 of H. R. 2535 and S. 49,
for example, calls for the people of Alaska constitutionally to
"forever disclaim" right or title to lands and properties which
may be held by natives or which is held in trust by the United
States for natives.
The highly controversial issue of aboriginal rights cannot be discussed in detail at this point, but
the mere mention of it demonstrates adequately the importance
of possible Congressional restrictions on the admission of
Alaska to the Union.
One may note, again, that section 205 (j) of H. R. 253537
sets out that grants of mineral lands to the new State of
Alaska are made upon the express condition that the lands so
granted shall contain a reservation to the State of all minerals.
The mineral deposits are subject to lease only and
the United States Attorney General is directed to institute
appropriate proceedings for reversion of the lands to the
United States if the terms of this trust are abrogated. 38
,
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Other examples of these controversial requirements might be
cited.
In calling them to attention at this point, it is not
the purpose to suggest that a complete catalog of such requirements should be made and the resulting list written into the
proposed Alaskan Constitution by the Delegates at College.
Some requirements may be safely ignored and others handled by
Convention ordinance.
Prediction of all the exact restrictions
which Congress might set out is impossible, though it is, of
course, safe to conjecture that presence or absence of some
specific requirements might serve to facilitate or block
These requirements will be noted, where
Alaska's admission.
applicable, in other staff papers.
The fact that a Constitution for Alaska has been written will serve, too, it can be
hoped, to place Congress in such a mood that further limitations will not be exacted from the prospective state.

PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
If the Delegates at College perform well their function of
writing a Constitution for Alaska, they will establish fundamental law under which the activities of the state government
will be conducted and limited.
In the words of J. A. Corry,
noted Canadian student of government,

A constitution is no more than the skeleton or
essential frame of orderly government. The constitution defines and provides for the establishment of the chief organs of government.
It outlines the relation between these organs and the
citizen, between the state and the individual. 39
The constitution represents the skeleton of government; the
flesh, muscles, nerves, and body are added in the process of
operation and growth under the constitution.

Persons who have grown up in the American tradition are accustomed to speak of "the constitution," by which they have
come to mean a single written document which has been adopted
by action of the people at a specific date.
The Constitution
of the United States is such a document, and the Alaskan Constitution will be another. Yet it must be recognized that
practice through the years establishes customs and traditions
which, though unwritten, are really a part of the "constitution" in the broad sense.
Constitutional practice does not
always follow the ideas which the formulators had in mind.
One of the best known examples, on the national level, is
found in the practice by which presidential electors have
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been mere rubber stamps; only on two occasions since the election of John Adams have presidential electors exercised their
constitutional right to use their independent judgment in casting a ballot for the President of the United States. '^0 Delegates to the Alaskan Constitutional Convention will recognize
that their handiwork may not receive the precise interpretations in subsequent years that they had intended when writing
the document at College.
Certainly, however, the Delegates at College will write into
the Alaskan Constitution the great principles of government
which have become so much a part of the genius and tradition
of the American people and, in some cases, of democratic
countries throughout the world.
The machinery for implementing
these principles may be the subject of argument but universal
agreement on the principles themselves may be assumed.
The Principle of Popular Sovereignty

Basic to the conception of democratic government wherever
found is the idea that the people govern.
Government is not
something imposed on the people; it is an institution which
comes from the people and over which they have control.
A
legal statement of the principle is found in the preamble to
the national Constitution:
We, the people of the United States, in order to
form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America.

With less 'verbiage the Declaration of Rights of the North
Carolina Constitution of 1776 stated simply:
"All political
power is vested in and derived from the people only." The
principle found expression in the bloody years of the Civil
War when Lincoln coined his immortal "Government of the people,
by the people, and for the people."
The principle of popular sovereignty is not a platitude.
"We
the people" govern.
We elect our lawmakers, and having elected
them, we may also choose new ones more responsive to our will.
We may err in our choice, and we may elect rascals instead of
statesmen, but the choice is ours
freely made and freely revocable at fixed periods.
And government officials, of high

—
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and low estate, are always the servants and not the masters of
the people.
On no other principle can democratic government
function and be maintained.
The Principle of Limited Government

Closely akin to the doctrine of popular sovereignty is the
principle of limited government.
This principle, too, is
absolutely essential to democratic government, whatever be the
forms of that government.
This doctrine is based on the idea
that certain areas of authority are denied to government, that
there are certain things that government and government officials may not do, no matter how expedient it might be at the
moment.

—

—

The officials of government are limited by law.
On the national level they are limited in many respects by the Constitution; the Bill of Rights of the national Constitution is an
expression of this idea. But of importance, too, are the
many restrictions imposed by statutory, as distinguished from
constitutional, law.
Administrators frequently find that activities they might wish to undertake are denied to them.
They find that funds they have requested are not appropriated,
or if appropriated are not appropriated for the purposes sought.
They find that the courts stand ready to enforce not only the
constitutional but the statutory prohibitions.

This concept is basic.
The people limit the government in its
activities by constitutional phraseology. And they may choose,
through the actions of their elected representatives, to limit
the officials of government still more.
The concept of limitation on the exercise of governmental authority cannot be removed from the democratic tradition without the complete destruction of that tradition.
The Principle of the Separation of Powers

Constitutionally, there are various ways in which the principle
of limited government may be implemented.
One is through the
device of Bills of Rights, which are found in all state constitutions and in the national Constitution.
The United States
has chosen to utilize the doctrine of the separation of powers
as a further aid.
The idea had its classic expression in Montesquieu, an 18th
Century French student of government and public affairs.
Since

-185-

THE STATE CONSTITUTION WITHIN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

the days of antiquity, governmental power had been classified
into legislative, executive, and judicial.
The legislative
power made the laws; the executive power executed and administered the laws; and the judicial power interpreted the laws
in case of dispute.
Montesquieu took this ancient classification and argued that the key to the maintenance of individual
civil liberty lay in so separating these powers that no one
man or group of men could ever hold all of them.
The whole
power of one branch should not be exercised by those who possessed the whole power of another branch of government.

Montesquieu's conception did not envisage a totally distinct
separation of the powers of the three branches of government.
He was well aware that some overlapping was vitally necessary
to the proper functioning of government.
His contribution
lies in the fact that he posited the idea that all power should
not be in the hands of one man or group of men.
Not all democratic countries use the principle of the separation of powers.
In Great Britain, for example, government
operates on the principle of fusion of powers.
Supreme
authority is lodged in the Parliament, from which the ministers, the executive branch of government, are chosen.
The
ministers retain their offices so long as they continue to
maintain the confidence of the House of Commons. The doctrine
of the separation of powers, then, is not essential to democratic government, yet its influence has been apparent in the
American scheme since 1789.
The Framers of the national Constitution did not, in so many
words, adopt the principle.
Rather they placed it in the
ConstiTiution by implication:
Article I deals with the legislative branch of government; Article II with the executive;
and Article III with the judiciary.
State constitutions have
frequently been more explicit and have used verbiage which
fundamentally is nothing but excess constitutional baggage.
The language of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780^ which
has been a frequent model, is an example:
In the government of this Commonwealth, the Legislative Department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them:
the
executive shall never exercise the legislative and
judicial powers, or either of them:
the judicial
shall never exercise the legislative and executive
powers, or either of them:
to the end that it may
be a government of laws and not of men. 41
It should be noted that neither in Massachusetts, nor in the
other states which have incorporated this or similar categorical language into their fundamental law, has the actual practice
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been as explicit as the phraseology would indicate.
There has
been an appreciation of the point previously made that the doctrine of the separation of powers does not preclude some exercise by one branch of government by the powers of the other.
The governor's veto power, certainly a legislative power in its
nature, is a typical example.
The Principle of Checks and Balances

A discussion of the doctrine of the separation of powers leads
logically to a consideration of the American constitutional
principle of checks and balances. The three departments of
government do not, and cannot, operate in vacuums, each removed
from contact with the other.
Further, the principle of limited
government would demand that each branch have some check over
the activities of the other.
The national and state constitutions therefore, without exception, have created systems of
checks and balances. As a general example, the legislature may
pass an act, but the governor or President may veto it, but the
legislature may in most circumstances override his veto by the
vote of an unusual majority, but the courts may find the law
to be in conflict with the constitution or may interpret it in
disputes brought before the courts. Thus we have one demonstration of a series of checks and balances in the delicate
mechanism of government.

Judicial review, the power peculiar to American courts to declare acts of the legislature and executive unconstitutional
or invalid in cases brought before the courts, is one of these
checks and balances.
It is not customary for provision granting this power to the courts to be made in state constitutions,
nor is any such provision found in the national Constitution.
The power of judicial review represents a growth of American
constitutionalism by custom and usage; it is now a tradition
so powerful that, regardless of whether or not the courrs
usurped their function in exercising it in the first instances
in the early days of our national and state governments, it is
now firmly a part of our governmental system.

Summary
These, then, are the principles which will undergird the Alaskan
Constitution: popular sovereignty, limited government, separation of powers, and checks and balances.
Just what machinery
will be deemed necessary to implement them is a question which
the delegates must decide at College.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF PRESENT STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The 48 present state constitutions present a considerable study
in contrast.
They vary widely in age, length, arrangement, cind
content.
They establish a tremendous array of varying executive,
legislative, and judicial machinery.
Some provide an excellent
framework within which state governmental machinery keeps pace
with changing economic and social circumstances; some are straitjackets, deterrents to state growth, prosperity, and welfare.
Age

About three-fourths of the state constitutions in effect today
are over 75 years old.
Twelve of the present state constitutions date before 1870, twenty-three fall in the period 1870
to 1899, and the remaining thirteen are dated 1900 or later. ^2
Georgia and Missouri accomplished extensive revision in 1944
and 1945 and New Jersey rewrote its fundamental law in 194 8.
The number of constitutions which individual states have had
varies from one (about one-third of the states are in this
category) to Louisiana which has had nine in its 14 3 year
history.
Length
The variation in length is as great as the variation in age.
The range is from some 6,000 words to well over 60,000.
The
Vermont and Rhode Island documents contain slightly less than
6,000 words; the California and Louisiana "examples" are well
over the 60,000 mark. The Constitution of the United States,
with its 22 Amendments, manages to stay within 8,000 words.
On the other hand, the New Jersey Constitution of the Revolutionary period contained scarcely 2,500 words.
It may be of interest to note that the original lengthy California constitution of 1879 had been amended 306 times by
1950; one famous amendment, written into fundamental law even
specified the name of a person who was to administer a particular piece of welfare legislation; the provision did not work
well and was repealed a year later.
Other ridiculous examples
abound.
An amendment to the Minnesota Constitution set forth
the complete town by town description of the highway system
of the state
in roughly 6,250 ill-chosen wordsl43
,

—
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Contents of State Constitutions
Certain subjects are treated in all of the 4 8 state constitutions, though the method and manner of treatment are subject
Other topics are found in a greater or
to wide variation.
constitutions, again with the treatment
the
number
of
lesser
No attempt will be made at
greatly.
varying
topics
of such
Many are
topics listed.
the
detail
discuss
in
point
to
this
papers.
staff
separate
the
subjects
of
properly
Bills of Rights

Each of the constitutions contains a Bill of Rights, a manifestation of the fact that the people have chosen to limit the
exercise of governmental power. The history of man's struggle
for individual freedom is a lengthy one; the American tradition
has its roots deep in English practice in the Magna Carta (1215)
and the English Bill of Rights
the Petition of Rights (16 32)
The Bill of Rights of the national Constitution was an
(1689)
outgrowth of English practice and American revolutionary experiThe rights deemed "fundamental" were thus incorporated
ence.
into the national Constitution and the early state constitutions.
,

.

The rights to freedom of speech, religion, press, and assembly
Protection against unare found in all state constitutions.
warranted searches and seizures and a guarantee of due process
and equal protection of the laws in criminal and civil proceedOther traditional
ings are part of each state's organic law.
rights have also found general acceptance.

Later states have incorporated into their Bills of Rights, or
Declarations of Rights as they are sometimes called, other
ideas besides those contained in the Bill of Rights to the naIowa and Mississippi saw
Times change.
tional Constitution.
fit to prohibit dueling. ^4 Minnesota, at a later date, incorporated as a "right" provisions relating to the sale of agricultural commodities 4^
.

The Delegates at College will be faced with the issue of how
many, if any, of the newer, "positive" rights they wish to
Such "rights" are usually
include in the Alaskan organic law.
highly controversial and many involve the expenditure of pubThis is particularly true
lic funds for their accomplishment.
where certain social welfare and pension programs are considered "rights. "4 6
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Suffrage and Elections
Each state makes provision for setting out voting qualifications and the methods and manner of handling elections. 47 it
is important to note, however, that not all the states choose
to do so in detail in their constitutions; many have found it
wiser policy to set down only the general outline in the constitution, leaving to statute law the necessary details of
election administration.

Separation of Powers
As has already been noted, provisions for distributing the
powers of government among the legislature, executive, and judiciary are common to all states.
Some constitutions, such as

that of Massachusetts, set out specifically such a requirement;
others follow the pattern of the national Constitution (thereby decreasing constitutional verbiage)
handling each branch
of government in a separate article and allowing the separation of powers doctrine to follow by necessary implication.
,

Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary

All constitutions provide for the basic machinery of state
government.
In each case, a legislature '^^ an executive, 49
and a judicial system -'^ are established.
Some constitutions
set out at great length the details of organization, procedure and powers of these branches.
A few states follow the
practice of the national Constitution and outline only basic
organization and powers. The national Constitution, for
example, established in Article III the judiciary of the
United States.
It is a notably short article, less than a
page of normal-sized type.
A great court system enjoying the
highest reputation has been created under this flexible
article. On the other hand, the Maryland Constitution, not
the worst nor yet the best of the state constitutions in this
regard, takes 21 pages to establish the details of a system
now badly antiquated and much in need of repairs after 85 years,
,

Amendment and Revision
All state constitutions make some provision for amendment and
most provide directly or indirectly for constitutional revision.
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The mechanisms provided may be so complex and difficult that
amendment is virtually impossible as in Illinois, or they may
be so easy that great numbers of amendments are possible, as
in California and Louisiana.

Other Provisions

From this point on the variation in subject matter, as well as
the variations in treatment, become even more diverse.
As
noted, all state constitutions contain some measures relative
to Bills of Rights; suffrage and elections; the powers, organization, and procedures of the three branches of the government;
and amendment and revision of the constitution.
One can only
list as this point a series of remaining topics treated in many,
but not necessarily all, state constitutions ^2
:

Finance
Local government
Education
Highways
Corporations generally
Banks, railroads, public utilities, monopolies, and trusts
Agriculture
Public welfare
Militia
Summary
If one were to attempt characterization of the present state
constitutions, if characterization of so diverse a set of documents were possible, he would be forced to the conclusion that
most of them are not nearly so old as the national Constitution,
exceed that document greatly in length, and treat a wide assortment of topics. Whatever may have been the reasons for the
length, detail, and topics chosen for consideration, ^3 the result has been a variation in treatment as wide as the variations
among the states in economics, social order, size and politics.

THE CRITERIA OF CONSTITUTION DRAFTING

Government is far more an
fore, no precise formulas
result automatically in a
however, certain criteria

art than a science.
There are therewhich, if carefully followed, will
high-grade constitution. There are,
which may be utilized by the Delegates
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to the Alaska Convention as general guideposts in drafting the
Alaska Constitution.
In no sense are these criteria to be considered as absolutes. While no criteria can be devised which
will eliminate the need for reasoned and careful judgment by
the Delegates, those which follow may be of aid.
(1) Constitutional language is significant and its drafting of
highest importance
.

Constitutional purposes are expressed in the American tradition
through the medium of the written word.
The words, phrases,
sentences, and paragraphs which are used must be so composed
that the result is a cohesive and comprehensible whole, an expression so far as human capabilities will permit of the meaning and intent of the constitution framers.
The first and
surest evidence of faulty and ineffective constitutional drafting is found in the incorrect use of language violation of
accepted rules of grammar, inaccurate punctuation, verboseness,
and, most important, failure to use words in their exact legal
context.

—

The Framers of the national Constitution were acutely aware of
the great importance of language and style.
The Convention met
at Philadelphia in May 1787.
By early September the members
had a draft of the Constitution, but they were wise enough not
to let matters rest at that point.
On September 8, 1787, a
Committee on Style aind Arrangements was appointed, consisting
of Gouveneur Morris, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Doctor
William Johnson, and Rufus King.
It was this committee, and
more particularly the literary and articulate Gouveneur Morris,
which had the responsibility of eliminating errors, inconsistencies, and excess verbiage and of giving final polish to the
language.

The responsibilities placed on the Committee on Style were
heavy ones.
They extended far beyond the questions of mere
literary technique and good usage.
The people of the Thirteen
States would read the document and would make the critical decision on whether or not to ratify it. Did the written words
express clearly the principles and ideas intended and desired
by the men of the Convention? The responsibility in large
measure lay with the Committee on Style. And if the document
were ratified and became the basis for a new national order,
interpretation by the courts, legislature, and executive--yes
and the people also would be inevitable and necessary.
Would
the language meet these acid tests? Again the Committee on
Style would have to bear the onus for any inaccurate and incomplete phraseology.

—
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The Committee on Style and Arrangements of the national Constitutional Convention did their work well.
The Constitution of
the United States, although not perfect in all stylistic and
linguistic matters, remains today a model of constitutional
draf tmanship
The prudent man does not hunt the grizzly with a .22 rifle,
nor does the wise man use a .45 on a rabbit. Experienced hunters handle their weapons with the greatest care, for injury to
self or others may easily occur.

Words, too, are weapons and tools as well.
It would be difficult to place too much emphasis on the importance of care and
judgment in drafting constitutional language.
The latently
explosive results of poor draftmanship on the future economic
development of Alaska, the welfare of its people, or the structure of its society are possible in almost every subject which
the Convention at College will consider.
Each clause or phrase
must provide adequate coverage of the subject and no more.

—

Almost every clause or phrase will be subjected at some future
date to the closest judicial scrutiny and interpretation.
Each
clause and phrase will have to stand in relation to the other
Legislature, executive,
applicable language of the document.
administrators and citizens will give their interpretations to
the written words.

Everyone has experienced the shock of having his own spoken
or written words misunderstood, words which he was convinced
were unmistakeably clear at the time. Most persons will admit
that they have, on occasion, failed to interpret properly the
communications of others. The possibility of misunderstanding
of the language of the Alaskan Constitution is infinitely
greater, and the consequences far more serious, than the casual
misunderstandings which occur daily in ordinary social and
business contacts.
The language of a constitution is not the language of the
streets--colloquialisms and slang. Nor can it be the language
of everyday discourse and writing.
Words and phrases used in
constitutions have judicially construable and enforceable meanings.
Those unfamiliar with the use and interpretation of
constitutional phraseology may be critical of an emphasis on
language.
Americans generally are impatient in such matters,
for precision requires time and we are disturbed by delay.
Everyday language may, with the very best intentions, be
written into a constitution, but the judicial interpretations
of such language may prove to be strikingly at variance with
the original intent.
Furthermore, the best legal draftsmen
frequently make errors; infallibility is a quality unknown
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among those who draft constitutions, who write statutes and
codes, who establish administrative regulations, or who are
charged with the interpretation of law. Extreme care in the
use of language will not eliminate error and possible misinterpretation; the goal is to keep such possibilities to a
minimum.
(2) Experience demonstrates the importance of confining the
language of the Constitution to fundamentals
.

Basic to all the other criteria of sound constitutional drafting is that which requires that a constitution should be a
body of fundamental law.
Transitory provisions, provisions
designed to deal with changing affairs and matters of passing
importance, have no proper place in a constitution.
Such matters are the proper province of statutory as distinguished
from constitutional law.
The differentiation, though frequently a matter of judgment and difficult to make, must be
kept firmly in mind.
Fundamental law, constitutional law, may
be defined for our purpose here as that law which is more or
less permanent in character, which is not subject to the need
for frequent change, which represents a fair degree of ultimate
unanimity of thought among the citizens, and which is concerned
primarily with principles, not with the mechanical means for
implementing the principles.
Statutory law deals with transitory matters; it is subject to frequent change to meet the
exigencies of the moment, lacks permanency in the constitutional law sense, frequently must be highly detailed in order
to accomplish its purpose, and represents a scope of activity
properly accorded to the political branches of the government.
The constitution of a state is no proper place for statutory
law, for legislative minutiae.
,

,

Certain consequences flow from strict adherence to the doctrine
of writing only fundamentals into the constitution.
First, and
most important, is the fact that a constitution containing fundamentals is a flexible document, for its phraseology is necessarily general.
General language is capable of the breadth of
interpretation necessary to meet changing economic and social
conditions.
The great strength of the national Constitution has
been in its general language, language which has made possible
the required freedom of action for the activities of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.
This
necessary freedom of action to meet rapidly changing demands
of the social order is practicable only with a constitution
v.'hich is devoted in the main to fundamentals.
A good constitution grows with the society it orders; it does not strait jacket
that society.
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A second consequence of a constitution confined to fundamentals
The
is that such a charter will be less in need of amendment.
national Constitution has been amended but twenty-two times,
and even some of these amendments, viewed in retrospect, were
scarcely of major importance. A constitution based on fundamentals will not need the constant therapy of additional
amendments to keep it in running order.
In an age when citizens are sometimes prone to pay too little
attention to their civic responsibilities, it is important
that the organic law of the state be in such form that people
will be encouraged to give attention to, and not avoid, them.
If the constitution is lengthy and detailed, it will require
frequent amendment in order to keep it abreast of the times.
If at each election, the citizen is faced with the necessity
of passing on numbers of amendments, he will rapidly lose his
ability and his interest in making reasoned judgments as to
what is constitutional and what is properly statutory law.
Constant amending of the constitution cannot but result in a
loss of citizen respect for and appreciation of the document.

(3) The civil rights and liberties set out in the Bill of
Rights should be stated concisely
.

The other criteria of good constitutional drafting devolve
The
logically from the first and great one of fundamentality
idea of a Bill of Rights as a part of a written constitution
Once given constitutional sanction, the
is an American idea.
right becomes fundamental and cannot be infringed by legislative or executive action, except within specifically provided
constitutional terms. Such guarantees are, therefore, matters
The disfor most serious thought and careful consideration.
tinction between constitutional and statutory law is of the
greatest importance. A guarantee of the right to assemble
peaceably and to petition the government for redress of grievances is properly a part of any constitutional Bill of Rights;
it may seriously be argued, however, whether there is a proper
place in a constitutional instrument for declaring as "rights"
either collective bargaining as between labor and capital or
the so-called "right to work" concept.
.

A Bill of Rights of minimum length and centered for the most
part on the traditional precepts which have been so long held
prevents the cluttering of the constitution with newly declared "rights," many of which are highly controversial and
difficult of enforcement.
It is important, too, for the layman to remember that the courts over a period of years have
developed rather precise meanings for the traditional language.
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Extensive and radical changes in terminology would in many instances mean the loss of the benefits derived from this judicial
interpretation; the courts would, moreover, be faced with the
lengthy and difficult problem of giving judicial effect to the
new language.
(4) Authorities agree that the constitution should set out only
the essential framework of the machinery of government
.

The Alaskan Constitution will of necessity make provision for
three branches of government:
the legislature, the executive,
and the judiciary.
Only the essentials of the method of selection of the personnel of each of the three branches, their
general organization, and their powers should receive constitutional attention.
The language should be simple; the potential for growth and adjustment great.
The judgment of future
generations on how well the Convention at College performed
its function in establishing the machinery of government may
well be written in terms of ability of these mechanisms to
adjust to changing future conditions.
Complex provisions in
this essential area will mean only the necessity for frequent
and drastic amendment as unforeseen contingencies arise in the
future
It is well to remember that the portions of the national Constitution which have worked in least satisfactory fashion were
those by which the Framers wrote mechanistic detail into the
document.
The example of the system of presidential election
comes immediately to mind.
Almost 50% of Article III was devoted to the mechanism for electing the President and VicePresident; it was complicated and it was naive.
It worked perfectly so long as Washington was available.
But after serving
the first two terms, the election machinery creaked and groaned
in choosing John Adams and it broke down completely in 1800
when Jefferson was finally chosen President after the election
had been thrown into the House of Representatives.
It became
necessary to change the methods used, and the Twelfth Amendment
was added to the Constitution, in an only partially successful
effort at correction. The Framers of the Constitution had been
unable to foresee that the advent of political parties would
make section 3 of Article III a piece of impossible election
machinery.

Adherence to the criteria that the constitution should establish only the broad general framework of government will prevent the "loading" of the document with lengthy and detailed
pronouncements on legislative organization and procedure and
on judicial organization and powers.
Numerous administrative
agencies, boards, and commissions, necessary parts of 20th
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Century governmental activity, will not be created by the constitution.
Creation of such agencies, and the details of the
legislative and judicial machinery and powers, will be left,
as they are in the national Constitution, to the political and
judicial instruments of government.
(5) A well-drafted constitution will be so organized that the
scope of executive and legislative powers and functions are
clearly defined in order that responsibility for govern:T\ental
action can be readily determined
.

Sound constitutional drafting will produce a document so organized that the duties and responsibilities of governmental
officials can be ascertained by the electorate.
Those matters
pertaining to the executive branch of government should be
clearly set out in that specific portion of the constitution
dealing with the executive and should not be scattered in haphazard fashion throughout the document. The same statement
applies with equal force to matters of legislative powers and
functions.
The voter should not be forced to search the entire
constitution in order to find all of the various provisions
which deal with either the executive or legislative bra^iches.
(6) The independence of the judiciary end to be desired in
constitutional drafting
.

The American and English tradition of the independent judiciary is one worthy of preservation in a state constitution.
The mechanisms for achieving this aim are varied and do not
require discussion here.
Certainly, however, a judge must not
be in a position where his decisions can be dictated by either
the executive or legislative branches.
Nor should he be placed
in a position where he will be subject to popular emotions of
the moment in a matter before his bench.
The vital importance
of an independent judge is readily apparent, and constitutional
provisions should assure that independence.

(7)

The Constitution should provide for Amendment

.

A sound constitution will contain provisions for its future
amendment and revision. No group of persons are so wise as
to foretell accurately what the future may hold.
A manifestation of their wisdom may, indeed, prove to be in how well they
discharge their responsibility in drafting the provisions for
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amendment and revision. For if the process be too difficult,
they may have created a constitutional s traitjacket instead of
a dynamic organic law; and if the process be too easy, they
will have opened the floodgates to the writing of statutory
minutiae into fundamental law.

Nor are there satisfactory guideposts available to aid them in
reaching decisions on this point.
Similar or even identical
procedures, adopted in different states, have proved in retrospect too difficult in the one and too easy in the other.
The
only general criterion available is the rule of thumb that a
long and detailed constitution will roost likely require an easy
process of amendment; a short constitution a more difficult one.
Summary
The criteria of good constitution drafting may be stated, then,
as follows:
1.

Constitutional language is significant and its
drafting of highest importance;

2.

The language of the constitution should be confined to fundamental or constitutional law as
opposed to statutory law;

3.

The Bill of Rights should be held to minimum
length;

4.

The constitution should set out only the essential outline of the machinery of government;

5.

The constitution should be so organized that the
scope of legislative and executive powers and
fvmctions are clearly defined;

6.

The constitution should guarantee the independence of the judiciary;

7.

The constitution should make such provision for
future amendment that the process will be relatively easy if the document is long and detailed
and somewhat more difficult if the document is
short and general.
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THE ROLE OF A STATE CONSTITUTION TODAY

A striking characteristic of modern society is the trend toward
increased governmental activity at all levels and the consequent ever-greater importance of government in everyday life.
As a political issue, the wisdom of this trend may be controversial; but as a fact of 20th Century life, it is not.
State
governments today must provide a wide variety of services for
their citizens.
Legislative activity and responsibility is
increased as the demands of the people for additional services
The provision of such services requires complex admultiply.
ministrative machinery, machinery which can be adapted to
rapidly changing social and economic situations.

Under the Constitution which the Delegates will write at College,
the state government of Alaska must provide not only the present
territorial services but must assume additional functions presently administered by the federal government.
The task of
writing a constitution sufficient to handle these operations
alone would be a great one.
But the Constitution must be more than a document applicable to
the "here and now."
It must be an instrument capable of providing a framework for an economy and society but dimly envisaged by the Delegates.
Few states have entered the union with
the tremendous potential for growth that Alaska has.
Above all
else the Constitution written at College must reflect that potential.
The Delegates at College will be writing what will very possibly
be the last of the constitutions for a new member of the American
They may draw on over 150 years of accumulated knowledge
Union.
and practice of American government.
Theirs is the weighty responsibility of making reasoned judgments in choosing those
portions of that knowledge and practice which will be incorporated into Alaskan organic law.

Politics has been described as "the art of the possible." No
document written at College will be perfect. Many of the problems which will face the Delegates will be incapable of any
complete solution, for the problems of government frequently
do not have a "best" solution but only a "more desirable" or
"Less desirable" solution.
Compromise is the essence of democratic government; the Delegates will find on many occasions
that compromise solutions to pressing issues will not be really
satisfactory to many of the convention members.
The national
Constitution, for example, has been aptly described as a
"bundle of compromises." Yet the compromises will be made at
College and the result will be a Constitution for Alaska.
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The Territory of Alaska stands on the threshold of becoming
the State of Alaska.
If the Delegates do their job well, they
will provide a constitution which will enable the prospective
state to grow socially, economically, and politically.
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NOTES

1.

There have been one national constitutional convention
and some 200 state constitutional conventions during the
course of our national history.

2.

Texas

3.

Fifth Amendment.

4.

An "information" is an "indictment" drawn by the prosecuting attorney, in contrast to a grand jury, which
is a specially chosen body of citizens created for the
purpose of deciding whether the evidence is sufficient
to return an indictment and cause the person to stand
trial

5.

Article

6.

Article I, section
clause 1.

9,

clause

Article

I,

section 10,

7.

Article I, section
clause 2.

9,

clause 5; Article

I,

section 10,

8.

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Tenth Amendment.

9.

Defined generally as the power which the state has to
protect the health, morals, and welfare of its citizenry.

v.

White,

I,

7

Wall.

700

(1868).

section 10, clause

1.
3;

10.

So-called "inherent" and "resultant" powers are not discussed in this paper.
They are definitely a source of
federal power, particularly in the field of foreign relations, but an understanding of them is not necessary
to this discussion.

11.

Article VI, clause

12.

In declaring in one of his most famous opinions that a
state could not tax a national bank chartered by Congress,
he stated that "the States have no power, by taxation or
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers
vested in the general government. This is, we think,
the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the
Constitution has declared. " McCulloch v. Maryland 4
Wheat.
316, 436 (1819).

2.

,
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13.

Article IV, section

14.

Ibid.

15.

Luther

16.

See, e.g., H. R. 2535 (84th Congress, 1st Session),
section 102, paragraph 2; section 203, paragraph 2; and
S. 49 (84th Congress, 1st Session), section 102, paragraph 2; section 203, paragraph 2.

17.

Article IV, section

1.

18.

Article IV, section

2,

19.

Individuals seeking to engage in most of the professions must procure a license in the new state; usually
an examination is required.
Such provisions are justified on the grounds that the state has the power to
protect its citizens' health and welfare under the
police power.
State universities may charge out-ofstate students a higher fee than residents, on the
ground that ordinairy tuition and fee charges do not
cover the total cost of students' education.
Similarly,
higher fishing and hunting license fees may be charged
out-of-state persons on the ground that the state has
a proprietary interest in its fish and game resources.

20.

Kentucky

21.

There are, for example, fisheries compacts among the
Atlantic, Gulf Coast, and Pacific Coast states.

22.

Approximately 55 of these laws have been promulgated
by the parent body, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The Conference merely
recommends, leaving decision on passage to the individual states.
Two, the negotiable instruments act and
the warehouse receipts act, have been adopted by all 4 8
states and the territories, including Alaska.
Others,
like the statute of limitations act, have been adopted
by no states at all.

23.

Article V.

24.

Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming.

25.

Kentucky, Idaho, Vermont, Wyoming.

26.

Escanaba and

Borden

v.

678, 689

v.

,

7

Dennison

L.

M.

4.

How.

,

1,

42

clause

24 How.

(1849).

1.

66

(1861).

Transp. Co. v. Chicago

(1883).
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,

107 U. S.

.

27.

2

Madison's Journal of the Debates in the Convention
1908), 89, 274, 275.

(Hunt's ed.

,

Smith

28.

Coyle

29.

2

30.

United States

31.

Coyle v. Smith

32.

Dick V. United States 208 U. S.
Webb, 225 U. S. 663, (1912).

33.

United States

34.

Ervien

35.

Stearns v. Minnesota

36.

R. 2535 (84th Congress, 1st session), section 203,
paragraphs 1 and 2; S. 49 (84th Congress, 1st session),
The provisions are comsection 20 3, paragraphs 1 and 2.
mon to all the recent statehood bills.

37.

As reported by the House Committee on Interior and Insu-

U.

v.

Stat.

S.

,

221 U. S. 559

701,
v.
,

(1911).

703.

Texas

339 U.

,

221 U. S. 559

v.

Sandoval

United States
,

,

,

(1950).

(1911).
340

,

v.

716

707,

S.

(1908); Ex parte

231 U. S. 28

251 U. S.

41

(1914).

(1919).

179 U. S. 223, 245

(1900).

H.

lar Affairs.
38.

It is the writer's opinion that the provision, paralleling as it does certain language found in other acts of
See esadmission and enabling acts, is constitutional.
pecially Ervien v. United States 251 U. S. 41 (1919).
,

This limitation on mineral lands is discussed in detail
in PAS Staff Paper No. Ill, The Alaskan Constitution and
the State Patrimony
.

39.

Elements of Democratic Government (New York; Oxford University Press, 1947), 19.

40.

One elector did so at the time of the election of Munroe.
One Tennessee elector cast his ballot for J. Strom Thurmond
in 194 8, even though Tennessee had been carried by Mr.
Truman

41.

Article XXX of the Declaration of Rights.

42.

W.

Brooke Graves, American State Government (Boston: Heath,
4th ed.
The following state constitutions are
1953), 70.
considered as rearrangements of earlier documents:
Main, 1876 rearrangement of 1820 constitution
Massachusetts, 1919 rearrangement of 1780 constitution
New York, 1938 rearrangement of 1894 constitution
,
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Vermont, 1913 rearrangement of 1793 constitution
Virginia, 1929 rearrangement of 1902 constitution
A rearrangement is not to be considered as a new constitution
nor as a revision of the older one.
43.

Article XVI, Minnesota Constitution. The amendment was
adopted in 1920 and represented an effort to take the
highway system "out of politics."

44.

Iowa Constitution, Article I, section
Constitution, Article III, section 19.

45.

Minnesota Constitution, Article

46.

The entire subject of civil rights is considered in detail in Staff Paper No. II, Civil Rights and Liberties

I,

5;

Mississippi

section 18.

.

47.

Discussed in detail in Staff Paper No. IV, Suffrage and
Elections
.

48.

Discussed in detail in Staff Papers No. V, The Legisla tive Department and No. X, Legislative Apportionment
.

,

49.

Discussed in detail in Staff Paper No. VI, the Executive
Department
.

50.

Discussed in detail in Staff Paper No. VII, The Judicial
Department
.

51.

Discussed in detail in Staff Paper No. XI, Amendment and
Revision, Initiative and Referendum
.

52.

Pertinent topics are treated in detail in various Staff
Papers

53.

Students assign many reasons for the length and detail of
state constitutions.
Some argue that length has resulted
from a distrust of legislative bodies by the people; others
argue that distrust of the executive branch has been responsible for increased length.
Certainly another factor
has been the growing complexity of the economic and social
order which has resulted in efforts to solve individual
state problems through the device of adding amendments on
given subjects to the constitution, or even in revising or
rewriting the document in an effort to meet particular
needs.
The advent of Jacksonian democracy in the 1820 's,
with its belief that the spoils of government should be
shared by the dominant political party and that government
was such a simple operation that any person could handle
any phase of it, probably caused provisions to be added to
state constitutions calling for the wide-spread election
of great numbers of purely administrative officials.
Yet
another factor has been the lack of adequate preparation
and staff work immediately prior to the holding of the convention.
The delegates have been forced to meet without
having adequate materials available on which to base reasoned
judgments.
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CHAPTER IX
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
By Albert L. Sturm

NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONS
EVERY GOVERNMENT operates under some form of constitution.
In the broad sense of the term, the constitution of a state
or nation consists of all the principles and rules under
which it is established and organized and which determine
the reciprocal relationships between the people and the
Unlike some other countries, the United States
government.
and the forty-eight states have governments based on written constitutions.
These documents are the fundamental
law upon which the superstructure of government is erected.
They serve a number of purposes, including (1) provision
for the basic framework and structure, (2) assignment of
powers to the various organs of the state, (3) limitation
on governmental authority and prescription of the manner in
which it shall be used, and (4) the safeguarding of individual rights and protection of persons and property against
unwarranted encroachment by the agents and instrumentalities
of the state.

National and State Constitutions
The federal plan as devised by the "Founding Fathers" in 1787
has resulted in substantial differences in the nature and development of constitutions on the national and state levels
of American government.
The Constitution of the United States
designates or enumerates in broad terms the powers which the
national government may exercise. Although limitations are
imposed upon both nation and states, the emphasis is not restrictive, but rather upon vesting sufficient power to enable
the three branches to discharge adequately their respective
duties and responsibilities.

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
Albert L. Sturm.
"General Characteristics of State Constitutions." Chapter 1 in Methods of Constitutional Reform pp.
1-9, 15-17.
Michigan Governmental Studies No. 28 Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1954.
,

,
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In contrast, state constitution-makers have been more concernUnder
ed with "restricting" than with "enabling" government.
the terms of the Tenth Amendment to the federal Constitution,
the states possess residual or reserved powers.
Except as
restricted by express limitations and by assignments of
authority to the national government, the framers of a state
constitution are therefore relatively free to determine the
structure and legal competence of state organs. The result
has been the imposition of numerous and excessive restrictions
on government, with the legislature as the principal object
in many constitutions.
These limitations have impeded adaptation of the basic law to changing needs and circumstances

and have often necessitated extensive amendments. The
status of state constitutions as essentially systems of
governmental limitations has been fortified by strict judicial
construction of constitutional provisions.

Distinction Between Constitutional and Statutory Law
A constitution is often characterized as organic or fundamental law to distinguish it from the body of statutory
enactments, which properly should relate to matters of more
detailed and transitory nature. The provisions of constitutions are presumed to relate to basic features of permanent
character and of sufficient significance to warrant consideration in the fundamental law of the state.
In reality,
however, it has become increasingly difficult to make any
clear-cut distinction in substance between the bodies of
constitutional and statutory law. This is truer on the
state than on the national level of government because of
the difference in character of the constitutions.

Emphasis upon limitations and the inclusion of a growing
body of detail in state constitutions have practically
erased any valid distinction that could once be made. Moreover, there is a tendency to break down the difference between forms of enactment. According to our traditional
theory of legislation, the constituent power--power to make
and adopt constitutions--resides ultimately in the people
who are sovereign, whereas statutory law is created by
legislative bodies regularly representative of the people.
In some states the same methods are used for the enactment
of statutes and the adoption of constitutional amendments,
thus nullifying the old distinction.
Procedures of direct
popular participation in lawmaking today enable the people
of more than one-fourth of the states to initiate, as well
as to give final approval to, both statutes and constitutional changes.
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With regard to substantive content, large parts of state
constitutions are no more basic or fundamental than the
So much legisproducts of the regular legislative process.
lative detail is now included in the constitutions of most
states that frequent amendments are necessary to render them
reasonably adequate to serve their purpose. One unfortunate
result is that the electorate is confronted with detailed
technicalities in numerous proposed amendments, causing
further deterioration of popular interest in the important
democratic function of voting on issues as well as on candidates.
Many voters feel that such matters requiring frequent alteration and adjustment should be left to the legislature and not submitted to the people, who do not have the
expert knowledge for passing intelligent judgment.
It is therefore obvious that any attempt to distinguish
constitutional law from statutory law on the basis of the
fundamental character of the former is no longer valid.
Contents of present-day constitutions include not only those
matters which the framers considered of sufficient significance for inclusion but, in addition, provisions growing out
of the pulling and hauling of a multitude of political
pressure interests, each of which is desirous of securing
the distinction of constitutional status and recognition.
As a whole state constitutions of the midtwentieth century
reflect the complexities of our age, the heavy demands on
the modern state, a reluctance to depart from the well-worn
paths of tradition, and a popular inertia which neglects to
keep the house of government in order. They differ greatly
from the documents framed during the Revolutionary period.

THE FIRST STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The first state constitutions were the logical outgrowth of
colonial experience.^ Although it is difficult to determine
just when the concept of a written constitution definitely
crystallized, the colonial charters provided the basis for
the first state constitutions formulated during the years
immediately following the Declaration of Independence. In
origin and purpose these documents were very similar to
legislative statutes and were confined primarily to
laying down the basic framework of government.-^ The task
of transforming the colonies into new states independent of
the mother country was relatively easy for Rhode Island and
Connecticut, which merely made a few alterations in their
charters. Mutatis mutandis these documents served as constitutions for these two New England states. Although other
states formulated new basic laws, the general collective
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results were not widely different because of similar experience and political philosophy.
In substantive content, the early state constitutions were
permeated by the principle that, at best, government is
evil and should therefore be restrained from an excess of
power.
Most of the men who framed the Revolutionary constitutions agreed with Jefferson and Paine in their dedication
to the natural rights theory of philosophical liberalism.'*
Primacy of the individual was a dominant feature.
It was
felt that, if government were to be restrained effectively
from excesses, it must be kept close to the people.
Emphasis upon popular consent and its frequent renewal was
evidenced in short terms for officers, both executive and
legislative.
Since leadership was regarded as a potential
source of tyranny, obstacles were posed to its development.
Fear of government autocracy, particularly at the hands of
the executive, resulted in the reduction of state governors
to "mere ciphers," as Madison pointed out.
The legislature
was exalted at the expense of the executive, since it was
felt to be closer to, and more representative of, the people.
Lawmaking bodies, however, were not free from restraint;
they were subjected to various limitations on their powers,
including bills of rights intended to protect persons and
property from unwarranted government acts. The familiar
tripartite structure, although an outstanding characteristic
and considered essential as a guarantee against tyranny by a
any of the three branches, was therefore tempered by legislative supremacy, following the precepts of John Locke.
In short, the Revolutionary state constitutions attempted to
avoid the offensive experience under colonial governors and
foreign control. The governments established by their proi'.-^visions suffered serious limitations that became increasingly
obvious with the passing decades. Nevertheless, with all of
these restrictions, the concepts of popular self-government
and constitutionalism became firmly entrenched.

Amendment and Revision
The technique of formulation and adoption of most of the constitutions of the Revolutionary' period would be considered
highly irregular today.
In most states they were framed by
the legislature and were not submitted to popular vote, but
were proclaimed as effective by the government in power.
Massachusetts, however, which was somewhat more deliberate
than other states in framing its first constitution, led the
way in establishing a new method of state constitution-making
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1779 and submitby calling a constitutional convention in
Thus
ting the work of this body to the voters in 1780.
Massachusetts was the first state to secure a new constitution through special drafting by a convention and adoption
This precedent proved attractive
by popular referendum.
to other states and established the predominant pattern of
procedure for constitution-making and ratification.

The power to frame and adopt constitutions was set above the
ordinary legislative power under the Massachusetts procedure.
This method involved selection by the people of representatives chosen for the sole purpose of formulating a constitution.
Since convention members were elected for this purpose,
it was thought that they would be closer to the people and
would reflect more directly and accurately the popular purpose
and will.
The constituent power was exercised not only
through direct representatives with a special mandate to
frame a basic instrument of government, but the product of
their labors required final approval of the electorate. This
procedure was the most direct that could be devised in a representative system for expression of the popular will.
It
had been widely accepted by the states. Although some state
constitutions have been framed and adopted by other procedures,
as will be noted in the following chapters, formulation by
convention and adoption by popular referendum has become the
predominant pattern.

Some of the earliest state constitutions contained no provision for amendment. This circumstance, however, proved
to be no great obstacle in effecting alterations which were
made by the legislature or in convention.
Provisions authorizing legislative assemblies to amend constitutions were
added during the early stage of state constitutional development, but a more difficult procedure was required than that
for regular legislation.^ Later, amendments were required
to be submitted to the voters for approval or rejection,
following the suggestion of Jefferson in 1776.
Connecticut,
in 1818, was the first state to put this plan into effect.
For general revision and extensive changes which became
necessary during the course of constitutional development,
conventions convoked for this purpose were gradually prescribed as the appropriate procedure.
Usually the legislature was required to take the initiative in assembling a
convention; in Pennsylvania and Vermont, however, special
boards of censors were empowered to call a convention to
consider proposed changes.
In order to ensure the possibility of amendment when legislative assemblies were unwilling to make changes, several
state constitutions set definite periods for consideration
New Hampshire designated a seven-year period,
of the matter.
which corresponded to the frequency of meetings of the
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censorial counsels in Pennsylvania and Vermont.
In Delaware,
the question of constitutional change could be raised at any
general election. The first constitutions of three states
authorized the legislative assembly to convoke a convention
at its discretion,^ and three others permitted the legislature,
to refer the convention question to the electorate when it
deemed such a step necessary.^
During the eighteenth century the modern distinction between
constitutional amendment and thoroughgoing revision was not
clearly made, although in the Delaware and South Carolina
documents separate procedures were prescribed for amendment
and the use of conventions.
The distinction between piecemeal alterations and thorough overhauling of the constitution
became more definite as the need for reform developed with
advancing age
One of the most obvious distinctions between the early constitutions and present-day documents is their length.
The first
state constitutions rarely contained more than five thousand
words, which were sufficient to outline the framework of government. ° Factors contributing to expanding state constitutions are primarily functions of the increasing complexity of
government and the conception which members of constitutional
conventions and legislative assemblies have of their task in
rendering these documents adequate to meet the needs of
modern society.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Perhaps the most obvious factor contributing to constitutional
growth in the states has been the necessity of adapting basic
law to the new functions and responsibilities of government.
The constitution of any state must be in harmony with political, social, and economic conditions and with the needs of the
people if it is properly to serve its purpose.
It has often
been felt that the complexity of such problems requires more
knowledge and wisdom than is normally found in legislative
assemblies.
In general, conventions have seized the opportunity to curb legislatures and to minimize their capacity to
mischief.
Constitution-makers have often been inclined to
view the basic law as a bundle of safeguards against incapacity, favoritism, and corruption.
Thus the growing magnitude
of governmental functions and responsibilities necessitating
broader and more numerous constitutional provisions has been
accompanied by a concomitant loss of faith in legislatures.
The preferential position assigned to legislatures under early
constitutions was very substantially altered during the
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nineteenth century when these bodies in some states, through
venality and incompetence, proved themselves unworthy of
public trust.

Elaboration of the framework of government by inclusion of
minutiae regarding new agencies and their respective powers
and duties has the obvious effect of restricting the discretionary powers of the legislature.
In addition, new lists
of limitations on legislative authority and lengthy regulations of legislative procedure provide abundant evidence of
popular loss of faith. The trend, therefore, has been away
from legislative dominance, with consequent increase in the
authority granted to the electorate.

Another factor contributing to constitutional expansion is
public dissatisfaction with strict judicial construction of
state constitutional provisions.
The greater the amount of
detail included in a constitution, the greater is the potentiality of judicial interpretation, which has often meant
greater restriction.
Popular discontent with the courts,
registered in the form of more interpretive provisions has
simply provided more grist for the judicial mill. As Professor Munro has pointed out, "Litigation thrives on constitutional verbosity."^
The demands and influence of special interests for constitutional insurance against curtailment of their "rights"
accounts for many additions to the body of constitutional law.
These groups feel that their safety and objectives will be
protected and enhanced by recognition in the constitution.
Such pressures have also resulted in the addition of new
guarantees considered to be fundamental to constitutional
declarations of rights.

Lengthy and detailed provisions have bred an expanding number
of amendments to the point that some state constitutions have
assumed the characteristics of a legal code.- Since details
bind the hands of public authorities, more efficient and
responsive government has not necessarily resulted from the
labors of constitution-makers.
Instead, the sheer volume of
constitutional law adds to the difficulty of effecting needed reforms.
Abandonment in many states of the concept of a
constitution as limited to fundamental law has destroyed the
traditional distinction between an organic document and
ordinary legislation.
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CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES
Much experience in the making and revision of constitutions
has resulted in the development of a fairly definite conception of what should be incorporated in these documents.!'^
In general, it is felt that a constitution should be confined
to fundamentals and its provisions expressed in broad terms
admitting of flexibility in application.
It should provide
the basic framework of government and establish a sound and
proper balance between the various branches.
It should lay
down rules for the exercise of governmental authority with
due care in assigning powers sufficient to discharge the
responsibilities and functions of the various organs of the
state.
All constitutions should contain provisions guaranteeing basic rights and protecting persons and property from the
arbitrary encroachment by government.
Finally, proper provision should be made for amending or revising the constitution
to mee;t social needs.
Flexibility, conciseness and clarity
of expression, and dedication to fundamental principles are
key concepts of the ideal state constitution.

Collectively, these ideas or principles have been honored
more in the breach than in the observance by constitutionmakers.
The bill of indictment against state constitutional
documents is a long one. Principal weaknesses of state governments based upon outmoded constitutions have been summarized as follows:
1.

An unrepresentative legislature inadequately staffed
to perform the lawmaking function intelligently,
unduly restricted in power, and frequently manned
by less capable citizens.

2.

A disintegrated executive branch with power widely
dispersed and responsibility divided among a large
number of elective officials on all levels and an
administrative structure of great complexity featured by overlapping and duplication of functions,
inefficiency, and waste.

3.

A judiciary staffed by judges selected by popular
vote, which places a premium on vote-getting ability
instead of upon possession of qualities becoming a
judge; lack of judicial independence.

4.

Rigid restrictions on county and municipal government which seriously obstruct home rule and prevent
government close to the people
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5.

A long ballot, confusing and indigestible to the
average voter, who is bewildered by long lists of
candidates and issues.

6.

Provisions for amendment so rigid, in some constitutions, as practically to deprive the people of
the opportunity to alter their basic law, and, in
others, so lax as to encourage too frequent changes.

7.

Inclusion of a mass of detail, blurring the distinction between constitutional and statutory law,
encouraging expensive and protracted litigation,
and necessitating frequent amendments.

These rigid strictures on state government have led to movements for constitutional revision in approximately half of
In this period three
the states during the past decade.
states have succeeded in securing new or thoroughly revised
constitutions; others have taken official action in preparation for modernization of their constitutional documents.
The following chapters explain the legal means available to
the states for amendment and revision of their fundamental
laws.
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CHAPTER X
THE NATURE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

By Albert L. Sturm

The constitution of a state is the basic law upon which its
government rests.
It outlines the framework of government,
provides for its principal organs, assigns and limits powers
and prescribes the manner in which they may be exercised,
and establishes safeguards for the protection of personal
and property rights.
The framers of American state constitutions both granted and restricted authority, but they were
more concerned with limiting government than with vitalizing
it by ample powers to accomplish popular social objectives.
To a great extent, therefore, most state constitutions are
bundles or rights and limitations rather than effective instruments for accomplishing the positive ends and purposes
of government.
In the broad sense of the term, the constitution of a state
embodies all fundamental principles and rules under which
the government is established and organized.
Thus, in this
sense it includes unwritten customs, traditions and usages,
as well as basic statutory legislation.
Political parties
and judicial review of legislation and executive action are

among the most characteristic features of American national
and state government, but few of our written constitutions
contain express provisions for them.

Unlike the constitutions of some other countries, England
for example, which are not single, written instruments,
American national and state constitutions are formal, written documents, drafted by representatives of the people with
higher authority than that of ordinary lawmaking. Characteristically, the constituent authority to make constitutions
is normally exercised by special representatives assembled
in a constitutional convention with a special mandate to
frame a basic instrument of government.
Amendments may be
proposed in most states by the legislature, but only

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
Albert L. Sturm.
"Nature of State Constitutions."
Chapter 1 in Major Constitutional Issues in West Virginia
Morgantown, West Virginia:
Bureau of
pp. 1-5, 7-11.
Government Research, West Virginia University, 1961.
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according to the constitutionally prescribed procedure for
exercising the constituent power. With a few exceptions, all
new constitutions and amendments must be submitted to and
approved by the voters before they become effective. When
promulgated, the constitution takes precedence over all ordinary legislation and official acts.

CONTENTS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
All Air.erican constitutions embody the basic principles of
political democracy. Popular sovereignty, the principle that
government comes from the people, is among the most important.
The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States asserts:
"We, the people ... do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America." Lincoln's classic expression in the Gettysburg Address, "government of the people, by
the people, and for the people," reaffirms this democratic
principle. Typically, the West Virginia Bill of Rights
declares:
"The powers of government reside in all the citizens
of the State, and can be rightfully exercised only in accordance with their will and appointment "1 The doctrine that
government rests on the consent of the governed is applied
through the selection of representatives, who speak for and
act on behalf of the people in determining and executing public policy.
When they are no longer responsive to the popular
will, the electorate may replace them.
Thus, government
officials and employees are servants of the people to whom
they owe their mandate for action.
.

Limited government is another precept of American constitutionalism.
It holds that the power to govern is limited by
formally defined and enforceable principles of political
organization and procedure expressed in fundamental law for
This
the protection of basic individual and group rights.
the
in
the
phrase
of
principle finds familiar expression
Massachusetts Constitution declaring that this is a "government of laws and not of men." The fundamental premise is
that no government agent may act arbitrarily and in a way destructive of generally accepted rights; public officials are
limited by law.
State constitutions implement the doctrine
limited
government
of
through the separation of powers, a
system of checks and balances, a formal bill or rights, and
by other restrictions.
Governmental separation of powers dates from antiquity, but
the framers of American constitutions learned about the doc-\
trine mainly through the writings of Montesquieu and Locke.
Montesquieu argued that the best way to protect individual
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freedom is to separate the powers of government so that no
Liberty
one persons or group could ever exercise all of them.
cannot exist where they are concentrated. Although not required by the national Constitution, all American state constitutions provide for the familiar tripartite pattern which
the
divides the powers of government among three branches:
legislative, which makes the laws; the executive, which
executes them; and the judicial, which interprets them in
Separation, however, does not precases and controversies.
clude some overlapping and the exercise by each branch of
some powers of the others.

Limited government is thus implemented by a system of checks
The three branches do not operate in a vacuum;
and balances
For example, the
each has certain checks over the others.
legislature appropriates money upon which both the executive
and the judiciary depend, has the power of impeachment, and
approves or rejects appointments; the executive has the powers
of appointment and pardon, and he may veto bills, which may
be passed over his veto usually by extraordinary majority
vote of the legislature; the courts, by judicial review, may
invalidate legislative and executive acts involved in cases
Even though American constitutions
before them for decision.
normally do not specifically provide for judicial review, it
is now firmly entrenched as one of the most characteristic
It should be
features of government in the United States.
operate
under complete
government
could
not
modern
noted that
separation of powers. Governmental processes necessarily and
inevitably involve an intermingling and fusing of all three
types of powers into practically a seamless web.
.

Every state constitution contains a bill of rights, which
further implements limited government. When the national
Constitution was siobmitted to the states in 1787, it contained
no bill of rights. A number of states ratified the proposed
document with the understanding that a list of guarantees
safeguarding persons and property against governmental encroachment would be added. This was done in 1791, establishing a precedent followed unanimously by state constitution
makers.
Rights thus guaranteed are the heritage of liberty
from oppression achieved after centuries of struggle principally rooted in English development and experience.
In addition to these basic principles, state constitutions
set forth the organization, powers, and procedure of the
three departments in varying detail, define boundaries,
describe the relationship of the state to the national government, prescribe suffrage qualifications and the manner of
conducting elections, and provide the method of amendment
Financial matters particularly taxation,
and revision.

—
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debt, expenditure^, and fiscal administration and local
governraent account for much verbiage in the average American
constitution. The growing complexity and widely diversified
functions of the modern state are reflected in articles
dealing with education, highways, corporations, welfare, agriculture and other areas of government activity.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The original state constitutions were short documents, rarely
containing more than five thousand words.
In philosophy,
they embodied eighteenth-century revolutionary ideals; in
substantive content, they were limited to the basic framework
of government.
Popular consent and its frequent renewal by
elections, restricted suffrage, the familiar tripartite
structure, limited government, and legislative dominance were
hallmarks of these early documents.

Succeeding decades witnessed many changes in state constitutions, reflecting changing political, economic, and social
conditions and problems of a growing nation. Major factors
contributing to constitutional development include: population growth; expansion of popular participation in public
affairs through the extension of the suffrage, increase in
the number of elective officers, and adoption in some states
of the initiative and referendum; industrialization; technological development, particularly in transportation and
communication; and consequent growth in magnitude and complexity of the functions and responsibilities of the state.
Of primary importance also is the change in the people's
thinking on the proper role of government in modern society.
Formerly, it was minimal; today extensive protective, regulatory, and service activities reflect growing public desire
for positive government.
Constitutional growth has occurred through the writing of new
constitutions, amendment and revision of existing ones, usage
and interpretation.
Liberal interpretation of delegated
powers has been the principal method of national constitutional
development, with few changes in the written document.
In
contrast, the states have relied mainly on formal amendment,
revision and rewriting of the basic law, resulting in a large
body of detail and lengthy documents. In large part, the
reasons for the length and detail of state constitutions are
implicit in the underlying factors contributing to big government.
New functions and programs require provision for expanded governmental machinery and powers. Much detail is
accounted for by the popular distrust of legislatures Resulting
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from legislative excesses and abuses during the nineteenth
Public dissatisfaction with strict judicial intercentury.
pretation of constitutional provisions, the pressure of
special interests for constitutional status, and faulty
drafting also contribute to the growth of constitutions
In some states,
Lengthy constitutions breed even more detail.
so much material essentially statutory in nature has been
written into their constitutions that the traditional distinction between the fundamental law and ordinary legislation
has practically ceased to exist.

ATTRIBUTES OF A SOUND CONSTITUTION
In making, revising, and amending constitutions, Americcin
states have acquired much experience in fundamental lawFrom such experience, both in making and in operating
making.
constitutions, some consensus on their desirable attributes
Some of these qualities are implicit in the
has resulted.
The following are a representative list.
foregoing analysis.

First, a state constitution should be consistent with the
Constitution of the United States, which contains limitations
Under the American fedon both national and state powers.
eral system, the national Constitution, laws of the United
States made in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under the
authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land.
All state legislative acts, both constitutional and statutory/
contrary to valid national law, as interpreted by the United
Despite
States Supreme Court, are unenforceable and invalid.
this basic principle, many state constitutions, including
the West Virginia document, retain provisions for segregation
in the public schools and other matters inconsistent with the
doctrine of national supremacy.

Second, the organic law should provide the basic framework of
government and establish a sound balance among the various
branches.
Although not required by the national Constitution,
all American states have adopted the familiar structural pattern- of tripartite allocation of governmental powers to legislative, executive, and judicial departments.
The state constitution should make necessary provision for the establishment of each branch, creating a proper balance among them
through a system of checks and balances, which affords safeguards against usurpation by any single department.
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Third, a sound constitution lays down rules for the exercise
of powers in clear terms, extending to each branch ample
authority to discharge its proper functions.
In many states
constitution makers, in violation of this principle, have
been more concerned with limiting government than with giving
it the necessary tools to accomplish the ends sought to be
achieved through political organization. A sound constitution
both restricts abuse of power and serves as an effective,
enabling and implementing instrument.

Fourth, all American constitutions properly contain a bill
of rights guaranteeing basic personal and property rights.
The national Constitution affords some protection, but this
is insufficient to prevent encroachment by state authority
A good state constitution provides
on human liberties.
insurance
their
maintenance. But where rights are
ample
for
adequately protected by federal provisions, there appears
to be little reason for repeating guarantees, thereby needlessly cluttering up and prolonging the state bill of rights.
Fifth, proper provision should be made for changing the constitution when necessary. No group of constitution makers
can foresee all future problems, nor should one generation
impose its will irrevocably upon succeeding generations.
Inevitably, over an extended period of time some parts of
any constitution will become obsolete, especially in an era
of great social and technological development like the present.
Unless an orderly procedure for change is provided, either a
constitution will be distorted in operation or disorderly
methods will be employed to evade its prescriptions. Experience has shown that procedures for both thoroughgoing reFurthermore,
vision and piecemeal amendment are necessary.
the initiative in effecting changes should not be left solely
to the legislature, which is sometimes unresponsive to the
wishes of the majority.
Finally, the procedure for changing
the organic law should be neither so rigid as to make alteration excessively difficult nor so lax as practically to
reduce basic law to the level of statutes, thus providing
both stability and flexibility.

Sixth, it should be confined to matters of fundamental nature.
Most present state constitutions contain a mass of detail
dealing with temporary and specific matters with particularity
characteristic of statutory law. Writing in 1819, Chief
Justice Marshall gave classic expression to the principle that
a constitution should be formulated in broad terms:

A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all
the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit,
and of all the means by which they may be carried
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into execution, would partake of the prolixity
of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced
It would probably never be
by the human mind.
Its nature, thereunderstood by the public.
fore, required that only its great outlines be
marked, its important objects designated, and
the minor ingredients which composed those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves.

A constitution containing only fundamentals is flexible beGeneral
cause its phraseology is necessarily general.
language is capable of interpretation necessary to meet
changing conditions. Herein lies the great strength of the
national Constitution, which has kept pace with the social
order through interpretation and adaptation. An organic
law confined to fundamental matters will not requijre _the^
::onstant therapy of frequent amendments to keep it in running order. Constant resort to the amending process not
only reduces respect for the constitution, but also tends
to breed more detail.
Seventh, a state constitution should be expressed in clear,
simple language readily intelligible to the average citizen.
Faulty drafting, obscure and technical phraseology, inconsistencies, poor organization, and retention of obsolete
provisions, unfortunately, characterize too many organic
These deficiencies make the task of the citizen who
laws.
desires to gain an understanding of his government exceedCertainly greater care should be exercised
ingly difficult.
Use
in writing a constitution than in drafting ordinary law.
clarity
of language in exact legal context, simplicity and
of expression are among the hallmarks of a sound basic instrument of government.

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
During the last two decades, growing awareness of the inadequacies of state government stemming in large part from
weak constitutions has led to a movement for constitutional
revision in more than half the states. These states recognize
that many constitutional documents formulated to fulfill the
needs of a former day no longer provide a sound basis for
government in the atomic age. Expansion of state functions
and responsibilities, consequent growth of the politicial
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mechanism, and pressure of public problems of immense proportions are the major stimulants to constitutional revision.
Reporting to the President in 19 55, the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations state that:

many State constitutions restrict the scope, effectiveness, and adaptability of State and local action.
These self-imposed constitutional limitations make
it difficult for many States to perform all of the
services their citizens require, and consequently
have frequently been the underlying cause of State
and municipal pleas for federal assistance.

The Commission believes that most states would benefit
from a fundamental review and revision of their constitutions to make sure that they provide for vigorous
and responsible government, not forbid it.^

Common weakness of state government based on outmoded and
inadequate constitutions are discussed in studies made in a
number of states preparatory to basic legal reform. Their
findings are strikingly similar. The following are typical:
r.

A cumbersome, unrepresentative legislature, inadequately staffed to perform the lawmaking
function intelligently, with excessively restricted powers, often unresponsive to public needs,
especially in urban areas, and subject to manipulation by selfish interests.

2.

A disintegrated and enfeebled executive with power
widely dispersed and responsibility divided among
a large number of elective officials on all levels,
and an administrative structure of great complexity featured by duplication, overlapping, ineffifciency, and waste.

3.

A aiftused, complicated, and largely uncoordinated
judiciary, often lacking independence, with judges
selected on a political basis and frequently without professional qualifications on the lower levels,

4.

Rigid restrictions on local government that seriously impede home rule

5.

A long ballot listing a bewildering array of candidates and issues and rendering the task of even the
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most intelligent voter exceedingly difficult.
6.

Provisions for amendment and revision so rigid,
in some constitutions, as practically to deprive
the people of the opportunity to alter their
basic law, and, in other, so lax as to encourage
too frequent changes.

7.

Inclusion of a mass of detail in the constitution,
blurring the distinction between constitutional
and statutory law, and necessitating frequent
amendments

Intelligent appraisal of an old constitution and the writing
of a new one both involve a number of basic considerations
of which the following are characteristic: What purposes are
to be accomplished and how can they best be implemented? By
positive institutional arrangements or by express limitations?
What are the lessons of experience, both in this state and
elsewhere? What provisions are of sufficiently fundamental
and lasting character to justify inclusion in the basic law?
Are assignments of power to the various organs broad and
flexible enough to enable them to achieve the positive goals
of government? Are appropriate checks provided which will
curb abuse of powers but not obstruct their proper exercise?
Does the constitution afford ample protection for basic
rights? Is the document stylistically simple and lucid, consistent, free from obsolescence, logically organized and
arranged, and compatible with the national Constitution "in
all respects? Careful attention to these and simiar pertinent questions, grounded on experience thoroughly researched,
should lay a solid foundation for an instrument that will
enable government to serve the people responsibly, responsively, democratically, and efficiently.
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CHAPTER XI
WHAT SHOULD A MODEL CONSTITUTION CONTAIN?
By Albert L. Sturm
4

SOME EMERGING TRENDS
I have previously stated in this presentation, from the
lengthy experience of American states in making and operating
constitutions some consensus has developed regarding the desirAlable attributes of these basic instruments of government.
though no "ideal" constitution exists for all the states, and
probably never will because of great geographical, demographic,
social and other differences, there is general agreement on
Here is a representative list.l
some basic common qualities.

As

1.

Consistency with the Constitution of the United States
Under the American federal system the national Constitution, laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under the authority
of the United States are the supreme law of the
All state law, both constitutional and statuland.
tory, that is contrary to valid national law, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, is
Furthermore, the principle
unenforceable and invalid.
has been established that the national Constitution
"looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States."^

2

Provision of a sound basic framework of government
with a proper balance among the three branches
The familiar tripartite allocation of governmental
powers to legislative, executive, and judicial departments is not required by the national Constitution, but it has become firmly established in the

.

.

Albert L. Sturm.
"Some Emerging Trends," "The Complete Constitution."
In "What Should A Model Constitution Contain?"
pp.
14-21.
Paper prepared for the Constitutional Revision Symposium,
Sponsored by the West Virginia University College of Law and the
Institute for Labor Studies and Manpower Development of the West
Virginia University Center for Appalachian Studies and Development, May 9 and 10, 1969, Mont Chateau Lodge, Morgantown, West
(Mimeographed)
Virginia.
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American system of government. An effective state constitution will make necessary provision for the establishment of each branch, creating a workable balance
among the three departments that affords safeguards
against usurpation. Moreover, viable constitutional
language will give recognition to the impossibility of
any rigid separation of powers in modern government.
3.

Extension of ample power to governmental organs to dis
charge their proper functions but with appropriate
controls to curb abuse of power
Vigor and capacity
for effectTve and responsive action have long been subordinated by state constitution-makers to the limitation of governmental powers.
If the states are to
recapture their viability in the federal system, they
must have the necessary tools to meet the pressing problems of the latter twentieth century and to provide
some solutions.

-

,

.

4.

Inclusion of a bill of rights
The national Constitution affords" some protection to basic personal and
property rights, but this is usually minimal and is
insufficient to prevent encroachment by state authority on human liberties.

5

Provision for orderly procedures for changing the constitution that strike a balance between extremes of
rigidity and laxity
Some state constitutions have
gone unchanged for decades because of a rigid amending
procedure; others, can be so readily altered that they
contain a great volume of extraneous matter.

.

.

6

Inclusion in the document of fundamental matters ex cluding substance of a temporairy or detailed nature
characteristic of statutory law
Writing in 1819,
Chief Justice Marshall gave classic expression to the
principle that a constitution should be written in
broad terms:
,

.

A constitution to contain an accurate detail
of all the subdivisions of which its great
powers will admit, and of all means by which
they may be carried into execution, would
partake of the prolixity of a legal code,
and could scarcely be embraced by the human
mind.
It would probably never be understood
by the public.
Its nature, therefore, required that only its great outlines be marked,
its important objects designated, and the
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minor ingredients which composed those objects
be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves 3
.

More than a hundred years later. Justice Cardozo stated
the matter more succinctly:

A Constitution states or ought to state not
rules for the passing hour but principles for
an expanding future.^
A constitution containing only fundamentals is flexible
General
because its phraseology is necessarily general.
necessary
language is capable of interpretation that is
to meet changing conditions.
Herein lies the strength
of the national Constitution, which has kept pace with
the social order mainly through interpretation and adaptation rather than formal amendment.
7.

Use of clear direct simple language readily intelli gible to the average citizen and arrangement of provisions in logical order conversely avoidance of
obscure and technical phraseology inconsistencies ,
obsolete provisions and poor organization ?^
,

,

,

;

,

,

,

These are widely recognized by students of state government as
general hallmarks of excellence in state constitution-making.

There is somewhat less agreement on the detailed substantive contents of state organic law.
However, comparative analysis of
provisions in the new state constitutions, the Model State Constitution and the writings of specialists in the various areas
of state constitutional systems indicates a substantial body of
agreement.
Four years ago I attempted to synthesize the common
ideas expressed in these various sources to develop a rough composite of substantive characteristics of the modern emerging
state constitution.
Admittedly inexact, nevertheless it i,s a
convenient device for summarizing recent trends in both theory
and practice.
Here are some of the salient features of the major
constitutional areas:
,

Bill of Rights
A set of guarantees of personal and political
freedom, including both traditional substantive and procedural
rights and those that have recently emerged (such as "equal
treatment" or "antidiscrimination" guarantees, protection of
persons in the course of legislative investigations and administrative proceedings, etc.).
:

Suffrage and Elections
Provisions for broad participation in
the electoral process with minimum restriction on voter
:
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qualifications, especially regarding residence requirements for
participation in presidential elections; state elections in the
odd-numbered years, to avoid overlapping with national elections
and issues; omission of organization and procedural details for
conducting elections, which would be determined by the legislature.

A continuous body (preferably unicamThe Legislative Branch
meeting anually as provided by law, with membership based
eral)
solely on population, elected in single-member districts for twoautomatic reapportionment after each
year terms (if unicameral)
decennial census by a nonlegislative agent; flexibility in legislative organization and procedure with provision for adequate
staffing; minimum restrictions on legislative power; legislative
post audit.
;

,

;

Integration of executive power in a governor
The Executive
elected for a four-year term and eligible for re-election (alternative:
election of the governor and lieutenant governor as a
team on the same ticket)
extensive executive and administrative
powers, including power to initiate administrative reorganization
subject to legislative disallowance, the item veto and with ample
time to consider legislative bills; limitation of the number of
administrative departments to a maximum of 20 into which agencies
would be integrated on the basis of major purpose; clear provision for succession to the governorship and reasonable procedure
for determining disability; general provision for a merit system.
;

;

The Judiciary
A unified judicial system with general provision
for two or three levels of courts and legislative power to create additional courts as needed; selection of judges by gubernaABA Plan) to serve during good
torial appointment (Missouri
behavior, but with definite provision for removal; administrative
direction of the courts by the chief justice; prescription of
civil and criminal jurisdiction by the legislature; vestment in
the supreme court of extensive rule-making power covering practice, procedure, and judicial administration.
;

—

Finance
An executive budget; public expenditures only in accordance with appropriations; minimum limitations on legislative
power to tax, borrow, and spend; contraction of state debt only
for projects or objects authorized by law; general flexibility
in finaricial administration.
:

Home rule for
Local Government and Intergovernmental Relations
cities and counties with provision for optional charter systems;
express authorization for the interchange of powers and functions
among local governmental units; broad express authorization for
;
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cooperative relationships, consolidation, and sharing and
transfer of functions among units of government.

Other State Functions General rather than detailed substantive provisions on governmental functions, such as education,
conservation, corporations, etc.; statement of liberal rule
of judicial construction to guard against judicial findings
of implied limitations.
;

Constitutional Change Provision for constitution amendment
and revision that permits the people, as well as the legislature, to initiate changes; express authorization for legislative proposal of amendments and constitutional conventions
automatic
(and, optionally, the constitutional initiative)
of
constitutional
referendum
on
the
question
calling
a
periodic
convention; mandatory submission of all proposed constitutional
changes to the electorate.
;

;

The Complete Constitution

This modern composite of substantive provisions has evolved from
long experience in state constitution-making.
In summary, it
guarantees both the traditional and recently emerged personal
and property rights widely acknowledged to be of sufficient fundamental importance to merit recognition in the basic law; it
extends the elective franchise on a wide base to all citizens
capable of participating in political processes; it provides for
truly representative organs of government fully empowered and
competently staffed to perform the functions of making, executing, and interpreting public policy without crippling limitations; it extends to political subdivisions full powers of local
self-government consistent with statewide interests, and authority to enter into all cooperative arrangements necessary to solve
common problems in a complex social order; it affords a sound
basis for development and use of personnel, financial, and other
resources essential for the performance of governmental functions;
and it provides procedures for constitutional change that insure
optimxim stability and flexibility.
On the whole, this composite offers a positive instrument for action and responsiveness to public needs.
It eschews traditional
limitations that prompted Henry Jones Ford as early as 190 8 to
refer to the "manacled state that puts a strait jacket cind handcuffs upon government. "7 It represents a sharp reversal from
the historic pattern of constitution-making
away from detail
and toward simplification and flexibility, yet maintaining responsibility along with responsiveness.
In short, it faces
squarely the demands, complexities, and problems of our time and
looks forward to the needs of future decades aind generations.

—
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CHAPTER XII
THE THEORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
By Roger H. Thompson

I

.

INTRODUCTION

The framers of the early American state constitutions attempted
the world's first written constitutions, and one could hardly
expect them to have understood the theoretical foundations of
constitutionalism. For example, only one-sixth of the framers
of the original Pennsylvania constitution had ever read anything on constitutional topics,! and the purported author of
the first Delav/are constitution composed that document in a
tavern without book or assistance. 2 Subsequently, however,
literally hundreds of constitutions have been written in many
states and nations, 3 and with this rise of written constitutionalism has come an increase in the understanding of the
political theory surrounding constitutions and constitutionThe puroose of this note is to attempt to supply from
making.
contemporary political thought and experience a theoretical
basis from which the framers of future state constitutions
might proceed. Those who draft modern constitutions have the
advantage of being able to draw upon the experience of past
generations and the political knowledge of the present; consequently, there should be no excuse today for attempting constitutional revision without a basic understanding of constitutional theory.
II. DRAFTING PREMISES

The drafters of a constitutional document should begin with
certain fundamental knowledge and assumptions. First, it
would be wise to understand the history of constitutionalism,
the nature of the political system in which we live, and the
function of a constitution within that system. A constitution
that bears little relationship to the actual workings of a
democracy or to the actual power and class structures within
a society is in danger of being disregarded- or overthrown.

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
Roger H. Thompson.
"The Theory of State Constitutions."
Utah Law Review (1966): pp. 542-562.
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Second, there should be an understanding of the source of
political power within our system since a constitution can
be either a vehicle for transmitting political power to a
government or a device for limiting existing governmental
power. ^ If political power inherently resides with the
government, a constitution is necessarily a limiting document, and any power not specifically denied the government
must be possessed by it.
If the source of political power
is found in an extra-governmental body--for instance, "the
people" a constitution then becomes a granting document,
and any power not specifically delegated to a government
must reside in the body granting the power originally. An
assumption regarding the source of pov.'er is essential and
basic to the tenor of a constitution because the words of
a constitution emphasize its granting or limiting nature.
It is a strange paradox in most state constitutions that
the source of political power is said to be in "the people, "^
and yet the documents themselves, for the most part, are
couched in terms that limit state governments.'
It is
logically inconsistent to limit power that was never granted.

—

Third, essential to any constitution is an understanding of
the sphere of political activity in which the government is
reouired to operate.
In a federal system like ours it is
necessary to knoxv the respective domains of and the relationship between the central and the local government in order to
provide adequate pov/er to each.

And last, a drafter of a constitution should entertain ideas
concerning a method to provide the best government while
keeping interference with individual freedom at a minimum.
Government should be effectively limited without substantially
curtailina its legitimate functions.
A. History of Constitutionalism and the

Purooses of a Constitution

Constitutionalism has been defined as a division of governmental power or as effective restraints on governmental action.
Inherent in such a definition is an assumption that all power
within a polity is capable of being concentrated in one individual or group; otherwise, power would be naturally divided.
Although Greek, Roman, and medieval institutions contained
some aspects of constitutionalism,^ it v/as not until the rise
of the nation-state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
when the power of governments became unlimited, that modern
constitutionalism began to develop.
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The unification of the nation-state was a necessary step
As the power of the church waned
tov/ard constitutionalism. 10
and the countries of western Europe became unified, the monPolitical theories
archs assumed positions of absolute power.
sovereignty
were develand
such as divine right, absolutism,
power.
The only
of
concentration
oped to rationalize this
this
during
period
limitations on the power of government
were the theoretical limitations imposed by the higher law
of God and the law of nature. 12

H

Three major forces eventually worked to bring about both more
effective restraints on the power of the monarch and the beginning of constitutionalism. First, Christianity and its
doctrine of personality emphasized the worth of the individual
Second,
in opposition to the complete supremacy of the state.
the
state
dewhose
support
upon
bourgeoisie,
the influential
own
their
further
to
pended, demanded restraints in order
personal and economic advancement. And third, the medieval
heritage of natural law provided a standard by which the
activities of the rulers might be judged. 13
In America, constitutionalism had some unique origins and
developments that represent a rare combination of political
theory and colonial experience. To the Puritan idea of

binding covenants between God and man and the Separatist
principle of individual interpretation of the scriptures,
the notion of limited government was a natural corollary. 1^
Corresponding with the theory of limited government was the
relative freedom from English control which the colonists
experienced from the inception of the colonies l^ This freedom, which was later curtailed by oppressive measures of
Parliament, instilled in the colonists the idea that government was only a necessary evil which must be restrained
to insure maximum individual liberty. 1^ Any encroachment by
government on their freedom, although often not unreasonable,
was immediately opposed. 17 The "social compact" theory of
governmental organization, in v/hich the government derived
its pov;er from the governed by agreement, was the prevailing political thought among the colonists. 18 This theory
was used to rationalize the breaking with England and the
formation of new governments based on the consent of the
The desire for v/ritten restraints contained in
governed.
a document arose, in no small degree, from the original corporate charters which gave the colonists proof of authority
from the crown and participation in the affairs of their
colonies 19
.

.

As soon as the American colonies broke from England, the
Continental Congress instructed the new states to form new
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governments,''" and most colonies wrote constitutions with
great rapidity. 21 Usually the first state constitutions
were simple documents; the most successful ones follov/ed the
basic outlines of the pre-revolutionary colonial governments 22
Because there had been great distrust of the royal governors
under the colonial rule, the early state constitutions placed
extensive authority in the legislatures, which had been the
champion of American interests against England before the
revolution.
Generally speaking, under the newly drafted constitutions the legislatures dominated the executive and judicial branches, and often, the legislatures were the sole
judges of their constitutional powers and limitations 23
.

.

Subsequent state constitutions, however, have evolved from the
simple documents to immensely complex works in which extensive
substantive and procedural limitations have effectively curtailed the activities of the legislative branch. 24
After
1837 a general reaction against the powers of the legislature
began which reached a clim.ax around the turn of the 19th century. 25
The sources of this discontent can probably be traced
to the unsound financial investments of the state legislatures
around 18 37 and their corrupt dealings v/ith corporations in
the post-Civil War era. 26 Rather than defeating corrupt
legislators at the polls, the people chose to v>?rite into
their constitutions many limitations that would help to insure against the misuse of legislative pov;er. Most of these
restrictions are still contained in our state constitutions. 27
Some of the more prevalent restrictions are:
restrictions
on state borrowing power; biennial legislative sessions; prohibitions against special and local laws; provisions requiring
bills to have only one subject, which must be expressed in
the title of the bill; and provisions allowing for referendum,
initiative, and recall. 28 These numerous restrictions upon
the state governments of today curtail many desirable and
needed functions of government along with undesirable practices.
As state governments come to be viewed as positive
and needed forces for good in a complex society, rather than
as just necessary evils, 29 present state constitutions will
becom.e more obstructive to effective government.
1.

What a Constitution Is

A constitution is a selection of legal rules that regulate a
government of a polity, 30 and in the United States, constitutions are regarded as supreme law, superior to all other
formal lav;s within the domain of the constitution's force. 31
A constitution can be amended or changed only by a procedure
apart from the ordinary law-making process, 32
and this pro-

cedure is usually quite difficult^ 33
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It is the function of a constitution to organize, to permit,
Consequently, a constitution
and to limit government.-^'*
of
the government in general
set
out
the
structure
should
terms and should define the relationship of the parts of
government to each other. A constitution should also define
the relationship between government and the individual so

that areas free from governmental interference are reserved
to private action.

A constitution should be short. ^^ Length implies specificity,
and the more specific a constitution becomes, the sooner it
will become outdated by the society it is trying to regulate.
A constitution should be general enough to allow for change
through interpretation and should permit each generation
through the courts and the legislature to give its ov;n specific direction to the basic constitutional pronouncements.-^^
A constitution should not contain legislative measures; however, most present state constitutions contain numerous legislative orovisions 37 and consequently, the average size of
the document is greater than the federal constitution. 38
Because a constitution is difficult to amend, provisions in
a constitution that are responses to specific problems, the
nature of which is likely to fluctuate with time, will, of
necessity, remain rigid while the nature of the problems
When this happens, the constitutions are often igchanges.
Therenored since their provisions are no longer applicable.
fore, only fundamental and necessary provisions should be included in a constitution, and all other laws should be left
to legislation. 39
,

What a Constitution Is Not
Drafters of state constitutions should be cognizant of the
fact that a constitution is a political document and, of
itself, provides little protection for the rights and ineffective enforcement of the limitations contained within
its pages. ^0 The provisions of a constitution are upheld
and enforced by the courts and other agencies of government,
and unless this government is responsive to the needs of
the people generally, a constitution becomes a collection
of political platitudes and ideals. '^^
A constitution, in the broad sense of the term, encompasses
more than the actual written words; it also encompasses a
general attitude on the part of the people tov;ard the functioning of our political system. ^2 it consists of public
attitudes and habits, and each generation produces a "constitution" that is significantly different in effect and
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interpretation from that of the previous generation. ^ For
instance, our oarty system has greatly changed the effect of
the separation of powers principle as it was conceptualized
at the founding of our country, ^
and the electoral college
has become a useless institution. ^ The rise of executive
authority, the widening of the electorate, and the change in
the relationship betv;een the national government and the
states have all produced significant alterations in our
political system, and all have occurred outside but alongside
the written constitutions. ^^ Therefore, writers of constitutions today should not consider a constitution as a panacea
for poor and ineffective government nor c.s an indelible blueprint for good and effective administration.
It can, however,
be an effective instrument in shaping the general form of the
government and in making government responsive to the needs
of the governed.
The framers of state constitutions should also be av;are that
everyone, to some extent, is a creature of self-interest and
naturally desires a form of government responsive to his particular needs. ^"^ Even the founding fathers of this country,
who created a masterful constitution, were not entirely without selfish motives as they constructed the form of government
for the nation. 48 The strength of the United States Constitution, unlike the constitutions of many other nations, lies in
the fact that it is considered supreme law by most Americans.
To some extent this is because no social class is denied its
share of political power; consequently, the Constitution is
°
still effective as a basis for peaceful settlement of disputes.
Likewise, state constitutions should reflect the needs and
desires of all classes in order to have the respect and reverence
of the entire community.
But, the history of state governments
has been one of domination by pressure groups to the detriment
of the public which has little organized representation,^^ and
therefore, the framers of state constitutions should attempt
to represent all classes of people.

B.

The Source of Political Power

In a constitutional republic like our ovm it is difficult
to isolate the source of political power.
John Madison
in the debates over the federal constitution said that "people,
not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty ." ^-^ De
Tocqueville in describing the genius of American government
stated that true sovereignty resided in "the people. "^^ /^n
of our state constitutions contain express language to the
effect that all political power is inherent with "the people"
or is in "the people. "53 And yet, the vast majority of courts
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have held that the state constitutions are a limitation on
state power and not the source thereof. ^'^ Thus, it would
appear that in the opinion of the courts, the state, not
"the people," originally possessed inherent political pov;er.

Sovereignty
The term "sovereignty" originated with the French philosopher,
Jean Bodin.^^
It was used by him as a tool for overcoming
the civil disorder and anarchy which grew out of the religBodin hoped to
ious \;ars in France in the 16th century.
overcome disunity and strife through a sovereign monarch by
declaring that in a state there must be a power strong enough
Bodin 's
to give lav; to all, v/ith or v;ithout their consent.
sovereign was bound by a natural law, but eventually Hobbes
and Spinoza made their concept of sovereignty a part of their
theory of natural lav; and thereby removed any remaining conThe modern statement of the
trol upon the sovereign pov7er.56
meaning of sovereignty was voiced by John Austin as he was
trying to justify parliamentary supremacy over the principles
of the common lav;. ^"7
According to Austin, there is in every
society "a supreme, absolute, uncontrolled power which has
the final decision with regard to the enactment and formulation of legal rules, "58 and this power is subject to no
higher authority.

Various v;riters have sought to adjust the concept of sovereignty to the constitutional form of government, but their
attempts have been less than successful because there is no
Bodin 's classical
unlimited power under a constitution. 59
definition of sovereignty--the supreme power over a territory
and its inhabitants--would appear to be the most accepted
theory of international sovereignty today, but even this
formulation implies a power unrestrained by any lav7 or rule
made by any other power on earth. ^^ Thus, it would seem
that constitutionalism, vi;hich means a limitation and a diffusion of power, is by its very nature incompatible with the
idea of sovereignty, and that the term sovereignty served a
purpose only in the pre-constitutional era in bringing about
national unification. 61 Therefore, if government under a
constitution is not sovereign but can be limited by the terms
of a document that is made by a body outside of government,
the government cannot be the single source of political pov;er.
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2.

Popular Sovereignty

Even the concept that sovereignty resides v/ith the people
in the estabv/ould appear to have little basis in fact. 62
lishment of the federal constitution it must be remembered
that the founding fathers were as apprehensive about democracy or majority rule as they v/ere about absolutism, and
government tyranny. 6 3 The balance that they struck through
the devices of a federal government, representation, and
separation of powers, all had the effect of insulating the
government from "the people." John Adams, \>7hose ideas and
writings greatly influenced the form of the state and federal constitutions, was of the opinion that the constitution
of Massachusetts should not be submitted to the people. ^^
Also according to Adams, the original justification for the
two chambers of the legislative branch was to neutralize
the democratic elements in the House with the aristocratic
elements of the Senate. ^^ Certainly these ideas qualify
the concepts of popular sovereignty.
It is interesting to note that the first constitutions of the
thirteen original states were by no means the product of "the
people." No state elected a special constitutional convention as is now the custom. ^^ Nor were any constitutions submitted to the people for ratification, even though the Continental Congress recommended such a procedure. Most of the
states did hold special legislative elections in which the
writing of a constitution was contemplated, but three states
Moreover, the majority
did not even hold special elections.
the people at all but
represent
not
did
the
legislatures
of
were similar in nature to the malapportioned, undemocratic
colonial assemblies. 67 More recently, only 19 per cent of
the population of Oklahoma, 8 per cent of the population of
Arizona, and 14 per cent of the population of New Mexico had
a voice in the adoption of the constitutions of those states. ^^
In addition, even though the idea of a constitutional convention and popular ratification is the rule, ten states do not
provide for a constitutional convention and sixteen states
do not require ratification of a proposed constitution. ^9
Therefore, oopular sovereignty appears to be altnost a meaningless term.
3

We the People

That all political power was held "by the people" was almost
universally assumed in 18th-century America and little, if any,
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Most philosophers of the
debate occurred on this topic. ^0
16th and 17th centuries thought that the people in a democracy v.'ould run the government with an eye out for their best
interests just as the kings and aristocrats had in the past.''^
But "the people" in a democracy in reality have very little
to do with the running of the government.
There arc great
segments of the population v;ho neither know nor care to know
how the government is operated.'^ Even if there are those
who know and care, there is often no connection whatsoever
between popular consensus and the course of government action. "73
Moreover, were popular opinion determinative in guiding
public acts, it is impossible even for political experts,
who are paid to be informed, to know everything about the
workings of government. ^4 Certainly, the public cannot be
expected to be knowle;dgeable on all governmental issues.
Nevertheless, "the people" in a constitutional government do
possess some politicc.l pov/er, and it is probably true, as
Wheare suggests, tha": "the supremacy of the people as lav/giver
is recognized in the United States so far as the Constitution
is concerned. ""7 5
Jcihn Locke did not consider all political
power to be in "the people" when government was functioning,
but did recognize their role v;hen legitimate government
ceased.
He postulatea that in every community there would
be a group of citizens, not necessarily the majority, v/ho
would resist the arbitrary dominion and control the government, and that these citizens would exercise a residuary
power in forming a new government and a new constitution as
existing government ce?ised."76
Friedrich calls this small
group with the residuary power the "constituent group. ""77
When a government is functioning and in most other situations '°
"the people" as such do not make the decisions of government
.

In the ordinary process of government, democracy functions
without the aid of the public except for votes on major
issues.
Our democracy has been defined as a "competitive
political system in v/hich competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way
that the public can participate in the decision-making process. ""^9
The public cannot take action in our system, but can
only respond to the initiative of government or of small
groups, who, through good organization and leadership, raise
political conflicts because of their special interests. °^
The vote of the general public is decisive especially v;hen
the issues are simple and the alternatives clear.
Therefore,
the idea that all political power rests with "the people"
does not correspond to political realities.
This does not
mean that democracy has failed; it only means that our
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definition of it was incomplete and fallacious.
Unless
government dissolves, the only power "the people" exercise
is the decision-makinq pov/er on major issues at the polls,
and this pov/er, as important as it may be, comprises only
a small portion of the ultimate power of the state.
VThere the Source of Power Resides

From the foregoing discussion it would appear that political
power in a constitutional state lies totally neither in the
government nor with the people but somewhere in between.
It
is true that the constituent group through the constitutionmaking process can set the bounds of governmental action and
prescribe its method of operation, and yet "the people" give
up whatever power they had, and they must rely on the government for enforcement of the constitution. 81 Not only is the
government bound through the constitution, but so are "the
people" since the constitution can be amended only through
the method provided therein. 82
"The people" have, by ratification, given up their right to revolt and change the government by forceful means. 83

—

For pragmatic reasons, however, constitution framers should
assume that all political power is possessed inherently by
the state.
If one assumes that the people possess all political power, a state constitution must contain almost innumerable grants of power since the activities of state governments are pervasive.
It is much simpler to limit existing
power through a constitution than to enumerate spheres of
permissible activity. 84 Once the constitution is written
and adopted, the public has only the power to choose between
alternatives at the polls. Power that is denied government
cannot be exercised by "the people" since "the people," as a
whole, cannot take any action as such.°^ It v;ould seem,
therefore, that either the people have initially the pov;er
to limit government through the constitution or they must
necessarily, through the constitution, give up most of their
power to the government, since they retain very little.
Since
it is easier to draft a limiting document, the former alternative is preferable.
In addition, it should be noted that a
government is always antecedent to a constitution and a constitution represents a refinement of that pre-existing government. 8 6
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C.

Division of Pov/er Betv/een the
Federal and State Governinents

In a federal system of government the political power that is
not denied government is exercised through the distributed
between the central and the local governments in the United
States, either through the federal government in Washington
or the governments in the several states.
Framers of state
constitutions should understand this distribution of functions in terms of present constitutional law and theory so
that adequate powers might not be denied the states.

—

Under the Articles of Confederation it v/as provided that each
state in the federation was to retain its absolute sovereignty.^'
The theory of the sovereignty of the states represented
a departure from the spirit of tlie Declaration of Independence
and the subseauent federal constitution, since those documents
were not founded on the action of state governments, but
rather on the action of the people of the Union as a v/hole.^^
It v;as generally conceded during the debates of the Constitutional Convention that the national government under the
Constitution would be the ultimate authority in the country
and that the states would no longer be sovereign in the sense
that they v;ere under the Articles of Confederation.^^ James
Madison made this statement:

Conceiving that an individual independence of the
States is utterly irreconcilable with their aggregate sovereignty, and that a consolidation of the
whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable, I have sought for
middle ground, v/hich may at once support a due
supremacy of the national authority, and not exclude the local authorities wherever they can be
subordinately useful. ^*^
Generally speaking, present constitutional law now follows
Madison's scheme.
Under Chief Justice Marshall there was no doubt that the Supreme
Court of the United States considered the federal government
superior to the states, 91 but under Chief Justice Taney the
Court enunciated the doctrine of dual sovereignty, which was
more favorable to state pov;er.9 2
por a great length of time
the tenth amendment, v;hich reserves to the states those
powers not delegated to the United States government, v/as
used by the Court for invalidating national legislation that
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purportedly invaded the exclusive sphere of state police
power. 5 3 Hox-;ever, beginning with United States v. Darbij^^
the tenth amendment has become advisory and no longer a
mandatory provision of the Constitution, and the concept
of dual sovereignty has been overruled.
Thus, the problem
of the distribution of pov;er between the federal government
and the states has been decided in favor of the federal government. Although the division of pov/er between the states
and the federal government will continue to be a hotly contested political problem, constitutionally speaking, there
is almost no area of traditional state activity from which
Congress is excluded. ^5

From the standpoint of political science, Friedrich has said
that once the "people" of a federation, and not just the
states composing the federation, ratify a federal constitution, creating a whole from which no state can secede, there
is in reality only one government whose powers are divided
between the national and the state levels.
The fact that such constitutional charters declare the local units "sovereign" does not need
to disturb the political scientist; wo have in
such declarations simply a verbal concession to
those v7ho might oppose the establishment of the
union--a concession to which nothing real corresponds. 96
In terms of constitutional law and political theory, then, it
is apparent that the development of our country has followed
the plan of Madison and the states are included in the scheme

of government wherever they can be useful;
ernment, nevertheless, is supreme.

the federal gov-

Because of the growing complexity of our economy and the conttinuing ineffectiveness of the state government in many areas,
there have been those who have advocated the abolition of the
states altogether in favor of one central crovernment ^7
These people contend that only the federal government can
overcome the disparity between the rich and poor states,
that minorities are better protected under the central government, that there is greater adm.inistrative efficiency and
better paid personnel in Washington, and that only the national legislature can handle the complex and the expensive
local problems. 98
.

Regardless of tlic merits of these arguments, the consolidation
of the states into one whole, as Madison said, would be

-242-

THE THEORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

inexpedient and probably unattainable. ^° Some of the conventional arguments for continuing our present system of
federalism are: mistakes which inevitably occur in government are confined to the states and can be corrected without
affecting the whole; voters are permitted to choose one
party nationally and another locally; overcentralization of
the federal government is conducive to waste, duplication,
and inefficiency; and local, special problems cannot always
be solved by uniform programs .l*^*^ In addition, federalism
allov;s experimentation on the local level, which, if successful, can be applied to national or other state problems, and
federalism allov/s for greater participation in government.
Furthermore, it would seem that the national government has
enough to do in trying to solve problems of a national
character without having to contend with those of a local
nature. 101

Federalism is an added restraint on the central government,
for the states are quite hesitant to give up any of their
vested powers, and independent governments can freely criticize each other; so although in certain areas the functioning
of federalism is far from efficient, it does offer an additional protection for liberty. 102
The present trend seems to be a type of cooperative federalism
in v;hich the taxing power of the federal government is made
available to the states through grants-in-aid and through
which increased state leadership in promoting the general
welfare is encouraged. 10 3
Perhaps the reapportionment of
the state legislatures through the impetus of the decisions
of the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr^^^ and Reynolds v.
Simms'^^^ will make the states more responsive to urban demands and will lessen the appeals by the cities to the federal government for assistance 106 jn any event, federalism
is advantageous, and the states still have many important
functions to perform.
.

Framers of future state constitutions should therefore assume
that the federal government is the ultimate authority and
that the state governments are constitutionally subordinate
to the central government.
It is imperative, under this
assumption, that the state constitutions allow the state
governments to exercise their maximtim permissible powers
in order that the federal system may remain a reality in
America.
Numerous constitutional restrictions have prohibited the states from achieving their full potential, and as
a result, the federal government has filled the gap.
As
Chief Justice Warren has said:
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When the state governments fail to satisfy the
needs of the people, the people appeal to the
Federal Government. Whether the question is
one of the advancement of human knov/ledge
through research, of lav; and order, or the right
of all persons to equal protection of the law,
the Federal Government need become involved only
when the states fail to act. 107
The framers of state constitutions should reappraise the
nineteenth-century constitutional limitations and should retain
only those which are essential to the preservation of liberty.
Instead of relying upon constitutional limitations, which
create bad government by hampering good government, it would
seem advisable to strengthen the legislature and encourage
reliable citizens, who will be responsive to the needs of the
public, to run for state offices.

Effective Limitations on Government Pov/er
If the framers of state constitutions are to proceed on the
assumption that all political power is inherent in the state
unless restricted in the constitution, and if the state constitutions are to be liberalized to give states adequate authority and responsibility, the rights of the individual must
in some way be protected against a potentially oppressive
government. There are certain constitutional devices v;hich
help to protect the individual v/ithout unduly restricting the
beneficial operation of government--devices whose combined
effectiveness has withstood the test of time.

1.

The Bill of Rights

Theoretically, at least, a bill of rights defines spheres of
individual activity free from encroachment by agents or agencies
of government. '-0^ The constituent group drafting these bills
of rights considers them so fundamental to liberty that government is permanently restricted from engaging in any activity
that might infringe upon them. 109 The rights contained in the
federal constitution and earlier, in the original state constitutions, had diverse origins in the English common law and
in the experience of the colonists under British rule. HO
The substantive content of a bill of rights should depend UDon
the attitudes of the framers.
However, the basic rights
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included in the bills of rights in the states have varied
little from those expressed in the federal constitution, and
one might conclude that there is substantial agreement in
the nation regarding the content of a bill of rights.
The
Model State Constitution lists seven basic sections in its
bill of rights v/hich include: no establishment of religion;
free exercise of religion; freedom of speech, press, assembly,
and petition; due process and equal protection; freedom from
unlawful searches and seizures; rights of accused persons;
and a restriction against political tests for public office. HI
Other rights found in the federal Bill of Rights are the
right to bear arms, the right to be free from unlawful
quartering of soldiers in times of peace, prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishments, and the right to compensation for pronerty taken for public use. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations includes
the right to employment, the right to be protected against
economic hardships of illness and old age, and the right to
full enjoyment of civil rights. '-^^
Some states may wish to
include the last mentioned rights in their constitutions as
they become enforceable through modern social legislation,
but the comment to the Model State Constitution recommends
that a bill of rights contain only those rights that are
presently recognized in order to give authority to the document as a v;hole.ll3

Although most of the fundamental rights contained in the
federal Bill of Rights have been extended to the states
through the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment, H^ there v-/ould still seem to be a need for the
states to have a bill of rights in their constitutions.
In
the first place, not all of the rights in the Bill of Rights
have been extended to the states. H^ Second, the states
should be allov;ed the privilege of sotting standards higher
than the minimum requirements set by the Supreme Court.
In
an age of increasing population and technology and expanding
governmental influence, new approaches to the preservation
of personal privacy need to be found, and some experimentation
in the states in this area would be advantageous.
And third,
with state bills of rights the citizen of the state tends to
look first to his state government for protection and has a
standard of conduct with which to judge his state government H'^
.

It must be remembered, hov/ever, that the rights contained in
any bill of rights are merely political in nature, and a responsible government is necessary for their enforcement .''
History is replete v;ith examples of governmental disregard of
individual rights, 118 and state courts, in particular, have
been reticent in granting full protection to the individual
in keeping with the state constitutions 119
Indeed, a bill of
rights in itself is not sufficient limitation on government
to fully protect personal liberty.
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Seoaration of Powers
Mr. Justice Brandeis has stated:

The doctrine of the separation of powers was
adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of powers among
three departments, to save the people from autocracy. 120
The doctrine of separation of pov/ers is a mainstay of constitutionalism. Although earlier v;riters had expounded upon
theories of separated government 121 it was Montesquieu v;ho
advocated the division of government into executive, legislative, and judicial functions, and it was he v.'ho greatly
influenced the form of the i\merican government 122 -j'he
American experience conformed to Montesquieu's theories,
which were based on his imaginary observations of English
government 123
The colonists had their own representative
assemblies, the executive was the royal governor, and there
v;ere colonial courts.
Because control of the latter tv>70
departments was under royal authority, it is not surprising
that the independent American states insisted upon separation of pov;ers.l24
,

.

.

Friedrich maintains that the wisdom of the doctrine of separation of powers rests not only in 18th-century political
thought but is also substantiated through modern experience. 125
Government powers, he says, fall quite naturally into three
categories.
Every government needs to make specific decisions and commands involving singular occurrences, make
general rule-making decisions that affect an indefinite number
of occurrences, and make decisions that transform the general
rule into a specific instance.
These three decision-making
functions correspond to the functions of the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial departments respectively.
It
is significant that even some administrative agencies that
exercise all three functions divide their departments along
these three decision-making lines.
For example, the Interstate
Commerce Commission is so structured that the administrative
decisions are made by one Commissioner, quasi- judicial decisions by three commissioners, and quasi-legislative decisions
by the entire Commission.
Thus it would appear that the basic
principle of separation of pov/ers, while evolving from the
English and American experience, has empirical validity in
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pragmatic application. 126 -p^e unfavorable results of the early
state constitutions which vested concentrated power in the
legislature and v/hich subordinated the executive and judicial
departments, v/ere readily apparent. 127
Fundamental to the theory of separation of power is the idea
that a combination of functions by one branch is detrimental
to freedom.
An executive who could make laws would be a
desDot; a legislature that could execute the laws could exempt
itself from obedience to the lar/s.
With the advent of political parties, however, there has been a strong tendency
toward cooperation between the executive and the legislature,
and the doctrine of separation of powers has lost some of its
significance. 128 However, the two departments still exercise
different functions and owe allegiance to different constituencies so that there remains an effective check between the
two, especially with a strong two-party system.
Because state constitutions have been written on the theory
that political power is in the people and that such pov/er is
delegated to the three distinct departments, it has been
assumed that the three departments must remain distinct and
separate and that the legislature, in particular, was an agent
of "the people" and could not delegate its lavz-making power
to do so would be a breach of the trust of the people. 129
Nevertheless, it is a mistake for framers of state constitutions to make the doctrine of separation of powers and the
implied theory of nondelegation too rigid or specific. 130
It was never intended that the three departments should be
completely separated into three distinct departments but
rather, that in some areas, responsibility would be shared. 1^1
The checks and balances built into most constitutions presuppose that government functions, in minor respects, are
interrelated and interdependent. Thus the veto pov/er, budget
control, approval of executive appointments, impeachment
proceedings, pardon, and judicial review are all devices in
which government power is shared. That law-making pov/er
cannot be generally delegated has been largely rejected
today, 132 since the necessity, in contemporary government,
for experts with specialized knov;ledge, the need for specialization and continuity, the need for flexible and sympathetic
administration, and need to handle the volume of cases, all
require that certain functions of government be delegated to
special agencies or commissions 133 Indeed, such a delegation of power need not be vieivod as a delegation of pov;er
at all but rather as a further separation of powers by reference to the technological context of a particular function 13^^
No constitution should unnecessarily restrict the delegation
of functions to specialized agencies by a mere overstatement
of the separation doctrine.
.

.
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Separation of powers is a useful device for organizing government and for creating a check between branches of government, but, like a bill of rights, is not, of itself, sufficient obstruction to ambitious men in power.
Judicial Reviev;
It is strange that the most potent force in controlling unconstitutional acts of government-- judicial review--is not
referred to specifically in the federal constitution. Article VI does state that the Constitution v;ill be the supreme
law of the land and that state judges must support it, but
at the inception of this country there was still some question
whether the judicial department could declare acts of the
other departments unconstitutional 135
Perhaps specific
reference to judicial reviev; was omitted because it v/as
assumed by most that the courts in the exercise of their
natural function would be the instrument for upholding the
Constitution. Even before Marhury v. Madison,^^^ v.'hich firmly
established judicial reviev;, it was not uncommon for state
courts to declare acts of legislatures void, 137 a^^ the prevalent feeling prior to the Revolution v;as that the English
constitution was antecedent and superior to statute.
The debates of the federal conventionl39 and Hamilton's
clear discussion in The Federalist^^^ point to the belief
that judicial reviev; v;ould be a necessary part of the nev;
government under the Constitution.
.

Intrinsic to the theory of judicial review is the belief that
constitutions are fundamental lav/.l'^l Any legislative or
governmental acts are, by definition, inferior to the provisions of the constitution, and the courts, in adjudicating
controversies betvjeen individuals and the government, must
decide in favor of the constitution in case of conflicts.
Thus the judiciary attempts to act, not only as a guardian
of the constitution in relation to the governed, but also as
a neutral arbiter in maintaining a separation of powers if
one branch of government should gain predominance. ^^ 2 -phe
strength of the judiciary should be found in its complete
independence of political and popular pressures and in its
general competence in the lav;. 14 J
Therefore, if the pov;ers
of the legislature and the executive are expanded by removing
the present constitutional restrictions, the judiciary should
continue to be independent and strong in order that constitutional safeguards might be preserved.
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III.

CONCLUCION

An attempt has been made to discuss some dominant themes
surrounding constitutional theory and to do so in light of
It has been suggested
contemporary problems and knowledge.
that the ideas of state and popular sovereignty have become
meaningless terms, and although the source of political
power in a constitutional democracy is found to lie somev/here between the people and the government, for the purpose
of state constitution-making it is best to proceed on the
assumption that the state has all the pov/er that is not
specifically denied it. And from a constitutional standpoint, the citizens of the United States are governed by
one government with pov/ers distributed betv;een the state
and the federal levels; the people have retained only nominal pov;ers in themselves, and all pov;er not of national
scope is presently left to the states.

Although to this point it has been assumed that v/ritten
state constitutions are necessary, it is interesting to
speculate v;hether states need them at all. The major constitutional restraints so far considered would probably
The federal Bill of
exist without a v;ritten constitution.
Rights has been extended, in great part, to the states
through the fourteenth amendment 144 and the state judges
Thereare reauired to support the federal constitution. 1'*^
constitufore, an omission of a bill of rights in a state
tion would not be likely to decrease the rights of the individual.
The doctrine of separation of powers, although
implicit in our constitutions, has been v/eakened through
In the absence of a written
the rise of political parties.
constitution, the states, like Britain, would likely rely
on the countervailing force of political parties to maintain a limitation on government 1^6 Judicial review has
become such a part of our political system, 1^7 even without
specific provisions in our constitutions, that this institution would most probably remain even if written state constitutions did not. Moreover, from a constitutional standpoint, the states have really become a subordinate arm of
the national government 1^^
Therefore, it would seem that
the states could exist and function without a v;ritten constitution, especially since so many of our important governmental procedures are not of constitutional origin. 149
,

.

.

However, the idea of v.'ritten constitutions has become so much
a part of the American tradition, that it is highly unlikely
that an electorate v;ould be content without a constitution.
Certainly a state constitution can be useful in organizing
the government and giving it a general form.
Without a
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constitution, procedures like the executive veto, impeachment,
and the election requirements for government officials v.'ould
possible change in favor of the legislature. There would be
nothing wrong with a parliamentary system of government per so
if the legislature would be responsive to the public generally,
However, a constitution is imperative unless it is generally
believed that the people's reoresentativcs can be trusted, and
unless the population is fairly homogeneous, is rooted in
common tradition, and is, by nature, opposed to change. 150

Because the need for government services is increasing, tlie
states must be equipped to exercise fully their powers under
our present system.
In reviewing our outdated state constitutions and in doing away with unnecessary restrictions, a balance must be achieved between effective and efficient government and the protection of the individual. Through the effective use of the traditional concepts of separation of
powers and checks and balances, of a formulation of individual
rights, and of independent judicial review, it is contended
that this balance can be achieved.
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CHAPTER XIII
THE IDEAL STATE CONSTITUTION
By John P. Wheeler, Jr.

Framing an "ideal" constitution which any one or all of the
states could adopt in toto is impossible. A constitution
like all human institutions must grow out of the history, the
traditions, the peculiar problems, the felt needs of the
political community. Each of the 50 states reflects differences from others, each possesses its own personality, its
It is
own traits and certainly its own political structure.
fruitless then for the reformer to search for a constitution
Yet
that can serve unmodified as a model for every state.
there are principles of sound constitutional structure which
apply to all 50 states, principles which may be implemented
in different ways but which provide common guidelines to the
development of modern constitutions.
The ideal state constitution expresses fundamental law, law
which is basic in providing the foundation for a political
The term "fundamental"
system and the powers of government.
is perhaps ambiguous, for no hard and fast definition of the
term can be given.
It is usually contrasted with "statutory"
law, the product of the legislature as that body pursues the
daily task of meeting the common problems of the community.
Generally speaking, fundamental law possesses greater permanence, is less detailed, requires fewer changes to keep it
up-to-date than does statutory law. Statutory law deals with
the emerging social, economic and political problems faced
by the state within the broader framework of the governmental
machinery and the "rules of the political game" established
by the constitution.
The major function of a constitution is threefold:
(1)

To protect the people in the exercise of their civil
liberties

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
John P. Wheeler, Jr. (Ed.).
"The Ideal State Constitution."
From "Introduction" in Salient Issues of Constitutional
Revision pp. xi-xvii. New York: National Municipal League,
,

1961.
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(2)

To define the powers of government,

(3)

To establish the more important, the more permanent institutions of government, such as the
executive, the legislative and the judicial.

—

Perhaps a fourth should be added to provide a method for
Certainly the perfect constichanging the fundamental law.
tutional document has not been written nor is it likely to
be.
A process for amendment must be provided to permit the
correction of errors which experience is sure to bring out
as well as adjustment to constantly changing circumstances.
In writing a constitution the watchword, cited by President
Robert E. Blake for the Missouri convention of 194 3, is
brevity--"brevity in our discourse and discussion--brevity
in time and brevity in the document which we shall submit to
It is a constitution which is being prepared,
the people."!
The ideal state constitution short and
not a code of laws.

—

general--reflects citizen trust of government and citizen
assumption of responsibility. Such a constitution vests
broad powers in the representatives of the people and- holds
them responsible through democratic, electoral processes.
STATE CONSTITUTIONS TODAY
Few contemporary state constitutions approximate the ideal.
Most are lengthy documents, replete with statutory materials
and unnecessary and unjustified restrictions on state government, cluttered with obsolete and sometimes inconsistent
A blanket
statements, badly written and illogically arranged.
indictment of state constitutions cannot be sustained but
most of them are subject to one or more of these criticisms.^
The early state constitutions more nearly reflected ideal standards.
They were brief documents which allowed broad power
to the legislature and provided simple electoral devices for
keeping the legislators responsible. Still smarting from
colonial experiences, however, their authors showed strong
hostility to executive and judicial powers. Connecticut's
first constitution contained only 1,500 words. New York's
3,000.
True, the problems faced then were relatively simple
compared with today's and the spirit of laissez faire which
dominated the thinking of that period contributed to keeping
government simple for it was called upon to do little. Yet
the constitutions of our early history provide helpful models
for consideration today.
"Significantly, our briefest and
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in many respects our best state constitutions tend to be
either the oldest or the latest. "3

Today's constitutions are not modeled on those of American's
early history but rather upon those of the latter half of
The period from 1870 to 1910 was one
the nineteenth century.
of great constitution-making in this country great in terms
During this period 42 states
of quantity, not of quality.
they held 128
old
constitutions;
adopted new or revised
many
of these resulted
course,
constitutional conventions. Of
period
in the South;
from the turmoil of the Reconstruction
regardless of
But
from
new
entering
the
Union.
others
states
long,
were
efforts
the reasons, most of products of these
detailed and restrictive constitutions.

—

Why did this change in the constitutional pattern occur? There
The latter part of the
are probably several explanations.
nineteenth century produced a growing disillusionment with public officials generally and with legislators particularly.
The rapid expansion of governments to meet the demands of the
Civil War and the postwar industrial expansion provided unparalleled opportunities for corruption. Scandals poured
forth from many of our state legislatures, public ethics dropped precipitately and the people grew increasingly suspicious
The people
and critical of their representative institutions.
sought protection against irresponsible government by denying
the power to govern.
So the majority of our present constitutions were framed in an atmosphere which encouraged creation
of a framework not to facilitate governmental action but to
hamper it.

The notion is still too widely accepted that the only insurance against irresponsible government is constitutional restraint; that, for example, the only defense against a legislature spending a state into bankruptcy is a constitutional
restriction on the power to appropriate. This approach has
consistently proved self-defeating for it has prevented states
It
from meeting the changing needs of a dynamic society.
is better to give power to the organs of government and then
to seek means to keep public officials honest and responsible
The constitution is a poor place
than to deny them power.
to seek complete insurance against irresponsible government.
There can be no substitute for a wise, concerned, informed
and active citizenry.
Of course, we should not ignore the promotion of the cluttered and restrictive constitution made and still being made by
interest groups. To protect particular programs in which
they are interested they seek to imbed them in the fundamental law of the state, thus tying the hands of future
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legislative majorities which may wish to reconsider such
programs in the light of changing circumstances. State
constitutions are replete with statutory materials. Tax
revenues are earmarked for particular purposes, removing
them from legislative control. Administrative agencies are
constitutionally created limitng legislative and executive
control over their structure and activities.
Dozen of
administrative and judicial positions--some anachronistic,
many grossly inefficient are granted constitutional isolation
from effective public scrutiny and control.
Specific policies
abound, some quite ridiculous in nature.

—

Even where sutticient public support can be mobilized to
change policies the time-consuming, often laborious, process
of amendment must be followed.
Not only does this place a
premium on minority power since extraordinary majorities
are usually required for constitutional changes--but where
successful the amendment process adds to the clutter and confusion in the document.
Alabama's constitution of 1901 now
has 153 amendments.
California's 70,000-word document has
336.
The 74-year-old basic law of Florida at last count contained 110, while that of her immediate neighbor to the north
has had over 30 added in its short life of sixteen years
plus over 100 of local application onlyl
Of course, Louisiana's is^ in a class by itself with over 200,000 words and
406 amendments since 1921, but New Yorkers have added some
147 changes to their 1894 document and South Carolinians 239
to their document, age 65.
In all, seven state constitutions
have over 100 amendments, exactly half more than 50, and
only three less than ten.

—

Compare these developments with our national experience. The
United States Constitution with its 6,700 words has required
only 23 amendments in its 172 years, a fact which stimulated
the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Kestnbaum
Commission) to comment that:
It is significant that the constitution prepared by the
Founding Fathers, with its broad grants of authority
and avoidance of legislative detail, has withstood the
test of time far better than the constitutions later
adopted by the states .4

NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
But the question might be raised. Why worry about the
constitution? Has the state not survived thus far? If the
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constitution is as old as it is, it must be serving a worthy
purpose. Why modernize?
Majority Rule vs Minority Control

A needlessly complicated constitutional structure will not
only hamstring majority rule--an essential ingredient of the
democratic way of life--but may very well establish rule
Of course, the principle of limitby entrenched minorities.
government
fundamental
is
to our political tradition and
ed
provided
proper
we have
means for giving expression to it.
and the system of separation of
example,
bills
rights
For
of
powers are means of limiting the scope of governmental effort
and preventing abuse of power.
Such restrictions we accept.
But we can carry the restrictive approach too far and make
it impossible for any majority to rule.
A disintegrated
executive branch diffuses responsibility and control and
makes it difficult for the people to supervise its activities
properly.
Such a system provides many havens for irresponsible public officials to hide from the searchlights of
citizen control.
The complicated legislative process can defy the majority
will.
Someone once counted 28 steps in the typical legislative process--28 points at which decisions are made affect
The majority
ing the course of the policy being considered.
to carry this policy through must win at every step; the
minority has to control but one to block all action. The
more complicated the legislative process the greater the
obstacles to majority action. American political processes
make dfficult simple majority rule that is, decision-making
by majority, of 50 per cent plus one.
But our political
beliefs are contrary to rule by minorities. Too many of our
state constitutions contain provisions that contribute
dangerously to the latter.

—

The Costs of Government
The states are fiscally suffering from growing pains.
The
rapid increase in and concentration of population, the
increasing tempo of industrialization, the rising demands
for new services and higher standards--all are contributing
to the financial pressures on the states.
Yet too often
the cost of financing legitimate needs is increased by
continuing restrictive constitutional provisions. At the
same time that the financing of private automobiles, homes
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and television sets is being simplified, the financing of
public services continues to follow complex and outmoded
procedures. A constitutional framework must be provided
to permit the development of sound fiscal policies and to
facilitate the financing of needed programs.
The States in the Federal System

Have state constitutions contributed to the weakening of
the states in our federal system? The oft-quoted Kestnbaum
Commission thought so:

Early in its study, the commission was confronted with
the fact that many state constitutions restrict the
scope, effectiveness and adaptability of state and local
action.
These self-imposed constitutional limitations
make it diffuclt for many states to perform all of the
services their citizens require and consequently have
frequently been the underlying cause of state and
municipal pleas for federal assistance .5
Henry Jones Ford thought so in 19 08. Ford pointed to the
accelerated passage of governmental responsibility from state
to nation--even at that time but he insisted that the states
were little justified in protesting since they lack the abilHe referred
ity to deal with the problems being transferred.
to the "manacled state the state that puts a strait- jacket
Lacking the ability or
and handcuffs upon government."^
willingness--to treat a problem does not eliminate the problem,
When the states are unable or refuse to act the people will
Most of our states
turn naturally to the federal government.
lack the constitutional elbow room for confronting and solving
many problems of the mid- twentieth century.

—

—

—

The claimed great values of American federalism are its provision for local initiative, its protections against dangerous centralization and the opportunities it affords for cooperative relationships among the states and between the
states and the federal government.
Yet the advances in this
century have been made largely through concentration of
powers and functions in Washington--sometimes at the expense
of the states.
The main defense against this has been the
always negative, sometimes hypocritical, cry of "states'
rights." But a negative defense for the states is insufficient.
In an age in which national and world conditions
make strong and active government inevitable the argument
for states' rights unsuppocn-id by deeds that increase the
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scope and effectiveness of state actions is likely to do
more damage to the states than to the national government,
As John E. Bebout once wrote:
The question ... is simply whether or not enough
people can be led to see that they have a greater
interest in organizing the states to be active,
effective instruments of government in the modern
age than in using them primarily as brakes on the
total job of government. ...
If this cannot be
done, there is no use talking any more either about
states rights or about the states as the active
guardians of decentralization and local self-government they have always been assumed to he J
'

The authors of this volume are not joining the chorus of
those who bemoan expansion of governmental activity in this
country.
They appreciate the role that government can play
in the solution of our social problems, in the raising
of our standard of living and in securing the blessing of
liberty.
The statements above should not be read as critiThe concern here
cisms of all contemporary developments.
is not with the development of the states as bulwarks
against governmental action but rather with the strengthening of the states so that they may more adequately
participate in our system of government. Our belief is
that the only way to preserve any useful "braking" power
in the states is to provide them sufficient capacity for
action to make it reasonable to give state action a try
before turning to Washington. We do fear that excessive
weakness in the states may force all important decisions to
be made at the center which could come to mean excessive
and headlong government.
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WHY REVISE OUR STATE CONSTITUTIONS

CHAPTER XIV
THE CENTRAL ISSUES

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

— WHAT

FOR?

By John E. Bebout*

In the last analysis there is only one salient or "central
issue" in state constitutional revision.
That issue can be
set forth in the form of a question:
What kind of state
government is constitutional reform intended to promote and
support? More specifically, is the constitution to be
changed to provide a legal underpinning for active, dynamic
government or is it to be changed mainly to curb governmental activity and control the exercise of the powers of
government?

Answers to these questions will depend on attitudes toward
such matters as the basic philosophy of government, the place
of the states in the federal system and the viability of the
particular state as a base for meaningful and responsible
politics concerned with vital issues of public policy.
Finally, the answer may depend upon an issue of constitutional ethics; this is, on a conception of what it is legitimate to attempt to accomplish by specific constitutional
provision and what ought to be left to the day-to-day processes of politics and government.
The various specific salient issues discussed in this book
can be readily related to the central issue just stated.
In general the authors have associated themselves with the
following attitudes:
1.

Constitutions ought to be written or rewritten so
as to facilitate active and dynamic state and local
government.

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
John E. Bebout.
"The Central Issues:
Constitutional Revision--What For?" Chapter 11 in Salient Issues of
Constitutional Revision edited by John P. Wheeler, pp.
165-172.
New York: National Municipal League, 1961.
,
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Accordingly, it is not appropriate to predetermine
decisions with respect to policies and services of
state and local governments by writing specific
prohibitions, mandates or prescriptions into the
state constitution.
Since the evolution of state
constitutions, with some notable and fairly recent
exceptions, has been largely a matter of putting
more and tighter curbs on the exercise of popular
and official discretion, this book in effect
suggests that the historic trend in state constitutional revision should be sharply reversed.

Is this a realistic position to take?
There is ample reason
for doubt:
the flood of specific and limiting amendments

which add continually to the complexity and bulk of many
state constitutions; the inertia and active resistance which
frequently defeat proposals to hold constitutional conventions
or to carry out extensive simplification by amendments; the
lack of both academic and public interest in state government
as compared with that displayed in national and even in local
government; and finally the continuing evidences of active
distrust of state government and disillusion with state
politics
This is a formidable array of discouraging signs but there
are others pointing in the opposite direction which give
cause for hope and a basis for action.
In spite of the relative neglect of state government and politics already noted,
an increasing number of authoritative voices have been raised,
especially since the end of World War II, in favor of
strengthening state governments. Some of these, for example
the admonitions of the national Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, known popularly as the Kestnbaum Commission
have been cited in earlier pages of this volume.
The views
expressed by the Kestnbaum Commission were in part anticipated
in earlier pronouncements by the Council of State Governments,
official organization of the states themselves.
They have
been increasingly echoed as the findings of the Kestnbaum Commission have been reviewed and publicized through such agencies
as the Committee on Government Operations of the House of
Representatives and the permanent Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.!
The objective of constitutional revision embraced here has
come to be identified with the movement for constitutional
simplification.
Simplification means shortening by elimination of excess or obsolete verbal baggage and clarifying,
and perhaps reorganizing, the document.
Far from important,
it means reducing the amount of detail in the constitution
so as to place greater responsibility for conduct of government on the legislature, the governor, the judiciary and
elected local officials.
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The most thorough exploration of the meaning of simplification was made by the recent Temporary Commission on the
Revision and Simplification of the Constitution of the State
Although that commission expired before it was
of New York.
complete
its study of simplification, many of its
able to
proposals and the studies back of them will continue to
provide useful guidelines for constitutional revisers in
New York and elsewhere.
The New York commission took the firm position that substantial constitutional simplification was both a desirable
and feasible objective, albeit a difficult one.
The nature
of the objective and the difficulty of achieving it were
stated at the beginning of its 1961 report:

Simplification of a complex constitution is not a
simple task. While a constitution should be an enduring statement protecting the fundamental rights of
the individual and facilitating responsible representative government, the New York constitution has gone
beyond this concept by including a mass of statutory
detail dealing with problems of a passing or changing nature.
Thus the simplification task of the
commission has been compounded. Not only must the
commission perceive and preserve the truly basic and
lasting principles embodied in the constitution but
it should lift out the shifting and ever-evolving
statutory details which impose upon the state a
constant necessity for piecemeal amendment that could
better be handled by legislative action.
After two years of work, this commission is more than
ever convinced that simplification is both worthwhile
and feasible.^
Back of these paragraphs were many studies, including a substantial pilot study in 1958 on The Problem of Simplification
of the Constitution prepared by an Inter-Law School Committee
headed by Professor Walter Gellhorn of Columbia University
and composed of leading members of the faculties of eight
law schools.^ In the concluding chapter of its report, the
Inter-Law School Committee confessed that when it "began its
work, its members were frankly skeptical that research could
demonstrate the unsoundness of any large number of constitutional provisions."
In the end, however, the committee had
become convinced that "a great service to the state of New
York can be done by coolly and rationally pruning the
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constitution." The major objective of simplification, in the
view of the committee, is to overcome such undesirable "consequences of excessively detailed constitutions" as "inflexibility"; "decreased responsibility"; "constitutional instability"; and "obsolescence, repetition and confusion."
These statements by themselves are little more than verbal
"straws in the wind" but the number and visibility of such
straws is increasing, not diminishing.
The exhortations of official bodies and the findings of
scholarship are, however, reinforced by certain trends in
the most recently written or substantially revised state
constitutions, especially those of Missouri, New Jersey,
Alaska and Hawaii. On the whole the three newest of these,
the constitutions of New Jersey, Alaska and Hawaii, reflect
more accurately the basic principles, including the brevity
and simplicity, of the national prototype, the constitution
of the United States, than do any other state constitutions.
They are among the shortest of the state constitutions and
they are for the most part confined to material generally
recognized as basic in character.
Few provisions seriously
limit state legislatures in the choice either of ends or of
legitimate means in the development of public policy. Finally,
all of them apply the separation of powers principle substantially as it is applied in the national constitution,
which, as experience indicates, is the only way it can be
expected to work satisfactorily.
In other words, unlike most
of the other state constitutions, these constitutions establish three truly coordinate departments a strong unified
executive, an independent unified judicial system and a
legislature with substantially the full range of legislative
powers left to the states by the United States Constitution.

—

The New Jersey constitution, it is true, always has been
short but the old document of 1844 provided for a weak and
ineffective executive and establish what was officially
described as "the most complicated scheme of courts existing
in any English-speaking state. "'^
The 1947 New Jersey constitution is a trifle longer than the old but contains a clearer
and simpler statement of basic principles and structure.
The
completely new constitutions of Alaska and Hawaii are more
in the classic mold of the United States Constitution than
those of any of the older states except possibly that of
New Jersey, and the constitution of the new common-wealth
of Puerto Rico presents much the same image.
The Constitution of Missouri is still, compared with these, a fairly long
document but it is shorter than its predecessor, a fact
attributable to planning to that end. Moreover, the Missouri
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constitution substantially strengthened the office of governor
and eliminated or relaxed some unfortunate constitutional
inhibitions on the legislative power, especially in the fiscal
area.

Less has been accomplished through specific or multiple
amendments in a number of other states since before World War
For example, Georgia, Tennessee, Rhode Island and, in
II.
spite of the continued piling of amendment upon amendment,
New York have all moved in a variety of ways to provide
greater freedom of action for both state and local governments.
Other states have moved in the same direction on
specific issues.

These illustrations of current trends do not prove it is
easy to shorten or simplify a prolix, complicated constitution, but the developments in Alaska, Hawaii and New Jersey
demonstrate "that it is still possible for a modern state
to write a short basic law in the classic tradition. "5
Such action is possible provided certain conditions exist,
including a definite purpose to draft this type of constitution.
As the Inter-Law School Committee reported to the New
York commission, "A strong sense of self-restraint was
operative within the New Jersey convention [194 7]
From
the first the delegates had been urged to avoid becoming
legislators. The governor in an opening address had, for
example, suggested that if they felt an uncontrollable
impulse to write statutes instead of a constitution, they
should submit a supplemental report in the nature of a
presentment, to be forwarded by the governor to the legislature for its consideration. "6
.

The goal which is suggested in this book for state constitution writers generally was stated by the makers of the Alaska
constitution.
They declared that it had been their purpose
to produce a constitution that "should be short and flexible,
to allow for the great changes that the future will bring
to Alaska," a constitution that "should provide for a government that is energetic in fostering the growth and development of the whole state and the welfare of all the people."
The convention asserted that "to accomplish these ends" it
had "prepared a simple plan of state government that is
characteristically American," It then explained:
"This
system in its essential features is very similar to that of
the national government in Washington.
This is because the
convention found that the state governments that worked best
were those that conformed most closely to the simple design
given to the government of the United States by the convention
""^
that met in Philadelphia in 1787.
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Admittedly it much harder for a state with a long constitution
to go back "to the simple design" of 1787 than for a new
state like Alaska or an old state with a short constitution
like New Jersey.
Other states have, however, demonstrated
that progress can be made in this direction and a greater
sense of urgency could speed this kind of progress. Whether or not this sense of urgency will develop in the next few
years depends in part on the resolution of an existing conflict of values attached by various parts of the American
public to the several levels of government, especially the
state and national levels.
In spite of continued lip service
to "states rights" and to the idea that as many of the
responsibilities of government as possible should be at state
and local levels there is ample evidence that in practice
most Americans have more interest in, and probably more
confidence in, the national government than in the states.
,

There is little hope that continued improvement of state
constitutions will occur unless it is possible to direct dramatically increased public attention to the states and to
the importance of their role in our system.
The recent spectacular growth in the number, magnitude and importance of
the activities of state-local government may contribute to
this.
Although the national government has continued to play
a major role in setting new goals in such fields as housing,
urban renewal and transportation, the state and local governments serve as principle instruments for translating these
goals into concrete operating policies and for carrying out
the resulting programs.
Since the American people have an
increasing, not a diminishing, stake in the quality and performance of their state and local governments, presumably
they may some day decide to give attention to these instrumentalities commensurate with that stake.
If the American people do give this kind of attention to the
structure and legal basis of state and local governments,
significant changes will almost certainly be made. As of now,
states are far from apt instruments for meeting the needs of
the continuously expanding, increasingly complex, predominantly urban society that America has become. As time goes
on the disparity between our state and local means as they
now exist and our national urban goals will become wider, not
narrower.

Corrective action, when it comes, will not necessarily be
along the lines suggested in this volume.
Conceivably the
American people may decide to act, largely through the
national government, in such fashion as to reduce state and
local governments more and more to the status of agencies
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through which national decisions and nationally directed proThus with relatively little change
grams are carried out.
in outward form, the powers of local initiative and decision
may be subordinated in practice and state and local administrative agencies be brought into an evertightening embrace
with great national departments or with area authorities
established under national law.
This will almost certainly happen unless the states display
an increasing capacity for active and responsive government.
More than half a century ago Elihu Root pointed out that
the "instinct for self-government among the people of the
United States is too strong" to be denied the governmental
action they feel they need.^ This brings us straight to
the one inescapable and ultimately decisive question about
the future of state governments and state constitutions.
That question is whether politics in most of the states can
be organized effectively and constructively around state
issues in such manner as to develop satisfactory solutions
to those issues through the constitutional instrumentalities
of state and local government.
The answer to this question will not be decisively in the
affirmative unless the people of the states are able to
restructure their governments to achieve and maintain reasonably representative legislatures, effective leadership in
the office of governor, local institutions which are able
with some degree of success to cope with the problems of
sprawling metropolis, and a liberation of their state and
local governments from the strictures of many traditional
constitutional provisions that have often made it seem much
more sensible to turn to Washington for action than to go
first to the Btate capitol, or to city hall, or to the county
courthouse.
It is not suggested that a modern constitution will necessarNew Jersey has one
ily result in dynamic state government.
of the best, least restrictive state constitutions, yet it

has one of the most outmoded and inadequate state tax systems
Unlike many states, New Jersey is not rein the country.
stricted by its constitution in any way which would interfere
with the modernization of its tax structure. The important
point for the future of the state, however, is that it is
free to deal with this problem as a political issue without
the constitutional complications that have not only delayed
tax reform in other states but have also delayed constituIn Illinois and a number of other
tional revision itself.
states, the fear of relaxation of existing constitutional
barriers against a graduated income tax has been a principal
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argvunent against opening the constitution to needed changes
in other directions.
Constitutional revision is not a
panacea but it may be a sign of political vigor in a state
and it may also be the necessary prelude to more effective

and responsible state and local government.
The fact that
the New Jersey constitutional revision of 1947 sparked and
facilitated statutory and administrative improvements in
many areas, including local government, civil rights and law
enforcement, confirms this view, despite the state's continued lag in financing public services.

Any nation as vast as the United States needs some system
not only for decentralizing administration but also for the
formulation of many aspects of public policy. There is
probably no ideal system and no ideal geographic breakdown
for the purposes of decentralization.
Certainly many of our
states are not now, if they ever were, ideal or natural units
for the exercise of political initiative and responsibility.
We have inherited the states, however, and it seems most unlikely, short of reconstruction following an unimaginable
national catastrophe, that we can replace them with fewer,
more viable, units.
In spite of their inadequacies, the
existing states have the advantage of being going concerns,
with a vast amount of valuable experience in government and
some important psychological capital in traditional loyalties.
This book takes the position that on balance the states are
assets that should be preserved and enhanced as valuable, if
not indispensable, instruments of self-government.
This book also raises the question of how long the nation can
can afford the luxury of state constitutions that seriously
inhibit, when they do not defeat, efforts to enlarge the role
of the states as active, creative elements in our system.
There can be no doubt that the overly detailed constitutions
of such energetic and dynamic states as New York and California have a depressant effect on their performance as natural
leaders in the sisterhood of states.
There are other states
whose constitutions make such performance virtually impossible.
Over-all, the trend toward or away from further centralization
in a federal system with as many units as our will be affected
more by pressures created by the inaction of the less energetic
members of the Union than by the actions of the most energetic
members.
This means that the whole nation has a vital interest
in the condition of the constitution of every state.
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CHAPTER XV
INTRODUCTION TO MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION
By John E. Bebout

Strictly speakina there can be no
Constitution" because there is no
when one essays the role of model
is immediately beset by a host of
end of the scale he is tempted to
that never existed and never will
for it.
One trouble with this is
probably need no constitution or,
tution.

such thing as a "Model State
model state. Consequently,
builder in this field, he
conflicting urges. At one
imagine the ideal state
and write a constitution
that the ideal state would
rather, no written consti-

Only a little short of this ideal state one is tempted to
imagine a state in which all citizens are active and responsible and in which the only need would be for an extremely
short document expressina the basic principles of republican
government and delineating the essential features of the
The very
legislative, executive and judicial departments.
mention of these three departments, however, calls to mind
that all that is really necessary to inaugurate republican
government is to establish a representative legislature which
may then exercise the constituent function with respect to
the other agencies needed to carry out public policy and to
administer justice and law.

The nev; Model State Constitution is, like its predecessors,
designed to be a practical help to persons interested in
improving the constitutions of actual states in the union.
Admitting the nonexistence of a "model" or even a "typical"
state, the architects of the sixth edition are not interested
in a blueprint for Utopia.
The Model is, therefore, quite
traditional; indeed, more traditional in its conformity to
basic American political ideas than either its predecessor
Models or most existing state constitutions.
In goinq back to earlier American constitutional traditions,
this Model looks more like the newest state constitutions
those of Alaska, Hawaii and New Jersey--than the middleaged, heavily inflated documents of most of the states.

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
John E. Bebout.
"Introduction."
Introduction in Model
State Constitution
New York:
2d rev. ed
pp. vii-x.
National Municipal League, 1968.
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The reason for this may be expressed in the words of A
Repovt to the People of Alaska from the Alaska Constitutional
Convention, which explained in the following paragraph why it
adopted "a simple plan of state government that is characteristically American":

This system in its essential features is very
similar to that of the national government in
Washington. This is because the convention
found that the state governments that worked
best were those that conformed most closely
to the simple design given to the government
of the United States by the convention that
met in Philadelphia in 1787.
The departure of many state constitutions from the simplicity
and clarity of the national prototype prepared by the convention of 1787 has been due, of course, to a number of causes,
perhaps the least of which have been unclear thinking and
bungling workmanship. For the most part, the overelaboration
of checks and balances, the built-in weaknesses in all branches
of government, and the proliferation of "thou shalt nots" on
the one hand and of essentially statutory declarations of
public policy in the guise of constitutional provisions on
the other stem from disillusionment with representative institutions and the desire either to prevent sin or to enforce the
good (as seen by those making the constitutions)

All previous Model State Constitutions have deplored the tendency of these hedges against human weakness to enfeeble state
and local institutions and to undermine civic responsibility.
It seems, however, to those who have prepared the present
Model that earlier Models have reflected too much of the same
tendency.
Consequently, while providing for a presumably
representative one-house legislature, earlier Models included
numerous compensatory devices such as the initiative and referendum, self -executing home rule, prescriptions for a legislative council and the like which are necessary only if the
legislature is not in fact representative and responsive.
Those Models have been curious combinations of the ideal
(not meaning Utooian) and provisions which clearly indicate
lack of confidence in the efficacy of the basic arrangements
Yet a review of the existing
for responsible government.
highly imperfect constitutions for our imperfect states indicates that many states do very well without some of the hedges
against sin or the admonitions for virtue contained in past
Models
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Moreover, times, customs and public morals do change and so
should constitutions, even model constitutions. Many of the
prolix provisions designed to confine or narrowly direct the
exercise of public authoritv--what Henry Jones Ford once
called "a strait- jacket and handcuffs on government" were
designed after the event to prevent evils far more characteristic of an earlier dav than of this generation. Yet provisions of a limiting nature, whether cast in the negative
terms of prohibitions or in the positive terms of statutory
prescriptions, are hard to change or eliminate no matter how
altered the circumstances. There is always someone who feels
advantaged by them, or at least someone who says, "It did
happen once, how do we know it won't happen again?" For this
reason it seems clear that a model state constitution should
push as strongly as possible for a hard-headed review of all
except the clearly basic provisions to determine whether or
not they meet present and future needs.
If a model state
constitution does not help those who consult it to distinguish
the ephemeral and transitory provisions inherited from a far
different past from those of enduring value, it is not performing its function.

—

It is not suggested that our states have begun to approach
the millenivim with respect to their readiness for responsible
government; but they certainly have outgrown the need for many
of the strictures that they imposed upon themselves in a less
sophisticated era of political development.

Speaking of the need for occasional constitutional revision,
Jefferson once observed that he knew "that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind.
As that becomes more developed, more enlightened ... institutions must advance also and keep pace with the times."
The limitations on state and local government action were devised for the most part during an age when less was demanded
of government than is the case today.
In a period of expanding governmental activity, special limitations on state and
local government may have a very different effect on the balance of power in the federal system than they had when they
were originally adopted. Even near the beginning of the
century Professor Ford saw in these limitations one of the
reasons for expanding federal power. Retention of these
limitations in the latter half of the century is even more
clearly conducive to this end, a fact which is entitled to
serious consideration by revisers of state constitutions.
In order to be of practical help to constitutional revisers
who feel the need for additional protections against unsatisfactory performance, supplemental or alternative provisions
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For
are suggested at various points.
executing provision for the making of
is included as an alternative for the
whose experience makes it seem unsafe
lature to make adequate provision for

example, a selfhome rule charters
benefit of states
to count on the legishome rule charters.

This Model, the work of many informed minds, presents a
plan of government that would be workable on the basis of
a modicum of political maturity and civic responsibility and
is therefore unencumbered by any limitations, checks or
"compensatory devices" not likely to be needed.
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MODERNIZING STATE GOVERNMENT
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Seldom have the states of the Union faced such urgent demands
for solution of difficult problems, or had such challenging
opportunities for constructive action. Yet their governments
This condition is not new;
for the most part are inadequate.
qualified observers have made the same assessment over and
Competent governments are a vital necessity
over again.
under present circumstances. Weaknesses and deficiencies
command attention and create compulsions for correction to a
degree not evident in decades past.

Profound social and economic changes post challenges to govLocal governments are conernment at all levels in America.
intensity.
The
critical
problems
of
cerned with community
in
domestic
leadership
active
national government assumes
Some state govaffairs, as well as in foreign relations.
well,
but
most do not.
ernments meet new needs relatively
lack of inforpart
to
due
in
All suffer from popular neglect
insistent
response
to
mation about their operations. Their
public demands is often negative. There are two primary
reasons for this hesitancy by the states, one substantive and
the other structural.
Substantively, trends toward grand-scale nationwide organizational networks in industry, communications, finance, commerce,
labor, and transportation together with great mobility of
population and associated social phenomena have impaired the
ability of states to cope with the consequences. Their resources and geographic jurisdictions are limited in dealing
with urgent problems emerging in congested and deteriorating
central cities, in impoverished and depopulated rural areas,
and in suburbs frustrated by failures to match rising expectations.
Archaic tax systems make it hard to finance state
operations.

—

—

Structurally, most state governments are poorly organized to
fulfill their growing responsibilities and to perform the

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
"Introduction and Summary
Committee for Economic Development.
Part of Chapof Recommendations," "Constitutional Revision."
ters 1 and 6 in Modernizing State Government pp. 9-22, 67-70.
New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1967.
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functions clearly within their province. These defects are
correctable, given the will, and changes are imperative if
the states are to be more than administrative instrumentalities
Governor Daniel J. Evans
of decision-makers at other levels.
of Washington stressed this point in his second inaugural address of January 19 67:
State governments are unquestionably on trial
today.
If we are not willing to pay the price,
if we cannot change where change is required,
then we have only one recourse
And that is to
prepare for an orderly transfer of our remaining
responsibilities to the federal government.
.

The states have a heavy responsibility for their fields of
action within the federal system.
Sweeping legislative
reapportionments still in process have deepened public
interest and fostered a climate conducive to change. Our
purposes in this statement are: (1) to describe reasonable
requirements for any state government seeking to utilize its
major opportunities and (2) to set forth measures for obtaining necessary reforms.

—

—

THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
The concept of federalism is deeply embedded in the theory and
practice of American government. Federalism encourages diversity in choice of priorities and institutional forms.
It
counters any tendency toward monolithic centralization of
power in the national government, since the states are political as well as legal entities and may be used to rally
public opinion against ill-considered national measures. And
it provides a training ground for recruitment and development
of public leadership.
The weaknesses of the federal system, as it actually operates,
are equally obvious.
States with small populations, or low densities,
densities, or chronic economic distress, or poor educational
patterns find it increasingly difficult to provide modern
public services. Moreover, as economic and social institutions expand in scale, ever-widening fields of human activity
lend themselves poorly to management or control by the several
states.
State boundaries, fixed by history, are not based on
current social and economic realities. The potential for
interstate cooperation exists, but has not been vigorously
exploited.
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Any fundamental change in the tripartite division of powers
and functions between national, state and local levels may
seem unimaginable. Yet, major changes in the basic character
Alterations
of the federal system have already taken place.
have been gradual, with consequences often unforeseen. The
federal system has proven remarkably flexible, permitting us
to overcome its deficiencies by adroit use of ingenious
devices.
Nevertheless its complexities have created serious
frustrations. Federalism cannot operate successfully without
competent and effective governmental institutions at all levels.
This elusive goal has not been attained and at times, particularly with respect to the states, it has seemed to move farther
beyond reach.
The states form the keystone in the arch of the federal system-the bridge between local governments concerned with community
problems and a central government dealing with nationwide
issues.
There is some validity in the facetious comment that
our three-level federalism leaves "the national government
with the money, local governments with the problems, and the
states with the legal powers." However, most states have
access to resources sufficient to satisfy the basic service
needs of their citizens.
The wealthier states can deal independently with many serious economic and social problems. But
few state governments have sought to collaborate with their
major cities or with other local units in meeting critical
local necessities. Many states have been more active in seeking new types and larger cimounts of federal aid than in modernizing either their own revenue systems or those of their
local units.

—

—

The values inherent in American federalism can and should be
preserved.
Effective and responsive state governments would
support local efforts to solve pressing community issues, and
could command a larger share of the Gross National Product
(GNP)
This outcome cannot be anticipated if the American
people continue to disregard the imperative need to reform the
legislative, executive, and judicial institutions of their
states
.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE STATES

Scholars have made much of the national government's expansion
through exercise of its delegated powers over interstate commerce, national defense, international affairs, taxation, and
appropriations for "the general welfare." But the national
government has redelegated some of its powers and functions
back to the states permitting or encouraging them to act
where federal authority is legally paramount, as in the
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i
maintenance of national guard units or the regulation of
insurance comoanies with interests crossing state lines.
The pressures of world politics are likely to command an
increasincj proportion of the energies within the national
government, making assumption of a larqer state role in
domestic management a logical possibility.
Many vital matters are within state jurisdiction.
States
have broad reaulatory powers over persons and property.
They charter coroorations control the terms of business
contracts, license trades and professions, grant land
titles, protect private and civil riahts, regulate utilities, and set the leaal framev;ork of family organization
through marriage, divorce, support, and adoption legislation.
Authority to limit the uses of land and other property in order to abate v/ater and air pollution or other
dangers to the public health resides in the states.
Building codes and zoning plans rest on state powers.
The
manner of use or failure to exercise these powers should
not obscure their existence.
,

In the daily exercise of their sweeping authority, state and
local governments manage the bulk of civil government operations in the United States.
Universal public education is
mandated, regulated, and largely financed by them.
Higher
education is also heavily state supported.
Highways are
constructed mostly by the states. Vast hospitals and institutional networks, includina those for mental health and
corrections, are under state management. The administration
of criminal justice deoends primarily on state courts and
in increasina measure on state police.
About half the
states manage public welfare programs directly, the other
half throuah their local units.
These and other functions
illustrate the imnortance of competent, imaginative, and

vigorous state administration.
A dramatic, nationwide instance of nealect in application of
state DOwers is the modernization of local government.
Under
American constitutional law the 50 states have absolute and
exclusive authority for the creation and dissolution of their
local governments.
While state constitutions often impose
limitations, there is a wide area within which state legislatures can move but have not to correct deficiencies that
plague the nation's 80,000 local units.

—

—

The cost of state operations, as such, is rising steeply.
Total direct expenditures in current dollars nearly tripled,
from $10.8 billion in 1952 to $31.3 billion in 1965, and per
caoita costs more than doubled in constant dollars.
Expansion
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Excluding defense,
continues, at 7 to 10 per cent annually.
the national government's purchases of goods and services as
a share of the Gross National Product fell from 3.8 per cent
in 1940 to 2.3 per cent in 1966,^ while the corresponding
state-local share of GNP rose from 8.0 per cent to 10.3 per
In 1966 the states and their local units employed
cent.
8.3 million persons, more than triple the 2.6 million civilAlthough local governments have
ians in federal service.
three times as many employees as the states, state employment exceeds federal when defense and related functions are
excluded
State aids to local units of government rose at about the
same rate as direct state expenditures, from $5.0 billion
During that period, fedin 1952 to $14.2 billion in 1965.
eral grants to the states more than quadrupled from $2 37
million to $1.16 billion. Direct state expenditures were
one-sixth of total governmental costs in 1965, the same as
in 19 32; but with defense-related items excluded the states'
share of the total has risen sharoly in recent years.
The conditional character of grants-in-aid has affected both
policy-making and administrative processes. The idea of
three levels or "layers" of government, each performing its
own distinctive functions independently of the others, beNational, state, and local levels are all
comes obsolete.
involved to some degree in education, health, welfare, transportation, hosDitals, maintenance of lav^7 and order, sanitation,
recreation, housing and slum clearance, and almost every other
governmental function. State and local politics even impinge
on locational and other aspects of defense, space, and postal
services. As perceptive observers have noted, the three-level
"layer cake" of former times has given way to the "marble cake"
of a newer federalism.

The leqal framework of federalism, as a system of "distributed
self-government," and the fine distinctions drawn in interpretation of the United States Constitution are matters of
profound concern to the American people. But pragmatic considerations often supersede legal and philosophical arguments.
In the longer run the role of the states in the federal system
will increasingly be determined by the capability with which
they function and the vigor with which they meet their obligations
.
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REASONS FOR INACTION BY THE STATES
The frequent failure of the states in coming to grips v;ith the
fundamental economic and social issues v;ithin their province,
and in coping with the chaotic fragmentation of local governments in most parts of the country, may be largely explained
by four major kinds of handicaps.

Boundaries set long ago
Geographic Handicaps
limit state size and jurisdiction, so that rational
solutions for some major problems are beyond the
reach of any one state.
.

Innumerable deficiences in
Outmoded Structures
the organization and management of state government
serve as self-imposed handicaps against effective
action.
.

Some states lack the
Inadequate Use of Resources
resources, and many the determination, to raise
sufficient revenues, leading to an increasing reliance on the national government for financial
support of state and local services.
.

Many states do not have the
Political Weaknesses
kind of political party organization necessary for
building leadership on fundamental issues and for
sponsoring highly qualified candidates for public
office.
in some states this extends to absence of
any meaningful two-party system.
.

Geographic Handicaps
The boundaries of many states coincide reasonably well with
the economic and social interests of the citizens, containing
resources and population adequate for economies of scale in
state services.
Even where population is small, geographic
isolation may justify separate statehood--as in Alaska and
Hawaii.
But some states are severely handicapped in solving
their most pressing problems because of av;kward boundary locations.
Metropolitan areas containing parts of two or more
states are illustrative, as are river basin problems whereever major rivers form state boundary lines.

Since no state, actinq alone, can be expected to solve multistate problems, there is an obvious need for active interstate
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cooperation.
Occasional and slov/ly increasing use has been
made of interstate comnacts, v/hich the United States Constitution has authorized since 1789.
Still, the potential
utility of this device is largely unrealized. Uniform state
laws have been drafted on a number of important subjects,
but comparatively few have been widely adopted.
A new form of interestate cooperation, exemplified by the
Appalachian Regional Commission, is now emerging under federal auspices.
It has federal and state co-chairmen, and is
largely financed by federal funds. A similar pattern is
being applied in New England, the Upper Great Lakes, the
Ozarks, and elsewhere.
This approach highlights the need
for interstate cooperation, seeking to overcome past failures to take advantage of opportunities for joint action by
the states on their own initiatives.

Outmoded Structures

Although there are partial exceptions, most state governments
are burdened by obsolete structural organizations that are
often fixed in their constitutions. This generalization extends to all three branches of state government.
Archaic Constitutions
In spite of the need for modern structural frameworks, only seven states have adopted new constitutions since 1945, including recently admitted Alaska and
Hawaii.
In some other states there are strong new indications
of public concern, but most have shown little popular interest
.

in the subject.

Unresponsive and Ineffective Legislatures
Past refusals by
legislatures to reapportion themselves in conformance with
clear state constitutional mandates have contributed to popular distrust of state government.
There is also a widely held
view that all governmental pov/ers should be limited and restricted.
Partly for these reasons, and partly through sheer
inertia, most state legislatures are hemmed in by severe constitutional barriers. For example, 29 legislatures still
meet in regular session only once in two years. Time limits
of 40 to 19 5 days are imposed in 33 states.
Many houses are
unwieldy in size; only 19 lower chambers have less than 100
members. Few have committee systems designed for modern needs.
Constitutional limitations in specific fields of legislative
action are common, notably in taxation and appropriations.
.
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Executive Weakness
Only half a dozen states give their
governors the means for exercising administrative authority
commensurate with their responsibility for faithful execution of the laws.
Independent departments, agencies, boards,
and commissions abound, inhibiting most governors.
Eleven
states deny their governors a second consecutive term and
13 others a third, reducing gubernatorial ability to provide political as well as administrative leadership.
Such
factors, together with low pay and inadequate staff assistance, discourage able persons from seeking the governorship.
.

Uncoordinated Court Systems
A few states have taken important steps to rationalize their court systems, but most have
done little.
Some or all state judges are elected in 41
states, most commonly by partisan ballot.
Often tenure is
too short and compensation inadequate.
.

Inadequate Use of Resources
Collectively, the states have been reluctant to use their
broad powers of taxation.
Local governments have gradually
claimed the lion's share of property taxes, and federal taxation of personal incomes has circumscribed state levies in
this field.
The states have fallen back on general or selective sales taxes for more than half their tax revenues.
Negative attitudes toward taxation in any and every guise have
been more strongly represented in state legislatures than in
Congress or local legislative bodies, particularly where
reapportionments were long delayed.
In January 19 67, there
were 17 states without a broad-based personal income tax,
13 without such a levy on corporate incomes, and eight without
a general sales tax.
Nevertheless, in recent years several states have added nev;
taxes and raised rates on older levies, under pressures for
better state services and increases in state aid. These
changes, coupled with revenue by-products of the rapid rise
in GNP, have left the majority of states in a strong financial
position. However, those with small populations and large
land areas are hard pressed despite heavy federal aids, and
those containing large metropolitan concentrations are in
above-average difficulty. Many others would have serious
financial troubles if more of the urgent demands being made
on them v/ere met.
State long-term debt outstanding on June 30, 1965, totaled
$26.2 billion, less than half of it on "full faith and credit."
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On that date, the 50 states had cash and security holdings
Meanwhile,
of $20.0 billion, exclusive of trust accounts.
in
grave
difficulty.
of
local
governments
were
many
their
The vacuum created by state inaction has drawn the national
government into law enforcement, highway safety, antipollution measures, conservation of natural resources, and many
other fields where state responsibility is supposed to be
primary.
It is possible for a state to be "financially
sound" and policy bankrupt.

Political Weaknesses
State politics are characterized by vigorous two-party
competition in many instances, permitting a healthy exploration of public issues.
Several states are under one-party
domination, hov/ever.
In 12 cases more than 80 per cent of
all members of the 1966 legislatures were members of the
Since 1900 all or all but one of
same political party.
the governors from 13 states have been of the same political party.

Students of politics in one-party states point out that
primary elections and runoffs give considerable opportunity
for choices between candidates and their political positions.
But it is also clear that popular participation in primary
and general elections is customarily far less than where
Control of governstrong two-party competition exists.
mental affairs by repressive "machine politics" like that
in many rural and urban communities--is often found in states
under one-party domination. We are, therefore, gratified to
note a recent trend toward the development of two-party
systems in New England, Southern, and border areas where
one-party government has been deeply rooted.

—

State and national politics are intertwined, to the degree
that national parties are described as "federations" of
state parties.
In 1966, 48 of the 100 members of the United
States Senate were former governors or state legislators,
or both.
In the United States House of Representatives
there were 160 former legislators and three ex-governors.
Often the main objective in holding state office is advancement to a national position. This helps to explain
why state election campaigns tend to focus on national
issues, particularly when they are held with national elections.
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There is some advantage in linking state and local elections
with national contests. All levels of government are increasingly involved in the administration of the same functions.
More voters customarily participate in state elections when they are held at the same time as national conDirect costs of elections and total campaign outlays
tests.
are likely to be lower. Joint elections may also help to
strengthen the two-party system, because weak state parties
can gain more support for state and local candidates when
tickets are headed by attractive persons running for national
office.

Despite these apparent advantages, concentration on national
campaigns distracts serious attention from issues and candidates at state and local levels.! The choice for governor,
for example, is frequently affected by opinions concerning a
potential for national leadership--in the Presidency, the
Vice Presidency, or the Senate--rather than upon executive
abilities for managing state affairs. Subordination of
state problems, policies, and leadership to broad national
trends may lead to defeat of outstanding state legislators,
solely on the basis of identification with the party losing
a national contest.
Such factors have led Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, and
Virginia to hold state elections in odd-numbered years, while
State
Louisiana uses an earlier month in Presidential years.
affairs are thought to command more intelligent attention than
would be possible with concurrent dates. Citizens of all
states should seriously weigh the advantages and disadvantages
of separate elections.
There is an intermediate alternative
already in use where state elections coincide with Congressional contests in non-presidential years.
If the states are to make independent policy decisions, their
political institutions should have a degree of separability
and a vitality of their own.
The machinery of party organizations and nominating procedures ought, therefore, to receive
careful attention. For example, consideration should be
given to Connecticut's "challenge primary," which is intended
to overcome the proven disadvantages of both the direct primary and the nominating convention.
It permits primary contests, but only when convention losers have significant support.
Every device designed to elicit greater popular interest
But vitality in state
and participation should be weighed.
fundamental
substantive
politics must depend most of all on
must
provide
matters, on which governors and legislatures
leadership.
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Each should
We favor vigorous and effective state governments.
be able to initiate solutions for major public problems, either
independently or in collaboration with other governments. Each
should also be capable of well-coordinated execution of policy
decisions.
The structural condition of most state governments
today, compounded by traditional inertia, blocks the path
toward achievement of these objectives.
This Statement on National Policy calls for sv^eeping renovation
to grant legislatures broad power in
of state constitutions
dealing with the issues of changing times, to strengthen executive caoability by providing modern tools of management, to
improve the administration of justice, and to establish appropriate relationships between state and local levels of government.
Structural and administrative readjustments will not,
in themselves, solve the substantive problems now facing the
50 states.
But they are an essential step if states are to
find sound solutions and put them into effect. We believe
most citizens desire to break away from traditional handicaps
and to adapt governmental institutions to meet new challenges.

—

Diversity among the states makes broad generalizations suspect;
each of the measures we propose applies more to some states
than to others.
We are convinced, however, that acceptance
of the basic patterns here recommended would give all states
a stronger capacity for cooperative undertakings with the
national government and with each other, for effective guidance of the affairs of local government, and for competent
management of state operations.
I.

State constitutional revision should have highest priority

in restructuring state governments to meet modern needs.
Stress should be placed on repealing limitations that prevent
constructive legislative and executive action, on clarifying
the roles and relationships of the three branches of government, on permitting thorough modernization of local government in both rural and urban areas, and on eliminating matters

more appropriate for legislative and executive action.
Ideally, a constitution is a statement of basic principles,
It
outlining powers, relationships, and responsibilities.
should not be encumbered with a vast bulk of ordinary statute
law as so many state constitutions now are.
Appropriate inclusions are a bill of rights, voting qualifications, provisions concerning political parties and elections, relationships between state and local governments, broad structural
patterns for each of the three branches of government, the
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scope of gubernatorial authority in legislation and administration, and the means of amendment. Most, if not all,
other matters are properly extraneous to this document.
In our judgment, no state legislature should have more
2.
than 100 members in total: smaller states would be better
In all states, sessions
served by still fewer members.
should be annual, without time limitations for adjournment.
Committees should be few in number, organized along broad
functional lines, and supplied with strong staff support.
Public hearings should be held on all major legislation.
Legislators should serve four-year terms and receive salaries commensurate with their responsibilities and equal
to at least half that of the governor.

These measures would aid state legislatures in overcoming
widespread distrust and suspicion, as reapportionments have
begun to do. Smaller size would elevate membership status,
increase visibility, and help in recruiting qualified canOnce legislatures are restructured, members should
didates.
receive no less than $15,000 annually in the smaller states,
Salaries in "full-time"
or half the pay of a Congressman.
legislatures of larger states should be substantially higher,
Even
ranging to at least $25,000 under current conditions.
for part-time legislators full-time availability is required,
Legislative discretion in
and this should be recognized.
many fields could be more readily broadened, once these
steps have been taken.
Governors should become chief executives in fact as well
Except for a jointly elected lieutenant-governor
as name.
the governor should be the state's only elective executive
He should have a four-year term, and freedom to ^
official.
seek re-election without restriction as to number of terms.
He should have authority and responsibility for the development of long-range plans, program supervision, budgetary
preparation and execution, and personnel management; staff
and other resources should be adequately suited to these
The governor should have appointive and removal
functions
The govpowers over all major executive department heads.
member
that
a
least
of
ernor's salary should be at
of
Congress (now $30,000 annually ) ; chief executives of larger
states should receive substantially more.
3.

.

To function as a chief executive, each governor must have
administrative authority commensurate with his responsibility
In addition to control over all
for execution of the laws.
executive departments and agencies--which should be few in
number and organized along broad functional lines--the governor needs authority and resources to develop and implement
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administrative reorganization plans, subject only to legislative rejection within a brief period of time.
His veto
power should extend to items in appropriation bills.
4.
State court systems should be modernized by adoption of
recommendations made repeatedly and consistently by study
commissions reflecting the views of the judiciary , bar associations, and qualified citizens
Specifically , all judicial
functions now performed by local courts should be brought
into a single statewide system.
Each legislature should
have authority to create new courts and abolish existing
ones as the need arises, and to provide for the unified administration of the entire system.
Judges should be appointed
Minimum levels of judicial compensation
for long terms.
should be sufficient to command respect.
.

Orderly and equitable administration of justice, both civil
and criminal, is a hallmark of a stable and respected government.
Responsibility for this function should not rest
upon minor civil divisions.
Until statewide unification
occurs, the erosion of public confidence in separate state
and local judicial systems resulting from delays and miscarriages of justice--is likely to continue.**

—

5.
Two-party competitions should be deliberately fostered in
Party organization and nominating procedures
every state.
should receive intensive scrutiny to assure their responsiveness and representative character, and to encourage active
citizen participation.

In addition to these measures, consideration should also be
given to setting state and local election dates in years v;hen
there are no federal or at least no Presidential contests.
However controversial any proposal concerning political
parties and elections may be, we believe that greater experimentation in these fields will help establish a more
important role for the states in the initiation and formulation of public policy.

—

—

Interstate cooperation in solving mutual problems should
through interstate compacts
Positive
encouragement should be given to counties and other local units
seeking collaboration with their counterparts both within the
state and beyond its boundaries
Wider adoption of uniform
state laws is needed.
Active experimentation with new formulas for federal-multistate cooperation should be encouraged.
All these measures can be taken without constitutional re6.

be exploited actively

.

.

vision.
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The Council of State Governments could play a more aggressive
role in stimulating and coordinating action in each of these
areas.
Unless the states and their subdivisions pursue cooperative endeavors more actively, it seems inevitable that the
national government will move to solve more and more of the
problems that transcend state boundaries. The extent and
rate of their progress will go far to decide the future of
state governments in the American system.

Stagnation and inertia have been characteristic of too many
American state governments. Obsolete legislative, administrative, and judicial mechanisms have produced v/eak response to
the needs of the people in these times of sweeping social and
economic change.
Each citizen has a stake in surmounting this
barrier to progress.
The business community has an emphatic
interest in clearing away basic faults that inhibit potential
growth and development of the national economy and its regional components.
This Committee finds the choice to be clear:
laggard state
governments must be renovated in far-reaching ways, or their
policy and functional roles will tend to wither away. We
believe the states should meet their responsibilities for the
urgent needs of a fast-changing social order, with the application of the time-honored doctrine of federalism. But without thoroughgoing revision of archaic constitutions and sweeping modernization of governmental institutions, burdens v/ill
be thrust upon national and local governments that neither is
well suited to bear.
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SECURING A CONSTRUCTIVE FUTURE FOR THE STATES
Prompt correction of the structural deficiencies of state
government, together with acceptance of responsibility for
modernization of local governments, would permit the states
to play a major future role.
Many of the necessary changes
will require amendment or comprehensive revision of state
constitutions.
Others can be made effective through statutes,
legislative resolutions, executive orders, or simple initiation of better management practices.

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
Of the 48 older states, only Georgia, Missouri, New Jersey,
Michigan, and Connecticut have adopted new constitutions since
Some
1945, and some of these made few substantive changes.
other states are showing a strong new interest in revising their
constitutions, however, with conventions currently being held in
Rhode Island and New York and others scheduled in Hawaii,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania.
(See Appendix Table
Most state constitutions are far too long.
In contrast with the United States Constitution, they are
6.)
cluttered with large sections of statutory as opposed to organic subject matter, resulting in numerous piecemeal amendIn November 1966, 381
ments to cope with changing conditions.
separate amendments were submitted to voters in 39 states, 162
The need for amendments would
of which dealt with local issues.
be greatly reduced if constitutions were written in clear, understandable language; kept brief and flexible; restricted to
fundamentals; and designed to serve future as well as present
needs.' The brevity of the federal Constitution, and its proper emphasis on basic principles follows this prescription;
apart from the Bill of Rights it has been amended only 15 times
in 180 years, with two of the amendments cancelling out.

—

—

Most states should hold constitutional
Gaining Public Support
conventions, at the earliest possible date, in order to draft
completely new documents. Yet, few states will authorize a
convention or ratify its proposals unless there is broad-based
citizen interest in reform.
This requires a massive educational
program.
Leadership talents from business, organized labor,
professional associations, service groups, and political parties,
for example, must be mobilized in a united effort to secure constitutional and legislative reforms.
.
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New Jersey's successful campaign to convince the public of the
need for a new constitution was led by a special "Constitution
Foundation," with support from the League of Women Voters, the
State Chamber of Commerce, the State Bar Association, and both
major political parties. The independent "Citizens for
Michigan" organization composed of representatives of a wide
variety of civic and business groups was instrumental in calling a constitutional convention, influencing the content of the
document, and gaining its ratification.
These results contrast
sharply with nearly universal rejection of proposed new constitutions in states which have failed to make intensive coordinated educational efforts.

—

—

Conventions should not be restricted to particular subjects,
since broad revisions are needed in nearly every state. Careful advance preparation is important to the success of a convention.
New York State's 1967 Convention has been exceptional
in its emphasis on assembling a qualified research staff to
assist it. Maryland has had several study groups, composed of
specially knowledgeable citizens, to develop background papers
on major issues prior to convening its convention in late 1967.
Undoubtedly, absence of preparation is partly responsible for
the recent Rhode Island convention lasting more than two years,
with resulting loss of interest among many delegates.
Those few states with short constitutions, flexible provisions,
and modern structures of government may make useful changes
through amendments proposed by the legislature, or through the
initiative (authorized in 14 states)
or through a constitutional commission.
Under the latter procedure, used by about
half the states a total of over 40 times since 1950, the commission is usually responsible to the legislature--which must
approve its proposals before submission to a popular vote.
,

Items for Inclusion
In revising state constitutions there are
certain crucial elements, identified in this statement, which
deserve careful attention.
.

Private and civil rights, beyond those protected
under the Constitution of the United States, need
to be defined in detail.
Clarification of property rights as against regulations concerned
with zoning, land use, pollution, and the conditions of human occupancy are at issue, for example.
The authority of the governor over all elements in
the executive branch should be made completely
clear.
Specifically, the governor needs authority
to initiate and effectuate administrative reorganizations, subject only to legislative veto within
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a specified period of time.
Succession to the
governorship in the event of death or inability
should also be fully covered.

The basic structure of the legislature and allowable ranges of membership ought to be made
clear.
Terms of office should be stated, and
responsibility for reapportionments fixed.
Restrictions on legislative powers in matters
of appropriations, taxation, borrowing and
grants of home rule to local units, for example, should be kept at a minimiam to allow
flexibility in meeting future problems

The judicial article should provide for a unified court system under central administrative
control, appointment of judges for long terms,
and suitable disciplinary arrangements.
The suffrage and legislative powers over nominations, elections, and political party organizations are fundamental items.
The organization and powers of local governments should receive careful attention, along
lines recommended in CED s policy statement on
Specifically,
Modernizing Local Government
establishment of a state boundary commission,
with continuing authority to design and redesign local jurisdictional lines, would be a
suitable inclusion.
'

.

The amending process-- through constitutional
conventions or commissions, legislative action,
or popular initiative and referendum must be
outlined.
Provision for preliminary studies
in advance of constitutional conventions would
be another appropriate item.

—

Hesitation may be anticipated in the abandonment of old and
tested documents in favor of new and untried instrioments however ideal.
The Declaration of Independence noted that "all
experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by
abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." After
making this observation the Founding Fathers proceeded nevertheless to create a radical, enduring, and classical national
Constitution.
,
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We urge every state without a short, flexible constitution to
hold a aonvention--after careful preparation-- to draft a new,
concisely written document which contains the basic structural
provisions here recommended.
Where only limited reforms are
needed they may be secured by using a constitutional commission to draft specific amendments
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NOTES

1.

Excluded from "goods and services" are transfer payments,
as from insurance trust funds and interest on the public
debt, estimated at $46.6 billion in fiscal 1968; this
sum would equal more than 5 per cent of GNP.

2.

For a more detailed sicsussion on the subject of federalstate-local finance see A Fiscal Program for a Balanced
Federalism a Statement on National Policy by the Research
and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, June 1967.
,

3.

See Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Taft, page 76.

4.

A classic local effort to make use of national issues was
seen in a Chicago campaign billboard of the 1920 's, "Elect
George F. Harding, County Treasurer--No League of Nations,
No World Court.

5.

See Memoranda by Mr. Joseph L. Block, and Mr. Marvin Bower,
pages 76 and

6.

See Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Taft, page 77.

7.

These principles are exemplified in the Model State Con stitution published by the National Municipal League
(New York, 1963, 6th ed.).

8.

For a more detailed discussion on how to gain public support for and hold a constitutional convention see "Staging
a State Constitutional Convention" by John E. Bebout and
Emil J. Sady in State Constitutional Revision W. Brooke
Public Administration Service, 1960),
Graves, ed. (Chicago:
67-85.
pp.
,

9.

See Modernizing Local Government
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CHAPTER XVII
DEAD HAND OF THE PAST
By James Nathan Miller*

Americans in as many as half the
states will have a chance to vote on one of the most impormodernization
tant government reforms facing the country:
of our ancient and ludicrous state constitutions.
In the next few years

,

It will be a crucial choice.
For if the voters refuse to
tamper with these "sacred documents "--as they have refused
to do over and over again in past years they will be missing one of their last good chances to pull our state and
local governments out of their present rapid decline into
senility and inef f ectuality

—

The basic fact to appreciate about state constitutions is
that they are designed not to help government officials
govern but to prevent them from picking the taxpayers'
To see why, let's look at the period when many
pockets.
of today's constitutions were drafted the era between the
Civil War and the end of the 19th century, the period of the
Robber Barons, the Boss Tweeds, "the shame of our cities."

—

"We meet," said the 1892 Populist party platform, "dn the
midst of a nation brought to the brink of moral and political ruin.
Corruption dominates the ballot box, the legislatures, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the
bench."

During these years more than half the states scrapped their
old constitutions and wrote their present ones, designed
specifically to force honesty on government. These are the
constitutions now long outdated that we have today.

—

—

As a result, distrust permeates the pages of today's state
charters.
For example, West Virginia's constitution,
drafted in 1872 after a series of railroad and coal company
scandals, bars railroad officials from legislative office
and spends 6,300 words more than are contained in the entire federal constitution merely on the section that lists

—

—

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
"Dead Hand of the Past." National
James Nathan Miller.
Civic Review 57 (1968): pp. 183-188. Copyright 1968 by
Reader's Digest Association, Inc.
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the things the legislature is forbidden to do.
Nebraska's
constitution, adopted in 1875, reauires that all executive
officers who come in contact with money be bonded for twice
the amount they handle.

Now look at these suspicious and distrustful documents
through the eyes of the people who have to make them work:
today's state legislators, governors and judges.
Faced
with an endless list of constitutional "thou shalt nots,"
there are three alternatives open to them as they try to
adapt government to the surging changes of the present era.
First, they can ignore the constitutions--and they do, to
a truly amazing extent.
The Oregon constitution, for instance, reflects its 19th-century distrust of judges by
providing that juries shall determine both the "facts and
the law" in a case.
Since this violates the basic division
of functions of Anglo-American jurisprudence--that the jury
must stick to the facts, letting the judge determine the
points of law--Oregon s courts simply ignore the provision.
'

In fact, there are few state constitutions that don't have
provisions that are openly ignored or violated almost daily:
in Iowa, the limitation of leases to 20 years; Kentucky's
prohibition against state highway construction; Mississippi's
requirement of a religious test for state officials, and so
on.

*********

What real harm is done by the violation of these minor and
foolish provisions? It creates a dangerous disrespect for
the important and sensible ones.
For instance, when the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1964 that state legislatures
must reapportion themselves on a "one man, one vote" basis,
it did so reluctantly, knowing that it was stepping into a
dangerous "political thicket" that it had long avoided.
But there seemed no choice.
At the time, 20 legislatures
were violating their own constitutions by refusing to reaoportion themselves.
The second alternative is to develop legal gimmicks to bypass a constitutional provision without actually violating
it.
For instance, about half the legislatures frequently
resort to the childish dodge of stopping the clock in order
to stay in session longer than the constitution permits.
In Minnesota and other states where the constitution requires bills to be read in full three times in each house
(to prevent the 19th-century practice of sneaking bills
through unnoticed), clerks simply mumble the bills' number
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To get around New Hampshire's absurd $200-aand title.
year salary maximum for legislators, which was written
into the constitution in 1899, the legislature first grants
itself an exorbitant mileage allowance for travel to the
capital--and then assumes that every lawmaker makes the trip
every day during the session. As a result, in the 1963
session, legislators earned an average of $15 a day, of
which only $2.50 was constitutionally authorized.
As with direct violations, these relatively minor dodges
One
blend off into major evasions that cause serious harm.
of the worst is the "single-purpose special district," a
grossly wasteful extra unit of government that is a way
Here is what
around outdated financial regulations.
happened.

During the serious financial depression of the 1870s, a large
So the 19thniimber of local governments went bankrupt.
century constitution-makers built into the documents strong
legislative control over local finances, and today the
statute books of most states are, by constitutional insistence, packed with incredibly detailed restrictions on local
borrowing and taxing.
What, then, do you do if you are a small village that needs
sewers but has already hit its sewer taxing or borrowing
ceiling? Let's say you apply to the state legislature, and
This is a
it sets up a sewer district in your village.
separate little government in itself, independent of the
village and complete with its own officers and elections-and, most important, its own taxing and borrowing authority.

What harm do these little half-governments do? They are a
spreading blight on the governmental landscape. One of the
most pressing needs of American government is a drastic
pruning of the incredible total of 81,000 local governments
that clutter the countryside, too small for efficiency,
bitterly competitive, and many of them so inconsequential
Yet, instead
that most voters don't even know they exist.
of reducing the number, constitutional requirements are
making governments multiply like rabbits. For instance, in
1952 there were 12,000 special districts water, sewer, liBy
brary, fire, mosquito control, street lighting, etc.
1962 there were 18,000, and they continue to multiply at the
They are, in the words of the
rate of about one a day.
Council of State Governments, "the new dark continent of
American politics."

—
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Thus, the first two methods of "getting along" with our
constitutions ignoring or evading them--have done serious
harm to state and local government. Unfortunately, the
final method, that of obeying the constitution, is probably the most harmful of all.
Here, for instance, are
some provisions that are widely obeyed and here are the
consequences of obedience.

—

—

Short Legislative Sessions
Because of the old distrust
of lawmakers, 26 constitutions set time limits on regular
legislative sessions (usually 60 to 90 days)
and 29 provide even these restricted sessions every other year.
This
may have been adequate for handling 19th-century problems.
When West Virginia enacted its constitution, for instance,
the state's total budget was $420,000.
But today it spends
nearly a billion dollars with its regular sessions still
held to 60 days every other year!
.

,

—

The result of such limitations is that, as the flood of new
problems sweeps over the states, their legislatures simply
don't have the time to give them adequate consideration.
Last June, for instance, when Connecticut adjourned its
every-other-year regular session, one legislator, recalling the hundreds of bills that had been rushed through in
the closing weeks, told a New York Times reporter, "It will
be weeks before we learn what we enacted."
Indeed, five
years ago, when Connecticut's lawmakers did learn what
they had enacted, the governor had to call a hurried special session to remedy it; they had forgotten to pass an
essential $6,400,000 education bill.

Long Ballots.
To run the entire national government we
elect only two national officials, but to run most states
we elect between six and a dozen on a statewide basis.
Oklahoma elects 17 from governor down to assistant mine
inspector.
On the local level things are even worse long,
constitutionally required ballots that include sheriffs,
surveyors, coroners, registers of wills, recorders of deeds,
road commissioners, judges, justices of the peace, etc.
This system virtually guarantees incompetence and disorganization at all levels.
First, it forces voters to fill offices they know little about with candidates they never heard
of.
Few Pennsylvanians, for instance, know what a prothonotary is, but in each county they must elect one every four
years.
New York's presiding judge of the court of appeals
(the state's equivalent of the chief justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court) is popularly elected, yet a poll of New York
City voters revealed that, just after electing a man to

—

—
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fill the post, only one per cent of the voters could name
whom they had chosen.

Making specialized government jobs elective fosters the
disease of incompetence. Tax assessors, for instance,
should be highly skilled professionals, but usually they
are popularly elected with no qualifications at all.
As a
result, the property tax in the U.S., on which local governments depend for 88 per cent of their tax collections,
is generally regarded as one of the world's worstadministered taxes.
Similarly, when the Pennsylvania
Bar Association polled 1,213 elected justices of the
peace in the state, it found that only seven were
lawyers, only a third had completed high school, 183 were
high school dropouts, and seven had not even completed
grade school.
Roughly comparable figures on qualifications
probably apply throughout the country to a broad range
of key jobs that the constitutions say must be filled
by elections road commissioners, county clerks, coroners,
sheriffs, etc.

—

Finally, the requirement for electing state cabinet-level
officers instead of allowing the governor to appoint them,
as we allow the President of the U.S. to do often paralyzes
the state executive.
In many states elected secretaries of
state, attorneys general, even treasurers and commissioners
of education, act not as executive aides to the governor,
but as his political enemies and would-be successors.

—

—

Laws Imbedded in the Constitution.
Because 19th-century
framers didn't trust legislators to pass certain key laws,
they began a pernicious practice that has since spread
through the constitutions like a poison: They wrote laws
directly into the constitution setting legislators' salaries, specifying how state documents shall be printed, restricting free railroad passes, etc. Over the years about
4,000 amendments have added to the detail, with the result
that today most state constitutions are not really constitutions at all, in the true sense of a body of broad legal
guidelines.
"They resemble statute books rather than expressions of fundamental law," says the Citizens Conference
on State Legislatures.

—

While our magnificent federal constitution is only about
5,000 words long, state constitutions average 26,000 words.
New York's charter all 45,000 words and 141 amendments of
it has been called "a haphazard mix of the Decalogue with
a municipal sanitary code."
It has one amendment correcting
the spelling of the city of Plattsburgh and two others
-309-
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permitting ski trails to be built through state forests.
Maryland's constitution authorizes Baltimore to build offstreet parking garages. Oklahoma's says that home economics
Louisiana's fantastic
must be taught in all public schools.
charter 236,000 words long and amended over 400 times since
1921 devotes 25 pages to the subject of highways, contains
a detailed road map of the state, and mandates a state holiday on Huey Long's birthday.

—

—

What real harm is done by putting a law in the constitution
instead of the statute books? Because constitutions are
far harder to change than statutes (in the states where it's
easiest, it requires a majority vote in each house of the
legislature followed by a statewide popular referendum)
the practice has gravely undermined the states' ability to
adapt to changina times.

Take the case of constitutional "earmarking" of tax funds,
a favorite lobby tactic for making special-interest legislaIt has been enthusiastically supported
tion hard to repeal.
This
by the auto, truck, gas and highway-building lobbies.
was done simply by getting written into the constitutions
of 28 states a statute that seemed to some a good idea when
first adopted earlier in this century as a boost to badly
needed all-weather roads:
the requirement that gasoline
As a
taxes be spent only for highway-building purposes.
result today, when suddenly we've awakened to the need for
more rapid-transit systems and commuter railroads to help
untangle traffic, most state governments can't touch their
huge gasoline-tax funds to help develop these other transportation facilities.
In fact, when Pennsylvania recently
wanted to use gasoline-tax money to build a new headquarters
for its highway department, the constitution forbade it:
Today, state
The funds were for highways, not buildings.
legislatures can decide how to spend only 59 per cent of
their tax receipts; the rest is specifically earmarked,
either by statute or by constitution.
The whole sorry constitutional story is well summed up by
former Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton when he
"Hardly a day passed,"
recalls his four years in office.
says Scranton, "when the constitution didn't prevent me
Indeed, it even
from doing something that needed doing."
prevented him from running for a second term, since the
framers had the theory that two consecutive terms could
make a governor a dictator.
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Thus, in an era of revolutionary social and economic change,
the overriding effect of our state constitutions is to prevent
governmental adaptation to it. Where flexibility of spending is
required as old needs dwindle and new ones appear, almost half
our state taxes are frozen in an ancient mold. Where the chief
need of local government is to reorganize itself into fewer
and more efficient units, the main thrust of the constitutions
Where we need
is to create more and less efficient units.
strong governors and creative legislatures with the ability,
authority and time to develop new solutions, the constitutions
are specifically designed to limit their prestige, their power
and their time in office.

The nationwide result, of course, is that the federal government,
flexible constitution enables it constantly to
adapt to change, is being pulled into the government-service
vacuum created iDy the states.
v/hose broad and

What should we do, then, with a body of law that causes basic
harm regardless of whether we violate, circumvent or obey it?
Junk it. But what hope is there of persuading the voters of
the urgency for writing new ones? In the last year or so
things have suddenly begun to look exceedingly bright for the
proponents of constitutional change.
For years, most voters have regarded constitutional reform as
what one expert calls "a big so-what?" Thus, while the National
Municipal League and the League of Women Voters have for years
been calling for reform, in most states the lack of popular
support has thrown the battle to the highly organized opponents of reform associations of local officials and specialinterest lobbyists.
Since 1900 only eight states have scrapped
their old constitutions, only three of them since World War II.

—

But today, as political leaders themselves suddenly awaken to
the rapid decline of state and local governments, and as the
reform movement gets powerful new allies like the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States and the Committee for Economic
Development, constitutional revision is suddenly beginning to
get strong political backing.
In the last year, ten governors
The
have called for new constitutions in their states.
Republican National Committee has created a task force to
push for new constitutions.
President Johnson specifically
called for state constitutional revision in his 1967 "State
of the Union" message.
In the last five years five states have
draw up entirely new constitutions.
In
are now trying to pick up the pieces of
revision that was defeated by political

-311-

held conventions to
New York reformers
a 19 67 attempt at
bungling.
This year

DEAD HAND OF THE PAST

alone, at least ten other states will be in some advanced
stage of major revision--f rom Rhode Island's and Maryland's
votes on the adoption of comoletely new charters to
Illinois' and New Mexico's scheduled ballots on holding
constitutional conventions. Extensive revision by the
adoption of significant amendments has taken place in
California and Pennsylvania. According to a National
Municipal League survey, more than a dozen other states
will be taking similar action in the next five years.
So in many states the decision will soon be up to the
The choice will be clear: support constitutional
voters.
revision at the polls, or let the states and localities
waste away, over\\7helmed by a federal structure whose constitution allows it to recognize the existence of the
20th century.

-312-

CHAPTER XVIII
WHY CHANGE OUR STATE CONSTITUTION?

Our state Constitution as adopted on October 1, 1889, consisted of twenty articles totaling 217 separate sections.
In
75 years we have added to, amended, and repealed various sections 82 times.
The United States Constitution is approaching 200 years of age and has been amended only 24 times.
Most States have found it necessary at some time in our history
to revise their constitutions to meet the rapidly changing
Because so much specific detail had been written into
times.
the constitutions, they could not meet the current needs of
citizens.
If we had been all-knowing when our state constitution was written, then we could very well have put in all the
detail and procedure which every person must follow.
But
men, then as now, do not have that all-knowing nature.
However, we do know from our history what specific human rights,
needs, and freedoms we want to secure for ourselves.
These
rights, needs, and freedoms are the ones which should be
placed in our Constitution, not every detail of government
or every procedure a public official must follow.
Our constitutional creators fell into error by doing this very thing.
They created a state and local government which could not, in
most instances, change to meet the needs of the times.
The
Constitution continues state and local governmental structures
and activities after the need for them has passed.
Archaic
procedures must be followed long after better ways of doing
business have developed. What good does it do to elect heads
of our state and local government and then not clothe them
with the power to effectively meet their responsibilities?
It is an axiom that if you delegate responsibility you must
also delegate power to meet that responsibility.
Our Constitution is not only unreasonably restrictive in regard to the
state executive branch, but also in county government, county
reorganization, public land control, the state and local
judicial branches, and municipal control.

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
North Dakota Constitutional Revision Committee.
"Why Change
Our State Constitution?" Part of the 196 5 Report of the
Constitutional Revision Committee to the North Dakota State
Legislature pp. 7-9
Bismark
North Dakota Legislative
Research Committee, 1965.
,

.
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As the basic policymaking branch, the Legislative Assembly
remains the basic instrument of responsible state and local
government.
The respective legislatures are, therefore, the
key to the vitality and strength of the states as vital political institutions in the American state-federal system.
It
is principally upon this branch that the self-imposed restrictions of state constitutions most effectively throttle vital
decisions affecting state and local government.

It is the philosophy of constitutional law that the Congress
is clothed only with such powers as are specifically delegated to it under the United States Constitution.
The governmental power exercised by the legislative assemblies of the
states is not circumscribed by such inherent limitations.
Legislatures were intended to have all governmental power not
delegated to the national government or specifically denied
the legislative assemblies by their own state constitutions.
In practice, however, the specific limitations and restrictions found in states constitutions are almost without
number.
In addition, most state constitutions contain specific delegations of power to the legislative assemblies, which,
in fact, become restrictions, for when a constitution states
that a given matter "may" be handled by the legislative
assembly in a certain way, it has been construed by the
courts to mean that it must be handled in that way.
We therefore have many specific and intentional restrictions and,
often, accidental restrictions upon legislative power.
Rather
than serving as authority for the Legislative Assembly to act
in the face of new problems, the Constitution has become a
device which too often prevents an effective legislative response to growing and expanding needs and demands of the citizens and local government.
The people of the states have
denied themselves their strongest instrument for effective
state government.
It has been denied to the only agency of
state government that could exercise this over-all residual
power ef fectively--the Legislative Assembly. A no-man's land
results in which the state and its political subdivisions may
not enter.
The states themselves have created a vacuum which
they refuse to permit themselves to fill.
The political or
governmental world is no more tolerant of a vacuum than is
the physical world, and this self denial on the part of the
states has become one of the clear causes of the increase in
the pov/er of the federal government.
Yet, while the states
loudly lament this increase in federal power, they fail to
put their own houses in order so as to make federal action
unnecessary.
'
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How did all this come about? By the end of the eighteenth
century and during the early part of the nineteenth century
popular confidence in state legislatures was shaken.
Land
scandals, improper issuance of special privilege corporate
and banking charters, reckless spending, borrowing and investment of public funds in internal improvements, and the
passage of notorious laws for the special interest of private
persons and particular localities are perhaps to blame. This
fear and distrust resulted in the detailed restrictions,
specific delegations, and a huge volume of statutory material
The philosophy of a
that is found in the constitutions.
strong governor did not exist among the states, a carry-over
of the distaste we still felt as a nation against the early
governors of the colonial days who were appointed by the
King of England and sent forth to govern us without our
consent.
The scandalous action of the carpetbaggar legislatures of the reconstruction days in the South contributed
to this loss of prestige of the legislative assemblies and
state government in general, from which it has never fully
recovered.

These restrictions and inhibitions reached their height in
1889 when four new states North Dakota, South Dakota,
Montana, and Washington were admitted to the Union.
Their
new constitutions were all similar in that they adopted the
most restrictive provisions of legislative power found n
the constitutions of older states and went far beyond many
of them in enacting extensive legislation and even administrative detail in the constitutions.
Consequently, these
states are locked in chain step to fears, details, and soluThe framers of
tions to problems as they existed in 1889.
these constitutions seemed to have thought that the governments of these states would be entrusted only to untrustworthy officials and scoundrels and that it was necessary to
set forth the details of state government and compel them to
forever follow the detailed course laid out by their opinions.
They failed to recognize that a constitution was to be a
statement of principles for the protection of the people from
their government, and not to protect people one from another,
which is the purpose of statutes. They also failed to recognize that the constitution should provide only the solid
framework to hang the provisions for state and local government upon, and not to completely create and forever govern
them in detail.

—

—

In practice, state constitutional conventions have not been
all wise and did not see into the future so completely that
their judgment was better than that of the citizens who came
after them.
These restrictions have not prevented state
legislatures from finding ways of occasionally repeating.
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shortcomings of the earlier day, and there is ample reason
to believe that the good they accomplished by these restrictions has been far outweighted by the harm that has been done.
Today, with a highly literate citizenry, rapid communication,
and an alert press using radio, television, and newspapers,
we need not rely only upon the Constitution to save us from
bad public officials. The new and unforeseen problems that
were naturally beyond the comprehension of the Constitution
makers have served to prevent good legislators and other
state and local officials from functioning effectively in
meeting the challenges of state government today.
Fortunately, we have seen some recent moves to reverse this
trend which existed for so many years in this country.
There
has been a move back in the direction of placing legislative
power and responsibility in the Legislatures and confining
constitutions to the job of establishing principles of government.
This pattern can be seen to a greater or lesser degree
in the new constitutions of Georgia, Missouri, New Jersey,
Michigan, Alaska, and Hawaii.
The need today is for a state government capable of exercising all powers reserved to it under the federal system,
able to act promptly and decisively in the face of new and
critical public problems.
The Legislative Assembly and state
and local government must be unshackled from unreasonable
constitutional restrictions to permit them to be capable of
meeting this need. State government cannot be expected to
fight the problems of this day with a Constitution tying one
arm behid its back. The placing of greater authority and
responsibility in state government will in itself create
greater public interest in it, resulting in a greater challenge
to a greater number of strong and able men to seek public
offices, and begin the process of revitalization of state and
local government.
Perhaps if we are willing to give ourselves
the capacity to govern, we might develop the will to govern.
Unless we have the desire and the will to do so, we are confessing the failure of our American dream of the American
state-federal system.
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CHAPTER XIX
INTRODUCTION TO HAWAII CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDIES
By Allan Saunders

The convention wisdom of the political scientist posits for
the proper state constitution four elements, namely: (1) a
framework of government; (2) a delegation to the government
of authority, with definition of its scope and limits; (3) a
declaration of individual rights, exemptions from governmental
action; and (4) a process of alteration of the constitution
itself.
Further, the document should be brief, lucid, and
deal only with basic matters, such as the source, extent,
and allocation of lawful authority.
Such is the profession, and the plea to constitution makers.
It is an attitude based upon contemplation of the federal constitution and unon the legalistic turn of mind that regards
a constitution as a charter of contract between principal
(The People) and agent (The Government)
written down to
exoress their agreement. As John Locke, so admired by the
Founding Father, premised, man--including political man was
capable and desirous of discovering through reasoning the
nature of things, and could therefore by majority vote determine the public welfare.
The charter constituted the reasonable, and therefore the proper course, pursuit of which would
Government
avoid the extremes of dictatorship and anarchy.
would be orderly, beneficent, just.
,

—

But this is a formal, static. Viewed dynamically, a constiIndeed, the more one contemtution takes on other hues.
plates the nature of the written state constitution, the more
Consider some of the
one admires man's inventive capacity.
it professes to
contradictions inherent in a constitution:
set forth the basic law of the land, and yet it provides
for its own alteration.
It seeks to describe the infraof
v;hile
every student of government
structure
governance,
must distort formal
relationships
knows that unofficial
oraani^ation in order to make it operational. A constitution both grants and withholds authority to act upon human
beings.
It should be lucid; yet every lawyer knows the

Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher from:
Allan Saunders.
"Introduction." From I ntroduction and
Article Summaries pp. 1-4. Hawaii Constitutional ConvenLegislative Bureau,
tion Studies^
Honolulu, Hawaii:
Universitv of Hawaii, 1968.
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It is to
snares of ambiguity resident in the written word.
future
contains
that
with
a
dealing
for
guidelines
provide
It professes to be a law superior
unpredictable novelty.
inevitably reflects the temporary
but
to passing politics,
It should be
pressures.
contending
among
of
power
balance
brief, perhaps in order to compel amplification by many
It is dedicated
statutes and much judicial interpretation.
by open partisans,
written
often
is
but
interest:
public
the
to

No wonder that commentators wax eloquent in their efforts to
It has been called The Ark of the
explain the constitution.
Covenant, The Bridge that spans Chaos with Order, The Anchor
that steadies the Ship of State, etc.

Perhaps the fundamental conflict in the American written constitution lies in its incorporation of logically opposing
attitudes toward public government. For the constitution is
intended to check-rein man's traditional enemy, government:
simultaneously, men turn to government for help, as to a
friend in need.
Yet these may be only formal contradictions, as may be seen
in governmental intervention to ensure health and safety,
It illustrates once
prerequisities of private enterprise.
again the old truism, that freedom and order, law and liberty,
are but two faces of social life.
But they point an important reminder for the member of a
His task is no easy one; nor is
constitutional convention.
On the
it one for jovian disregard of current controversy.
contrary, the convention is called to revise the constitution,
i.e., to discover and record a new symbiosis, a new association of political organs, public and private, that will be
viable for a measured time ahead. This, by the way, is the
role of a convention, what differentiates it from constitutional "amendment", which is a process of piecemeal repair
Amendment
of malfunctioning parts of the ship of state.
corrects past defect, constitutional revision provides a new
vehicle for advance toward attainment of the goals of organThis means, therefore, that the convention
ized society.
delegates must ask and answer the fundamental question:
What kind of society do we favor? And the answer must mesh
with the current popular interests, must probe the current
controversies in order to discard what is flimsy passing
fancy and to retain what is significant for future progress.
No easy task; but one relevant to the composition of a convention, for a convention is an assembly of citizens chosen
to speak for the community of people.
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Hawaii's constitution is not old, as state constitutions go.
But very much has happened since 1950; more pertinent happenstatehood, masTo mention a few:
ings than can be listed.
sive tourism, enormous federal aid to education, sizeable
immigration that alters substantially the age and "racial"
distribution of our population, development of light industries, new interisland political and economic relations.
Nor should one overlook larger changes that affect Hawaii's
stance in the world: e.g., the intensification of our Revolution into Equality, the shift of American concern to the
Orient, the rediscovery of the generational gap and tb'? reclamation of youth, the escalation of warfare. Developments
such as these demand of us a fresh consideration of the
route to travel and of the destination of Hawaii's people.
Of the route, as well as the destination, because the instrument of government must be workable in the new conditions,
What role should
if it is to be consistent with the goal.
be assigned the several branches of formal government:
Legislature, Executive, Judiciary, Electorate? What is
the impact upon state government of the new federal concern
with the city, with civil rights? Do we need to decentralize school administration, to strengthen county government?
These are but a few of the questions, answers to which should
at the least, not block improvement (however the convention
defines that term) of Hawaii's society.

They are important questions.
That they have risen to prominence in the few years that have passed since statehood was
achieved is sharp reminder of the pace of change; and presages
equally rapid change ahead. To meet future needs, therefore,
the convention delegates will scrutinize carefully the method
of amendment, and the conditions prerequisite to the assembling of another convention.
Since the 1950 constitution,
nearly 20 amendments have been proposed; but very few have
reached the ballot paper. Does this mean that the legislature has been too protective of the status quo, or that advocates of panaceas have sought to escape legislative control
by placing their project in the supreme law?

A constitution is both charter and manifests, both a frame of
government and a set of directives. Both the frame and the
directives will vary with current trust (or mistrust) of
today's government, legislative executive and judicial.
Through much of the 19th century, distrust of the legislature
grew, and reliance upon a knowledgeable executive replaced
the weak, diffused executive that was a relic of Revolutionary
resistance to irresponsible royal governors. By the time
Hawaii's constitution was drafted, conventional wisdom prescribed a strong and centralized executive. Few or no
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administrators were to be independently chosen; and administrative activity v/as to be concentrated hierarchally so that
Parallelthe governor's span of control could be inclusive.
ing this should be an executive budget and companion legisTo complete the busilative powers vested in the governor.
nesslike analogy was the merit system for recruitment and
maintenance of the civil service.
The Hawaii constitution is a model of this approach to governPolitics is appropriate for the legislature; technical
ment.
competence for the executive. For the constitutional conIf administration of the govvention the question remains:
ernment of Hawaii inherently involves choices aimong policies,
should not the structure of the executive branch more openly
reflect the people's choice, facilitate attainment of the
sort of society desired by the sovereign people?

Matter of structure, in other words, is inextricably inter- •
twined with matter of program. This is true of a state constitution as of a state government. A constitution is a
manifesto and a guaranty, in addition to being a structure
Indeed, one might view a constitution as a
and a grant.
segment of the stream of time: Just ahead are suggestions
and authorizations for innovative government action (perhaps,
the ombudsman, or minimum income for all, or mandatory public
behind, in the completed past, are
service from everyone)
firm and clear commands to do and commands to refrain (e.g.,
there shall be no restriction on speech, no suspension of
habeas corpus except in time of rebellion, judges shall
Thus, as a spectrum,
retire upon reachina the age of 70).
decisions that have
political
the constitution will contain
been established throuah experience; and also political directThe decisions are
ives set by the present body of citizens.
directives
are encouragethe
government;
restraints upon the
demand.
with
popular
current
ment to the government, to keep
taught
the
has
experience
because
The decisions are there
the
be
checked;
enemy
to
be
an
government
can
people that
democracy,
representative
in
a
because
included
directives are
government can be employed to further the good life that is
everybody's natural right.
;

The job before the delegates in the constitutional convention
is to join toaether old, tried-and-true prescriptions and new,
tentative instructions in such appealing symmetry that the
voters in the referendum approve the revised constitution.
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